ISBN 978-83-979051-3-9
9 788397 905139

CENTRE OF
SOCIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

CREATING NEW SOCIAL ORDERS IN CONDITIONS OF WARTIME

MONOGRAPH

EDITED BY

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and Oleh Demkiv



UDC 316(477)+ 355.014

Recommended by the Scientific Council of the Faculty of history of Ivan Franko Lviv National University.
Protocol No. 10/2024-25, May 28, 2025.

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Pachkovskyy Y., Chernysh N., Kovalisko N., Demkiv O., Lapan T., Khymovych O., Kalynyak O., Kozachenko O., Marusiak T., Savchynskyi R., Kudrynska H. Ukrainian Society: Creation of New Social Orders in the Conditions of Wartime. Monograph. Edited by Y. Pachkovskyy and O. Demkiv. Centre of Sociological Research, Poland, 2026.

ISBN 978-83-979051-3-9

The monograph offers a thorough analysis of the transformation of Ukrainian society amid the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. The authors investigate the emergence of new social orders and the multifaceted challenges confronting Ukrainian society during this turbulent period. Special attention is given to the role of social capital as a vital resource for resilience in wartime, the adaptive strategies and experiences of internally displaced persons, as well as shifts in mentalities and stereotypes among Ukrainians throughout the conflict.

In addition, the study examines the institutional repertoires of Ukrainian civil society organizations across both pre-war and post-war contexts, the adoption of innovative educational practices under wartime conditions, and the legal framework of martial law in relation to the legal consciousness of Ukrainian society.

Through a comprehensive approach, the analysis provides an in-depth understanding of the most pressing issues facing Ukrainian society during wartime, including the formation of new social structures, the challenges of social adaptation, and potential pathways to address these challenges through social dialogue and shared social responsibility.

Intended for specialists in sociology, social policy, public administration, and international relations, as well as scholars, educators, researchers, and all those interested in the societal transformations occurring in Ukraine during the war, this monograph contributes valuable insights into the ongoing social dynamics of the region.

UDC 316(477)+ 355.014
© Pachkovskyy Y., Chernysh N., Kovalisko N., Demkiv O., Lapan T., Khymovych O., Kalynyak O., Kozachenko O., Marusiak T., Savchynskyi R., Kudrynska H., 2026

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Bibliographic information

of The National Library of Poland

The National Library of Poland / Biblioteka Narodowa lists this publication in the Polish national bibliography; detailed bibliographic data are on the internet available at https://www.bn.org.pl.

ISBN: 978-83-979051-3-9

DOI: 10.14254/ 978-83-979051-3-9/2026

First edition, 2026

Publishing House: Centre of Sociological Research

http://www.csr-pub.eu

Szczecin, Poland 2026

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INTRODUCTION

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has ignited a conflagration that extends far beyond the battlefield. It has precipitated a profound societal upheaval, reshaping the nation's social fabric, institutions, and individual identities. This monograph delves into the intricate process of social order creation in Ukraine during wartime, examining the institutional factors that underpin these transformations. The war has not merely inflicted physical devastation but has also catalyzed a seismic shift in the nation's social landscape. The emergence of new social norms, values, and institutions is a testament to the extraordinary resilience and adaptability of the Ukrainian people. As the nation grapples with the dual challenges of survival and reconstruction, it is imperative to understand the complex interplay of forces driving these societal changes.

This monograph seeks to answer the central research question: How do the conditions of wartime influence the creation of new social orders in Ukrainian society, and what are the key institutional factors that shape these transformations? To address this question, we employ a multi-faceted approach that integrates theoretical frameworks, empirical data, and case studies. The war has unleashed a wave of civic activism, with Ukrainians rallying around their nation and providing invaluable support to the military and displaced populations. Yet, the conflict has also exacerbated existing social inequalities and eroded trust in traditional institutions. These contradictory trends highlight the multifaceted nature of social change in wartime.

Ukraine today represents a grassroots, network-centric society transitioning toward an open-access order, defined by irreversible threshold changes in social organization. This transition is driven not by economic or political imperatives alone but by a collective reimagining of what constitutes a «proper» social order-one rooted in democratic participation, civil society oversight, and institutional accountability. The war has accelerated the rise of horizontal, bottom-up initiatives, where perceptions of national unity and shared purpose fuel the creation of new organizations and institutions. These entities, from local self-governance bodies to volunteer networks, now embody the three pillars of legitimacy: legality, infrastructure, and public trust. Such developments challenge global stereotypes of stagnant traditional institutions, positioning Ukraine as a laboratory for innovative social restructuring amid existential threats.

Our analysis draws upon the seminal work of D.C. North and his followers on social orders, while critically adapting their frameworks to Ukraine's unique wartime context. Unlike classical models that prioritize economic or political hierarchies, Ukraine's social order is increasingly perception-driven, with grassroots organizations shaping formal institutions. This inversion of North's hierarchy-where societal aspirations precede institutionalization-reflects the adaptive ingenuity of a nation under siege. However, this transformation is not without tensions. Social differentiation, fueled by mass migration, economic disparities, and «war fatigue,» risks fracturing the hard-won unity that has sustained national resistance. The proliferation of infra-legal consciousness, where citizens demand accountability from the state while excusing their own noncompliance, further complicates efforts to establish cohesive legal norms.

The role of social capital has been paradoxical. Early in the invasion, it surged through volunteer networks, community defense efforts, and cross-sector collaboration. However, prolonged conflict risks depleting this capital, leading to polarization and civic disengagement. Civil society organizations (CSOs) have emerged as critical actors, outperforming state institutions in crisis response and service delivery. Yet, their autonomy often strains relations with governmental bodies, highlighting the need for sustainable cross-sector partnerships to consolidate wartime gains into post-war governance structures.

Forced migration has introduced additional complexities. With over 10 million displaced Ukrainians, the state faces unprecedented challenges in ensuring returnees' reintegration and addressing the needs of those abroad. Migrants' decisions to return hinge on balancing host-country integration with enduring ties to Ukraine-a dynamic that demands nuanced policy frameworks and international cooperation. Meanwhile, shifts in national identity reveal both unity and fragmentation. While the war has strengthened collective values like freedom and patriotism, latent paternalism and distrust of institutions persist, reflecting unresolved tensions between individual agency and state authority.

The legal consciousness of Ukrainian society under martial law presents another critical dimension. Public support for rights restrictions coexists with growing skepticism toward state mandates, particularly regarding mobilization and border controls. This ambivalence underscores the delicate balance between national security imperatives and the preservation of democratic norms. Without transparent regulations and robust civic engagement, such contradictions could undermine social cohesion and embolden adversarial narratives.

The monograph is structured to explore these themes through empirical and theoretical lenses. Chapter 1 analyzes the rise of new social orders via community initiatives and institutional adaptability. Chapter 2 interrogates social capital's dual role as a catalyst for resilience and a vulnerability under prolonged strain. Chapter 3 examines forced migrants' adaptive strategies and their implications for social cohesion. Chapter 4 traces evolving mentalities and stereotypes, while Chapter 5 evaluates CSOs' institutional repertoires in pre- and post-war contexts. Chapter 6 assesses martial law's impact on legal consciousness, and Chapter 7 investigates the transformation of educational practices amid disruption.

The authors' contribution to the study is as follows: N. Chernysh – Chapter 1 (creation of new social orders); Y. Pachkovskyy and O. Demkiv – Chapter 2 (social capital as a resilience resource); N. Kovalisko – Chapter 3 (experiences of forced migrants); T. Lapan and O. Khymovych – Chapter 4 (mentality and stereotypes); R. Savchynskyi and A. Kudrynska – Chapter 5 (institutional repertoires of NGOs); O. Demkiv and T. Marusiak – Chapter 6 (legal regime of martial law); O. Kalynyak and O. Kozachenko – Chapter 7 (new educational practices).

By synthesizing these threads, the monograph aims to illuminate the mechanisms through which war reconfigures societies-not merely through destruction but through the contested emergence of new orders. Ukraine's experience offers a stark yet instructive case study in how collective agency, institutional innovation, and unresolved tensions shape the trajectory of nations at war.

This monograph is the result of a collective effort by the Department of Sociology at Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, as part of a departmental research project on the topic: «Creating new social orders in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war». The work focuses on the war in the theoretical and applied field of modern sociology, exploring the mechanisms of self-organization of social initiatives in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The study examines volunteerism as a social phenomenon, the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons as components of the new migration movement, and the creation of new social orders in the system of relationships between individuals, volunteerism, local authorities, and the state.

NataliyaY. Chernysh - Dr. Habil. in Sociology, Professor at the Department of Sociology, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv. Email: nataliya.chernysh@lnu.edu.ua. ORCID: 0000-0003-1638-8639.

CREATING NEW SOCIAL ORDERS IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN CONTEXT OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

The chapter clarifies neo-institutionalism's cognitive potential for analysing a society at war, focusing on contemporary Ukraine. Its aim is to apply D.C. North's conceptual model of social orders (developed with J.J. Wallis and B.R. Weingast) to Ukraine's transformation under Russia's full-scale aggression. The research questions concern abandoning old social orders embedded in the concept of the "Russian world" and forming new ones. Secondary analysis of leading Ukrainian sociological centres' data suggests that today's Ukraine is a network-centric, grassroots, horizontal society that is gradually moving toward open-access orders. This transformation involves irreversible threshold changes in integration, solidarity, and cohesion. Another conclusion is that canonical sociological models must be used cautiously for non-Western societies: in wartime Ukraine, North's hierarchy, centred on economic and political institutions, does not work. Instead, ideas shape mass organisations and, from below, new social institutions.

Keywords: social orders, threshold changes, neo-institutionalism, network-centric grassroots horizontal society, "long-lasting war".

The problem of order has been a central issue and a fundamental concept of sociological theorising since the beginning of sociology in its positivist form. Maintaining social order was the main task of the authorities, and sociology itself was seen as a science that should contribute to the development of "positive politics". Its goal was to identify points of tension in society and thus help prevent possible conflicts as violations of the established order. For a long time, this was the vision of the purpose of sociological science in relation to social order in canonical (mostly Western-oriented) sociology.

Globalisation at the turn of the twenty-first century has weakened the familiar foundations of social order, increasing chaos and uncertainty amid growing risks and threats. As a result, the problem of order has again come to the centre of sociological reflection. Its relevance is sharpened by rapid, large-scale and permanent changes that radically transform existing social orders. In wartime, as the case of contemporary Ukraine shows, societies face particularly complex choices about how to organise themselves. In this context, two clusters of sociological knowledge – social order and war – intersect and demand special analytical attention. This is especially important for the young Ukrainian sociological science, which only since 1991, the year of the collapse of the USSR, has been freed from the "soviet legacy" of Marxism-Leninism [88]. It headed the structure of all fields of knowledge in the Soviet Union and acted as a general theory for almost all Soviet sciences, including sociology. The fall of the USSR led to the rejection of Marx's "materialist understanding of history" and the search for non-Marxist general sociological theories. Unfortunately,

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these searches continue in Ukraine to this day, so there are reasons to consider the structure of sociological knowledge in contemporary Ukrainian sociology incomplete, incomplete at the highest levels. It is dominated by primary sociological knowledge gained as a result of the active work of applied sociologists, as well as more or less developed middle-level theories.

The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war has radically changed the situation. On the one hand, it has led to the final choice of paths and directions for future development, as well as to the consolidation of Ukrainian citizens and the unification of their efforts in the fight against a common enemy. On the other hand, under the pressure of the war, the country has virtually completely abandoned the old social order that was characteristic of the Soviet era and which is embodied by the aggressor country. According to S. Hanafi and other leading sociologists, these outdated social orders are now embodied in Putin's domestic and imperial paradigm [1]. In order to successfully address these vital issues, Ukrainian sociologists are paying attention to the world's contemporary sociological achievements, especially in the field of metatheorising, and their connection to the topic of social orders. However, in 2023-2024, these searches in Ukraine were focused, firstly, mainly on the post-classical metaparadigm (which is understandable given the tradition rooted in the post-Soviet world), and secondly, they have not yet been brought to the level of understanding the new Ukrainian realities.

At the same time, the multiplicity of orders/disorders gave rise to a multiplicity of sociological versions of their interpretation in the world sociological thought. The specific position of a sociologist depended on the axial principle or angle of view chosen by him/her to analyse society (in Daniel Bell's terminology) [2]. Among the various axial principles of the possible study of society in sociology, we can distinguish the following: the axial principle of D. Bell himself - the development of technology; for A. de Tocqueville - justice; for P. Drucker - knowledge; for F. Fukuyama and P. Stompka - social capital and trust; for C. Handy - the nature of value systems; for some other researchers - the social orders themselves [87].

It is important to emphasize that the concept of "social order" is interdisciplinary and, therefore, has a comprehensive theoretical reflection and empirical research base, mainly in such sciences as sociology, social philosophy, political science, etc. The scope of this section does not allow for a thorough analysis of scientific works on social orders in general, as there are many such publications. We can only highlight the main lines of reasoning regarding them. Researchers identify different criteria for their proposed points of view or the core principles of their research. In particular, many works are carried out in the context of the dichotomy "order, stable state of society – chaos, disorder" (branching – social deviations); "macro-micro dichotomy"; "organized/coercive order – spontaneous order," "normative order – actual order," etc. Binary oppositions are also characteristic of debates about the basis of social order: economic structure or cultural factors [3].

Other authors of works on social order prefer to avoid dichotomies and binary oppositions and choose a single axial principle of analysis for studying social orders within the framework of sociological classics and post-classics or non-classics and post-non-classics. Despite the dominant body of work on social order in macro- or microsociology, scientific research is not uncommon in focusing on the global (mega-) or meso-levels of sociological analysis. P. Sztompka adds to "first (macro-) sociology" and "second (micro-) sociology" his own "third sociology" with its everyday practice of social orders in the lives of ordinary

people [4]. Numerous attempts have also been made to involve specific figures from the scientific world who wrote about social order and understood it differently in the analysis. Examples include slogans about social order in encyclopedias or anthologies on social order for students [5; 6] or ordinary articles based on such personalization [7]. Many works contain detailed descriptions and theorising about specific forms of social order. These specific forms can be conceptualised as systems, structures, norms, identities, institutions, networks, etc. There are many such ways of thinking about social orders.

Recently, there have been attempts to move away from a fragmented view of social order based on the criteria listed above and to propose a single, comprehensive arch theory of social order instead. I consider the 2024 publication by two researchers, Michael Grothe-Hammer and Eloise Berkowitz, the most notable [8]. It is no coincidence that it appeared in the journal Critical Sociology, as this work begins with a critical analysis of existing conceptualizations of social order. According to the authors, they all emphasize either binary definitions or one form of it (for example, institutions or networks). They all tend to overemphasize a particular understanding (or axial principle), and therefore remain dispersed and detached from context. The authors add to this the shortcoming of existing theories of social order, namely, excessive attention to static characteristics.

Nevertheless, the nature of social order, write Grote-Hammer and Berkowitz, is complex, relational, and processual, and therefore requires the creation of a comprehensive theoretical construct that addresses social order as a whole, in all its fullness, in broader dynamics and interrelationships. They propose understanding social order as having four properties: ontology, determination, changeability, and acceptance. "These four properties relate to the question of what order is (ontology), how it was created (determination), how it can potentially change in the process (changeability), and whether it is accepted or contested (acceptance). On this basis, we outline an analytical framework that allows researchers to study all social phenomena subtly, multidimensionally" [8].

I believe this analytical procedure can also be used in our study on creating new social orders in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Other developments by our foreign colleagues regarding modern Ukraine were also helpful to us. Although not all of them were concerned with creating new social orders, they highlighted fundamental aspects of the development of Ukrainian society, especially regarding the seeds of change in social orders. Therefore, it cannot be said that the dynamics of modern Ukrainian society's development did not attract foreign analysts' attention. On the contrary, recent foreign publications contain many important works that directly or indirectly help to understand the process of the emergence of new social orders in today's Ukraine. Some of their provisions can serve as evidence for my arguments. An example of such works is the publication and repeated reprinting of the book by the well-known British researcher A. Wilson under the eloquent title Ukrainians: The Story of a People Becoming a Nation. It has already been published five times (most recently in 2022) and will be republished in the future [9].

Other examples include numerous publications presenting the results of international research projects on contemporary realities in Ukraine. However, I would like to note that the focus of these research groups is mainly on socio-political issues, with the metamorphosis of Ukrainian identity being the central theme. Indeed, this is fundamentally important for understanding the changes taking place in contemporary Ukrainian society, but it is still somewhat distant from our chosen topic of creating new

social orders. I would like to highlight the work of Olga Onuch, Professor of Comparative and Ukrainian Politics at the University of Manchester. In 2023, she became the first person to be appointed full professor of Ukrainian politics at an English-speaking university. She has published extensively on the latest political processes in Ukraine, and some of her work is directly related to the formation of new social orders, which I will discuss in more detail later. In Ukraine, a book co-authored by Henry Hale focuses on the figure of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and discusses the new Ukraine, its people, and its nation [10]. Among O. Onuch's undoubtedly fruitful scientific achievements, I would also mention her research in collaboration with foreign and Ukrainian scholars, particularly V. Kulyk. In April 2020, an international team of scholars — Henry Hale (George Washington University, USA), Volodymyr Kulyk (Institute of Political and Ethno-National Studies, Ukraine), Olga Onuch (University of Manchester, United Kingdom), and Gwen Sasse (Center for East European and International Studies (ZOiS), Germany) — published the results of a nationwide representative telephone survey of the Ukrainian population conducted as part of the project "Identity and Borders in Flux (IBIF) on the Example of Ukraine." As the title suggests, the focus here is also mainly on Ukrainian identity [11].

As O. Zlobina, an analyst at the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IS NASU), rightly points out, in the vast majority of works on Ukrainian identity, researchers have overlooked the procedural nature of identity change, especially at the individual level and especially under the influence of war. For the most part, sociologists have focused primarily on collective identities and used quantitative empirical research methods. In her opinion, Ukrainian sociologists should include the construction of identity at the individual level in their research and use qualitative methods. As for the metamorphosis of Ukrainian identity, a significant shift from ethnic to inclusive civic Ukrainian identity centered on the Ukrainian state can now be observed. As a result of qualitative research on identity changes conducted under her chairmanship, she and her colleagues concluded that changes in national and civic identity at the personal level are possible in the direction of a shift from a formal to an informal sense of being a citizen of Ukraine [12].

Increased research attention to identity changes in the context of the war in Ukraine can be found in several recent scientific publications. At contemporary scientific conferences and symposiums on identities, the transformations in Ukraine in the context of the ongoing war often become, if not the main subject of discussion, then at least individual case studies. The latest work of well-known foreign and Ukrainian scholars evidences this. At the ASEN1 conference (2023), E. Wilson, whom I have already mentioned, gave a presentation entitled "Ukraine at War: Basic Identity and Social Construction." It presents the movement from an unconsolidated nation in 1991 to a nation capable of resisting Russian invasion due to cumulative identity changes following successive revolutions and two stages of war — in 2014 and 2022 [13]. The same applies to one of the latest publications by V. Kulyk, who works closely with his foreign colleagues [14]. The German conclusion of this and other studies is that there is currently a high level of support for a consolidated national identity in Ukraine, in which civic and ethnic elements are inseparable. This is important because the question of identity is central to defining belonging to the national-civic concept of the nation, which, in turn, underlies the formation of a new social order in contemporary Ukraine.

Therefore, the best findings on identity in Ukraine can be indirectly interpreted in terms of gradual

changes in the social order, since the Russian-Ukrainian conclusion, to begin with, and the groundwork for the emergence of a new version.

When analyzing scientific literature related to our topic, scientometric search engines provide good opportunities, as they build graphs of the frequency of language units selected by the researcher in a set of printed sources. For example, using Google Books Ngram Viewer, we can see that a language unit such as "social order" (social order) can determine the number of relevant publications for a given period. This search engine also shows two periods of increased publications on social order: before and during World War II, and in the present day [15]. Thus, it can be assumed that the growth of scientific interest in the issue of social order is determined by the exponential escalation of social events and wars in the world. That is why the phrase "Russian-Ukrainian war" was added to the search for linguistic units. However, combining these two concepts immediately narrowed the scope of the identified matches: as of September 2024, only five publications from 2022 to early 2024 were found where social order was mentioned in the context of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war [16; 93].

Among these five publications, three are from Korea, France, and the Czech Republic, and two are from Ukraine. The author of the first one is Benedict Edward DeDominicis, affiliated with the Catholic University in Korea. He devoted his article in the International Journal of Interdisciplinary Global Studies to present-day development trends from a macro-comparative perspective, using the example of Russia's irredentist policy towards present-day Ukraine and Bulgaria in the case of North Macedonia. In his opinion, this kind of policy leads to the destabilization of the European national-state liberal regime and, accordingly, to the violation of the established international order. However, this article does not analyze Russia's policy in Ukraine in terms of its influence on the preservation and imposition of the old social order of the "Russian world" or the formation of new social orders in Ukraine.

Another representative of a Catholic institution from Lille (France), J. Grzhybowski, also considers the supposed crisis of the "liberal international order" in the quarterly Global Studies [18]. However, he does so using the example of separatist attempts by pro-Russian agents in Ukraine and the rejected demands of the self-proclaimed Islamic State. His research leads him to conclude that the claims described in these extreme cases point not so much to the demise of the international order but its reincarnation and revival, albeit in a modified form. However, this article also focuses on the resilience of the international order rather than on the struggle between old and new social orders in Ukraine in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

An article by V. Klepárník from the Czech Republic takes us from the international order to reflections on the origins of the conflict in Donbas (from the perspective of history, the identity of the region's inhabitants, and the intervention of "third" actors). In this article [19], one can, of course, look for insights into the inclination of Donbas residents toward one social order or another—the order of the "Russian world" or the order of an independent Ukraine—but we will not find a complete picture of Ukraine here.

The next article was written by Ukrainian and Polish authors – Y. Pachkovskyy, K. Ilyk, and M. Błaszczyk. It focuses on one of a number of problems facing present-day Ukraine aimed at supporting a new social order. It arises in the context of energy restrictions following massive bombings of Ukrainian energy infrastructure by Russian aggressors. The authors emphasize that these tragic circumstances have created unique conditions for increasing resilience to maintain social order under energy restrictions [20].

Despite the importance of this article, it concerns only one episode of the confrontation with Russian

aggressors, the formation of social resilience among Ukrainians, and their successful adaptation to the war situation.

A collective article by Ukrainian authors M. Dykha, V. Lukyanova, V. Polozova, O. Pylypiak, M. Ivanov is devoted to a more complex problem – the destruction of the usual way of life and, at the same time, new opportunities for the formation of new orders of socio-economic development of the country during the war [21]. The dynamics of foreign investment, GDP growth, and defense sector financing before and after Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine are presented. It is important to emphasize the impact of these indicators on the current situation at the front. The problems that influence the formation of new social orders in the country are listed, as well as ways to overcome these challenges and transform them into additional opportunities. The value of this publication lies in the fact that it not only records the overall picture of the socio-economic situation, but also contains specific proposals for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine.

Thus, there are still very few scientific works analyzing the issue of social order in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian war, both in Ukraine and abroad. In the above-mentioned publications by foreign authors, social order is considered mainly in connection with the international order established since the end of World War II, and the Russian-Ukrainian war is a separate case of comparative analysis to illustrate the violation of this order. In contrast, Ukrainian academic publications focus mainly on internal aspects of forming new social orders in various spheres of public life (socio-economic or energy), while specialised studies of the new migration wave from Ukraine further elaborate war-related social transformations [92]. Thus, the clear lack of publications in the "social order + Russian-Ukrainian war" chain can serve as an argument in favor of publishing our collective monograph.

As for Ukrainian sociology, various attempts to understand the Russian-Ukrainian war and its impact on both Ukrainian society and the development of sociological thought in the country have prevailed recently [22]. However, most of the published reflections on this subject are based on a description of the results of applied sociological studies of the course of the war, which began literally on the third day after the Russian invasion (as did representatives of the sociological group "Rating," which, as of September 2024, had already conducted 27 nationwide surveys of respondents on war and peace) [23]. Unfortunately, there are still virtually no studies on the ongoing war in the context of its impact on social order.

Returning to the question of the presence (or rather absence) of conceptualizations of social order in contemporary Ukrainian sociology, the following should be noted. First, when writing this section, there are only a few studies on rejecting the old and forming new social orders in present-day Ukraine. Second, these studies are mostly scattered and mainly concern specific areas of social life. Third, they generally do not address issues of causality and cause-and-effect relationships. Fourth, academic reflections in this area have little to do with the ongoing war or issues of accepting new social orders or rejecting old ones. Fifth, since scientific research in this area is only just beginning, publications of this kind focus on presenting various foreign concepts and theories without analyzing the limits and possibilities of their application to contemporary Ukrainian realities.

As an example, I would highlight the most important work in Ukrainian sociology today, which is devoted to the analysis of social orders according to various axial principles in the post-classical group of teachings. The author of this work, M. Sobolevska, turns to the interpretation of social orders within the

framework of post-classical sociology, which I can explain by the long-standing attraction of Ukrainian sociologists to positivist conceptualizations. This is probably why M. Sobolevska uses two interpretations of social orders in the works of foreign sociologists [24].

Unfortunately, this valuable sociological work contains nothing about Ukraine. Therefore, let us consider two variants of interpretation of social orders in the post-classical group of theories according to M. Sobolevska to highlight the modern sociological understanding of this issue. First, it is neofunctionalism (as a revival). It is represented mainly in the works of J. Alexander, P. Colomi, N. Luhmann, and N. Smelser in the revival and interpretation of the paradigm of structural-functional analysis with the axial principle of functions of social orders. Secondly, it is poststructuralism (as a rethinking), which can be found in the works of M. Foucault, J. Deleuze, J. Derrida, and P. Bourdieu, with its aim to overcome the limitations of classical structuralism by recognising the multiplicity of social orders with the axial principle of their structural characteristics. The author sees that what these two groups of contemporary sociological theorising have in common is a return to social order in new socio-cultural conditions and the ideas of the desired orderliness of modern social life.

I consider neo-institutionalism with the axial principle of the role of social institutions to be the third option for understanding social orders. In this regard, neo-institutionalism can be seen as a revival of classical institutionalism in the context of interpreting the role of social institutions in maintaining existing or creating new social orders. It is well represented in the collective work of D. North, J. Wallis and B. Weingast translated into Ukrainian [25], although this third option. And again, even in this work translated for the Ukrainian reader, there is no mention of the possibility of applying the provisions set out to modern Ukrainian realities in condition of war. My appeal to the scientific work of the authors mentioned above is due to several reasons. First and foremost, there is the theoretical weakness of young Ukrainian sociology, which during the existence of the USSR developed in a minimal space and only under the condition of devotion to Marxism-Leninism. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a vacuum emerged in the structure of sociological knowledge in Ukraine, primarily at the level of general sociological knowledge, and those metatheories that could replace the Marxist sociological structure. Middle-level theories were better developed, and practical empirical research dominated. Consequently, for a long time, the Ukrainian academic community was insufficiently familiar with the types of metatheories existing in world sociology, including such a direction of sociological theorizing as the paradigm of social orders and the possibilities of its application in the analysis of contemporary Ukrainian realities of wartime. There was also insufficient attention to the procedural dynamic characteristics of social development in terms of their circulation, the issues of their changes, the reasons for forming new ones, the description of transitional periods, etc. In contrast, in the aforementioned work by North and his colleagues, we see a revelation of the essence of social orders from a neo-institutionalist perspective, identifying periods of formation and change of social orders with clear markers and indicators for their empirical study. However, we consider it necessary to carefully consider the leading theoretical positions of these researchers, who are undisputed experts in understanding humanity's historical and economic history with its reversal to social processes and phenomena, including social orders.

In this history, North and his colleagues distinguish between three types of societies (similar to Bell's distinction of pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial types):

- hunting and gathering (not analysed);

- of a society with a restricted access order;
- of the open-access society.

North and his co-authors use the following basic concepts of their analytical apparatus to understand the latter two types of societies.

1. Institutions that establish the "rules of the game" through laws and norms of behaviour to maintain social orders of limited or free access.
2. Organisations or "players" that act according to the rules established by institutions.
3. The idea of social order.

Institutions play the leading role, and perceptions close the hierarchy.

Accordingly, the authors distinguish two models of social order (and, accordingly, different states): the model of limited access and the model of free access.

The model of limited access in the natural state:

- slow economic growth and vulnerability to challenges;
- political systems without the consent of citizens;
- a relatively small number of organisations;
- a small and centralised state apparatus;
- the dominance of social ties is based on selective legislation, privileges and hierarchies, unprotected property rights, and the spread of the idea that not everyone is equal.

Free access model:

1) rapid economic and political development, reduction of negative economic growth;
2) a prosperous and active civil society;
3) a large and decentralised state apparatus;
4) the prevalence of impersonal social relations based on the rule of law, protection of property rights, justice and equality with equal treatment of everyone;

North and his followers emphasise that most modern states (80-85%) are natural states with the first limited access model and corresponding social orders. The rest are well-developed states with the second model of open access. Between these two models of access (and, accordingly, types of state) lies a transition that natural states are trying to overcome.

Where is Ukraine in this coordinate system? In my opinion, Ukraine is currently transitioning to an open-access model. This can be presented as compliance or non-compliance with the above five indicators, with the following details and additions. To form my evidence base, I have chosen a method such as secondary analysis of databases of leading sociological institutions and research centers in Ukraine: Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IS NASU), Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), Sociological Group Rating, and several others. This database includes the results of empirical research conducted by these institutions from February 2022 to June-September 2024. Speeches and interviews with well-known Ukrainian sociologists based on their vision of current events in Ukraine at the front and in the rear, as well as some statistical data, were also used.

1. In this discussion, I combine the first and second features of the North's open access model, namely political and economic development [89]; and the reduction of negative economic growth in the economy. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has undoubtedly reversed previous, gains albeit small, economic growth. Thus, according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the country's real gross

small, economic growth [90]. Thus, according to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, the country's real gross domestic product (GDP) in 2021 increased by 3.4% compared to 2020. But with 20% of Ukrainian land under the rule of the Russian occupiers, the country's GDP in the fourth quarter of 2022 fell by 31.4% compared to the same period of the previous year. According to the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, Ukraine's GDP decline for 2022 is 30.4% (+-2%), which is still better than the previous forecasts [26].

This large drop in GDP is due to the fact that the largest industrial enterprises were located in the east of the country, while agricultural production with irrigated land was located in the south. The situation was further complicated by Russia's actions aimed at blockading seaports and disrupting the grain deal to export Ukrainian grain to countries that needed it. In such a situation, the Ukrainian industrial sector was forced to either relocate within Ukraine or move its operations abroad, while the agricultural sector had to look for new trade routes to export its products. That is why Ukraine adopted the State Business Relocation Program, which is currently being implemented by the Ministry of Economy and regional military administrations within the country. As for external relocation, it is decentralized, although it is quite productive in creating Ukrainian businesses abroad. For example, 48,484 Ukrainian businesses were registered in Poland in 2022-2023 [27].

However, of course, all these measures failed to minimize the economic woes of the Ukrainian economy, despite the tremendous support it received from the allied countries. At the same time, despite all the difficulties of wartime, in September 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave a rather optimistic forecast of Ukraine's real GDP growth in 2024 by 3% with inflation of 9% [28]. This can be considered encouraging result in times of ongoing war.

At the same time, the economic well-being of Ukrainians during the war makes us discuss the Ukrainian paradox. Against a general deterioration in the economy, about half of Ukrainians surveyed in both 2022 and 2023 still assess the current economic situation as good (average score 4.6-4.4 out of 10). However, only a third of respondents thought so during peacetime, and 65.9% considered their living conditions generally good or satisfactory [29].

As Russian aggression has turned into a "long war," i.e., as of June 2024, Ukrainians' assessments of the country's economic development have become less optimistic. According to the annual monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IS NASU), 56.1% of respondents assessed the economic situation in the country as bad and very bad [30].

However, the overall social well-being of Ukrainians has remained reasonably stable in recent years. In 2024, the index of general social well-being (in the range of values from 20 to 60), fixed by the IS of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, was 39.2 and was even higher than in pre-war 2012 (37.4) [31].

Looking ahead, the citizens of Ukraine associate the successful post-war development of the country with the economy, the rule of law, and social unity [32]. Such perceptions of ordinary Ukrainian citizens give hope that economic problems can be overcome both during and after the war's victorious end, which is the key to rapid economic growth in the future.

As for the rapid political development as the second component of the first feature of the transition to the free access model is rapid, although it implicitly contains certain limitations caused by the ongoing war. In general, it can be said that Ukraine has undergone a real revolution over the past two years in the sense

of finally choosing the country's development vector, rejecting the old socio-political order, and forming a new elite. According to leading analysts of the Institute of Sociology of Ukraine, during the 16 months of the war, the effect of national and political solidarity in society (i.e. freedom of expression, presence of political leaders, as well as parties and movements) was recorded, although this effect, compared to 2022, weakened somewhat in 2023. At the same time, assessments of political parties and movements that can be entrusted with power are gradually declining and approaching the levels 2021 [33].

Recent empirical studies have helped to clarify the specifics of the general attitude of Ukrainian citizens toward the state. The model of limited access, typical for natural states, was based on the existence of a political system without the consent of citizens. There have been two notable changes in Ukraine as part of the transition to the free access model. On the one hand, the results of the Institute of Sociology's monitoring of the state during the ongoing war show unprecedented support for it in the respondents' estimates. In the June 2024 monitoring, the question was asked: "How important is the existence of an independent Ukrainian state for you?" As a result, this option was important for the vast majority of respondents (93.7%) (including 84.4% of respondents who considered it very important). Thus, at the personal level, the existence of a sovereign and independent state is extremely highly valued in Ukraine today and is not in doubt [34][1].

Nevertheless, on the other hand, the same citizens often have a critical attitude toward the state, especially the central authorities, which is also evident from the responses received. For example, in June 2024, only 7.3% of people surveyed believed these state bodies were coping with almost all their responsibilities and were effective, and 42.8% believed they were only partially doing so [35].

In other words, for the vast majority of Ukrainian citizens, the idea of an independent Ukrainian state is an absolute priority. At the same time, the state and its bodies need constant control by the population and civil society. It is necessary, among other things, to prevent the renunciation of Ukraine's statehood and a return to the old social order embodied by the state of the aggressor country. Criticism of the government also leads to a desire to help one's state where it is currently underperforming. This leads to a strong development of volunteerism and charity for ordinary citizens, which will be discussed in more detail later. This vision (control and assistance) is probably the prevailing one because it ultimately works for the independence of the Ukrainian state as a higher-order value. In August 2024, another KIIS survey dedicated to Independence Day illustrated this value, when 87% of respondents supported the idea of independence guaranteed by the state, while only 0.3% of respondents believed that Ukraine should unite with Russia. It should be added that in 2013, the number of such supporters of Russia and the "Russian world" with their social order was about 17% [36].

Ukraine has a multi-party system with appropriate representation of parties in the legislative and executive branches. At the same time, since the beginning of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the activities of several pro-Russian political parties have been banned. First of all, we are talking about the Opposition Platform "For Life" (OPFL), against which on Sep. 15, 2022, the Administrative Court of Cassation of the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the appeal and thus finally banned its destructive

[1] Since the results of the NASU IS monitoring had not yet been published at the time of writing this section, I refer to them based on a presentation of these data prepared by the deputy director of this institute, NASU corresponding member S. Dembitsky. Each of my references to these data is a screenshot of the corresponding slide of the presentation..

activities in our country [37]. This was done based on existing threats to national security, which were manifested in the demonstrative support and promotion of the aggressive anti-Ukrainian policy of the Russian Federation, both at the level of the leadership and its ordinary members. As it was proved, the OPFL relayed the official position of the aggressor country towards Ukraine and caused significant damage to the interests of our state. The involvement of leading OPFL officials in activities that posed real threats to Ukraine's national interests, security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity was established. Earlier, in May 2022, the Communist Party was banned.

However, real multi-party democracy is a fait accompli in Ukraine in the context of the ongoing war, as is the regular holding of elections to central and local government bodies. Currently, Russian sources are actively discussing the issue of President Zelensky's alleged illegitimacy due to the expiration of his term. However, in Ukraine, most respondents surveyed on this issue (according to KIIS, 81% of respondents) do not support holding elections during martial law [38].

Somewhat different results were reported by the Rating sociological group in its February 17-21, 2024 survey. They show that 49% do not support holding the next presidential election during the war, while 18% do not support it [39]. Still, two-thirds of respondents, which is the majority, oppose this idea. In both cases, the number of opponents of elections during wartime is much higher, and the authorities also rely on their sentiments. This correlates with the enshrining of this idea in the Constitution of Ukraine, which prohibits holding elections during martial law. It also shows that the state and its citizens primarily act together in matters of existential nature.

The speed and scale of changes in Ukraine's political space are impressive. While in the fall of 2021, a little more than half of respondents (56.8%) considered Ukraine's democratic development important to them, in the summer of 2024, the vast majority of respondents (86.8%) already held this opinion [40]

Before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, 63.9% of respondents rated the ability to freely express their opinions on political and other issues without fear for their freedom as important. As of the summer of 2024, the number of such responses was already 91.3% [41].

At all levels of government and the country's main legislative acts, the course towards membership in the European Community and NATO was enshrined. In this way, the rejection of the old political order, which Russia was trying to push/impose, was officially proclaimed. These official decisions had solid support from the bottom, from the majority of the country's population, and this support grew with each passing day of the war, regardless of the respondents' region/place of residence. For example, in December 2022, 79% of respondents would vote for joining the EU and 47% for NATO [11]. However, according to the latest sociological surveys, as of May 2023, their numbers were already 92% and 89%, respectively [42]. No significant regional or age differences were found. Thus, in this regard, sociologists also record a rapid increase in the proportion of supporters of the turn to new social orders in Ukraine, embodied in these two organizations.

The situation with the elites and attitudes toward them is also evidence of the rapid political ups and downs of Ukrainians' support for specific social orders of political significance. On the one hand, sociological research during the active phase of the Russian invasion showed that the environment of the "old" politics with its former leaders is experiencing a deep existential crisis and is losing the trust and support of the

population. On the other hand, a new elite is emerging in Ukraine, mainly from those tested by the war and topping the ratings of trust from ordinary citizens [43]. In the summer of 2024, the number of supporters joining these two alliances was also in the majority. However, the disappointment of some respondents can be explained by our allies' delays in making final decisions on Ukraine's accession to the EU or postponing the invitation to NATO. At the same time, no significant regional or age differences were found. Thus, in this regard, sociologists also record a rapid increase in the proportion of supporters of the turn to new social orders embodied in these two organizations in Ukraine.

According to the prevailing views of respondents, this elite should primarily include military personnel and volunteers. On the one hand, sociological studies of the period of the beginning of the active phase of the Russian invasion showed that the environment of the "old" politics with its former leaders is experiencing a deep existential crisis and is losing the trust and support of the population. On the other hand, a new elite is emerging in Ukraine, mainly from those who the war has tested and led to the ratings of trust among ordinary citizens [44]. According to the prevailing perceptions of respondents, this elite should primarily consist of military personnel and volunteers. This vision has not changed in the summer of 2024.

Another manifestation of rapid political change is the growing politicization of the population in terms of defining their political preferences. Sociologists cite the following example of this trend: while previously those who could not identify themselves with any political spectrum prevailed, the number of ideological (self-defined) respondents in the summer of 2023 was 57%, and among them the ratio of "left" to "right" was approximately one to three [45]. Furthermore, in the summer of 2024, these figures changed dramatically: 69% of ideologically oriented respondents were already recorded, and 43.8% called themselves supporters of the "right" [46]. Thus, the process of depersonalization in the politics of modern Ukraine is gaining momentum, although hopes for specific leaders remain strong.

Thus, concerning the first group of signs of orientation towards the transition to an open access society, it can be stated that despite negative economic growth, which can be considered a regular phenomenon in times of war, and certain political restrictions, we can observe the stability of economic and political guidelines for Ukraine's development. In general, their meaning is that a consensus has been formed in Ukrainian society on the desired new social order, and it has clarified what heritage (of the old social order) we are abandoning in the economic and political sense.

2. According to North, the second sign of approaching an open access society is a strong and prosperous civil society with many organizations. Recent sociological data suggests that Ukraine has formed a strong civil society that tends to determine the nature and direction of government and municipal activities. This was especially evident during the confrontation with Russia's full-scale aggression, when, in many cases, the people's will from the bottom significantly influenced the adoption of important state decisions. The specificity of Ukrainian civil society can be seen in the imbalance between it and the government in favor of civic priorities and initiatives. In this sense, Ukrainian civil society can be described as grassroots and horizontal, as well as network-centric, when power is transferred to the grassroots. The situation with the desired end to the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war can be considered an illustration of this statement. Despite the pressure from some of our Western partners, Ukraine's leadership has to take

into account the views of ordinary citizens and their civil society organizations on the end of this war. Furthermore, they include the desire to wage war until Ukraine is completely liberated and returns to its 1991 position. The absolute majority of respondents on the 16th month of the war (83.5% of respondents), according to one study [47], insist on fighting for the return to Ukraine's 1991 territorial borders, and 90% according to another [48]. The central government cannot ignore such public beliefs, not agreeing to calls for a truce on Russia's terms, or, in fact, surrender. The KIIS study on this issue shows that after May 2023, there has been a gradual increase in the share of those ready for territorial concessions, up to 32%. At the same time, the share of those who oppose territorial concessions decreased accordingly and as of May 2024 amounted to 55% [49]. According to the changing public opinion, the Ukrainian authorities demonstrate a confident readiness to negotiate with the aggressor, but subject to guarantees from the allies to preserve the country's independence and reject Russia's demands.

As for the level of prosperity of Ukrainian civil society in times of war, it cannot be considered high in principle, but rather the opposite. Nevertheless, even in such circumstances, the country's citizens greatly support their army and often give their very last dime. For example, Sergey Prytula's charity fund alone raised and donated UAH 4.2 billion to the army during the first year of the war. As of the summer of 2024, the total amount of donations collected during the war amounted to UAH 6.6 billion, or more than USD 165 million. From a small handful of like-minded people, this foundation has now grown into a branched, powerful organization with 200 volunteers working to help the frontline and civilians [50]. Analysts have generally identified new and diverse forms of activity of Ukrainian civil society for the benefit of the state and the army. These include a new culture of donations. There are three main components of this culture: public awareness of the need for donations, organization of collections (choice of audience, platform, method of collection, and reporting), and the process of donations [51]

Donations are voluntary financial contributions in favor of socially significant initiatives, particularly to help the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other victims of military aggression. The main organizers of such fundraising are volunteer fundraisers of the era (from the English words "fund" and "raise"; "fundraiser"), who not only coordinate the fundraising process but also actively motivate the public to participate in funding.

According to a study by Deloitte, 92% of Ukrainian citizens surveyed in 2023 said they donated to the Armed Forces or victims of hostilities. Among them, 33% do it systematically, emphasizing their activity and desire to support the army and civilians affected by the conflict. The study also found that among 71% of respondents who donate, the amount of money they contribute is moderate and amounts to up to UAH 200. This figure indicates that even small financial contributions can significantly impact the total amount of aid, as they contribute to a common cause. At the same time, 60% of respondents make donations to state fees, and the average amount of contributions in this case is 121 UAH. [52]. This emphasizes that Ukrainians consider it important to support charitable foundations and government initiatives to support the army and war victims.

Ukrainians are wealthy in their belief in their armed forces and in helping their army, although the level of financial support is decreasing with each passing month of the war due to the depletion of resources.

However, if we take the criterion of the level of civil society organization, then in this respect, Ukraine is also distinguished by the widespread use of organizations created based on civic initiatives, mainly from below. Here, we also observe a rejection of the old social order of creating such organizational forms of civil society controlled by the authorities, created by a decision from above, and, as a rule, passive.

As of Jan. 1, 2024, the State Statistics Service of Ukraine recorded more than 170 thousand public, charitable organizations and a new type of associations in the country. The most effective of these are charitable and volunteer organizations. Statisticians also note that high-speed growth rates of their members characterize these organizations. For example, from 2021 to 2023, charitable organizations increased by 43%. Moreover, these are the organizations that Ukrainians trust the most. Thus, in the fall of 2023, 88% of KIIS respondents trusted volunteers, and 61% trusted NGOs [53].

Another specific feature of contemporary Ukrainian civil society is the transfer of grassroots initiatives and organizational efforts to higher levels of social organization. In wartime Ukraine, sociologists have recorded a trend of the most effective civil society organizations growing into new social institutions. Two examples of this are:

- development of volunteer organizations of different levels and orientations into a fully-fledged institutional entity with all its attributes,

- and the formation of a qualitatively new institution of local self-government for Ukraine. In this direction, ordinary citizens' ideas about how their state should be organized and what new social order it should be based on are working. In this regard, Ukrainian civil society is beginning to dictate its aspirations to the authorities and pressure them in the broader public interest. Therefore, according to the second feature, Ukraine has formed a poor but active civil society with many organizations created from below (the so-called horizontal or grassroots Ukraine).

We can only add that this trend in the development of Ukrainian civil society is not accidental; it has been evident since the Euromaidan. In support of this, I will cite the assessment by O. Onuch, mentioned earlier, of the lessons of Euromaidan. One was the rapid development of civic and local organizations, which continued their work and are being institutionalized as an increasingly strong and coordinated civil society sector. Onuch lists the main areas of their activity: "They provide aid to the military, act as watchdogs of the government, and have set up professionalized networks and civil assemblies, all allowing "ordinary" Ukrainians to contribute to the reform process" [54].

3. Regarding the state apparatus, its size and reforms within it, according to D. North's third feature, the system of state authorities, as in most countries, consists of the following links: legislative (headed by the Verkhovna Rada), executive (headed by the Cabinet of Ministers) and judicial (Constitutional, Supreme Court and other courts of the country). In addition, local self-government is successfully operating in Ukraine. The war against Russia's aggressive invasion led to the creation of 15 regional and district military administrations based on civil regional and district administrations. A presidential decree was issued on the first day of the full-scale Russian invasion on Feb. 24, 2022 [55].

There is a complex and ambiguous system of interactions between all subjects of power, which is currently being debated in the Ukrainian academic community between two camps. Representatives of the first camp believe that in times of war, the state apparatus should significantly increase its powers to mobilize resources for the country's defense and repel the aggressor. Accordingly, such an entity as, for example, local self-government should cede some of its powers to implement consolidated decisions of the center. The other group consists of those analysts who see these measures as a threat to bottom-up initiatives and express warnings that this may result in a restriction of democracy, both representative and participatory (i.e., participatory democracy). In their view, relations between the subjects of power should be balanced even in wartime. It should be noted that the views of Ukrainian citizens in this regard are generally closer to

those of the second group. Historically, Ukrainians believe that any state specific to them should not be the sole owner of the country, but the executor of the people's will. Ukrainians will change the state if there is a gap between the authorities' actions and the people's will. This is the basis for the position of the Ukrainian leadership that no compromises with the occupiers and no territorial concessions are possible.

By the fall of 2024, however, the number of supporters of negotiations with the occupiers had increased, as noted earlier, to almost a third of respondents. At the same time, in the context of possible "concessions," Ukrainians are mostly against "peace on any terms". Although there is ambivalence in the views of Ukrainians (and this is quite normal for democratic societies), it is not as striking as it is being presented, and the results of the KIIS survey show that Ukrainians are flexible within the framework of a possible dialogue. The priority requirement is security and truly convincing guarantees [56]. Furthermore, the Ukrainian state and authorities must consider this in their international policy.

This kind of public perception of the state and the government, and the growth of critical attitudes towards them, are eloquently demonstrated by the comparative results of sociological surveys conducted in 2022-2024. While in 2022, almost half of the respondents (47%) gave an upbeat assessment of the state's work, in June 2023, the number of positive assessments was half as high. According to the Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, E. Holovakha, Ukrainians become more critical of the state when they notice discrepancies between the government's actions and people's expectations and perceptions. The state has survived, and Ukrainians highly appreciated it, but the facts of corruption and abuse by some government officials can quickly turn people's sympathies into growing demands for the state [57]. Furthermore, this is confirmed by the results of the summer (June 2024) public opinion monitoring of the population, conducted by the Institute of sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. In 2021, negativism prevailed in attitudes toward the government (8.2% of moderately optimistic assessments of its activities). The situation has changed significantly after a two-year period of growth and change for the better (2022-2023). Thus, in June 2024, experts of the Institute of Sociology counted only a little more than 7% of moderately optimistic and strongly positive government assessments, which means there was a return to 2021 [58]. Here, we see another Ukrainian paradox: despite the extremely high value of the Ukrainian independent sovereign state, many people are dissatisfied with the authorities' actions.

Due to the implementation of a complex and growing range of new powers of the authorities in the context of the war in Ukraine, the state apparatus is growing, and at the same time, its reform, which began in 2014, continues. This decentralization reform was implemented based on the relevant concept adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on Apr. 1, 2014, where communities are defined as basic-level administrative-territorial units. Thus, the reform envisages not only the transfer of powers and resources from state authorities to local self-government bodies, but also the creation of a basic local self-government entity - a capable territorial community. From 2015 to 2020, as part of the decentralization reform, amalgamated territorial communities (hereinafter referred to as ATCs) were formed in Ukraine through the voluntary amalgamation of neighboring territorial communities of villages, towns, and cities. The amalgamated communities received significantly greater powers and financial resources, which previously only cities of regional significance had. Since 2020, there have been 1469 amalgamated territorial communities (ATCs) in Ukraine. Decentralization is recognized as one of the most successful reforms in Ukraine in recent times and is the most supported by the population. Even Ukraine's international partners see this - the European Parliament calls decentralization one of the most effective and successful reforms implemented in Ukraine, which has become a crucial factor in the social and economic development of

contemporary Ukrainian society [59]. According to the results of a nationwide survey conducted by the Rating sociological group, the "resilience formula" of the Ukrainian people, which helps them to survive in the most difficult times of their existence, includes their participation in the life of local communities. The experience of the war shows that the most effective areas of work of local authorities are assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons (43%), solving economic and communal problems (29%), assistance to the army (29%), and rebuilding damaged infrastructure (21%) [60]. However, the most important fact is that even in times of war, civic and political activity moves from the center to the regions [61]. It is precisely these high assessments of civic engagement and initiatives that can be seen as a reflection of citizens' strong beliefs in the main features of the new social order

Notably, such beliefs tend to be enshrined in reformed Ukrainian legislation. For 2024, Ukraine has several lists of priority legislative changes. The Group of Seven (G7) countries recommend reforming the justice system and fighting corruption through further decentralization and introducing good governance. There are also already balanced assessments of this kind of legislative activity in Ukraine. At the end of 2023, the Reform Index project by Vox Ukraine recorded 51 important developments in the legislative process. Independent experts (each in their field) analyzed the documents in six components and noted the most important changes to the legislation in the fourth quarter of 2023. Most changes occurred in human capital, public administration, and the business environment [62].

Therefore, the third feature of the transition to free access societies, described in D. North's Concept, can be considered the leading and most developed in modern Ukrainian society.

4. The fourth feature and requirement of a successful transition to an open access society is briefly described by D. North as equal treatment of all. This refers to the prevalence of impersonal social relations based on the rule of law, protection of property rights, justice, and equality, with a tendency to abandon the leading role of famous personalities, as well as the nomination of new leaders (partially discussed in the previous part of this chapter). Ukraine has a large and extensive legislation system that analysts consider quite complete and generally requires only specific changes. The conclusion of the European Commission (June 2022), which considers that Ukraine is officially becoming a candidate for EU membership, where the rights and obligations of its members, including the rule of law, are known to be legally formalized, can be considered competent. At the same time, the EU provided a list of seven conditions that Kyiv must fulfill to confirm its new status. Since then, leading Ukrainian experts have carried out three checks on the state of implementation of these proposals and believe that it can be assessed at 5.8 points out of 10. Among these conditions, virtually none would require Ukraine to achieve full equality of citizens and equal treatment of all, except for the recommendation to complete the reform of the legal framework on national minorities, which is being prepared with the participation of the Venice Commission [63]. This can be considered indirect evidence of the absence of problems with "equal treatment of all" in the sense of having an adequate legal framework. However, there is still a certain distance between fair laws and the real situation in everyday life.

Therefore, to analyze the problem of justice in Ukrainian society in the eyes of ordinary citizens, let us turn to the results of the annual sociological monitoring of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, published in the summer of 2023. This model unexpectedly turned out to be meritocracy (63.6% of responses), meaning that citizens take positions corresponding to their achievements and abilities, not their connections and background. Moreover, one-third of all respondents believe this model is being implemented in Ukraine. According to respondents in 2023, Ukraine has become fairer, which the Institute's sociologists interpret as the effect of solidarity during the war [64].

It should be added that in the recent past, Ukraine was dominated by personal social ties built on a personal basis, including, as D. North writes, privileges and social hierarchies, the formation of social organizations not based on ideology, but on the position of their leader. Although this can still be observed today, it is becoming less and less common. In general, 57.1% of respondents in political life already hold ideological rather than personalistic positions, among which the «right-wing» orientations are in the lead [65]. Other Ukrainian sociological agencies also provide similar results in terms of equality, freedom, and justice. For example, this is a study by the Rating sociological group dedicated to the anniversary of Ukraine's independence (August 2023). When respondents were asked about their perceptions of the future, they called Ukraine a country with a high level of democracy (64% of responses) and freedom (75%) [66].

On this basis, it can be assumed with a certain degree of confidence that modern Ukrainian society, in the perception of its citizens, is moving forward towards building new social orders focused on ensuring equal rights and freedoms of its citizens both on the part of the state and its legislation and in the personal dispositions of its representatives.

The following should be added to the features of a successful transition listed by D. North: the specific ability to adapt to changes quickly, and a high level of social well-being. This interpretation of this feature is made with an allowance for the unique situation in Ukraine during the ongoing war against Russian aggression. It demonstrates the quality of Ukrainians' adaptation to the changes caused by the war, which is reflected in their accelerated adaptation. The following data evidence this. In June 2023, most respondents (82%) considered Ukraine a successful state. In general, respondents assess the effectiveness of the central government (68% consider it effective) and local authorities (56% consider it effective) relatively well [67]. Ukrainians demonstrate a friendly attitude towards almost all social groups (except Russians), including internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and residents of the occupied territories [68]. The latter results are significant, as this study surveyed not only people living in the territories controlled by Ukraine, but also those who were forced to leave it for various reasons, i.e., to become migrants. No particular differences in the attitudes of all respondents to patriotism and the country's future were recorded, except for small aspects that do not change the overall picture.

Both professional sociologists and professional psychologists confirm Ukrainians' high adaptability level. According to the head of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, E. Holovakha, a good psychologist by training, Ukrainians demonstrated amazing examples of adaptability in the early 1990s and later manifested during the war [69]. I think the adaptation of Ukrainians was historically conditioned by their constant membership in various state formations, including empires and the loss of their statehood. Now, the war has led to the fact that Ukrainians have become accustomed to it and are ready to endure as long as necessary until victory.

Markers such as the level of social well-being also indicate the organic and natural nature of Ukrainians' rapid adaptation to change. In general, according to the results of research conducted by the Rating Group, 67% of respondents believe that things in Ukraine are moving in the right direction [70]. The main feeling of Ukrainians in the second year of the war was pride for their country, which accounted for 74% of such responses. About half of Ukrainians are engaged in volunteer activities permanently or temporarily. The victories of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (65%), reconstruction (49%), and helping each other (40%) can unite Ukrainians the most [71]. These answers, which compare favorably with the sociological data of the pre-war years, demonstrate the social optimism of the majority of Ukrainian citizens, their belief in victory,

and future revival. However, perhaps the most powerful argument in support of these generalizations is the level of happiness of Ukrainians, which has grown even during the war. In the UN's World Happiness Report 2023, Ukraine ranked 92nd out of 137 countries assessed.

Furthermore, in 2020, it was only 123rd [72]. Furthermore, this is also another Ukrainian paradox. After all, not only are economically or politically developed countries happy. In addition, the criteria on which this ranking is based are respectable: GDP per capita (taking into account domestic prices in US dollars), social support, life expectancy, civil liberties, perception of corruption, sense of security and confidence in the future, level of trust, generosity (charity), and generosity.

Thus, in this aspect, Ukrainian society during the Russian-Ukrainian war generally corresponds to D. North's fourth features (plus my fifth) of transition.

Thus, the data on all four components of North's model - evidence of the success of the transition period - have given rise to optimistic visions of Ukraine's ability to overcome the aggressor and the main guarantee of such a scenario is the formation of a consolidated society and a united Ukrainian political nation with a new vision of new social orders.

Such statements seemed quite obvious for virtually the entire first year of the aggressive phase of Russia's attack on Ukraine until the end of summer and fall of 2023, when, as some Ukrainian bloggers put it [73], «war fatigue» appeared in Ukraine, resulting in a turnaround in public consciousness. At the same time, Ukrainian sociological services began to provide new data on the slightly changed situation of entering the «long war» phase and the corresponding public sentiment. Thus, in the Ukrainian academic sociological environment, along with the recognition of the complicated situation at the front and the rear, as well as around external support for the country, discussions began between representatives of different points of view, ranging from a few supporters of alarmist positions to their more numerous and moderate colleagues. Paradoxically, the fact that the adherents and sympathizers of both groups rely on the same results of empirical research conducted by leading sociological institutions and research centers in Ukraine in 2022-2023 was surprising. In my opinion, we are dealing not so much with fundamentally different views of sociologists as with the problem of interpreting the sociological information received, which has existed in our environment for a long time.

Based on the monitoring studies, some sociologists from the first camp have had occasion to clarify the periodization of the development of Ukrainian society after independence by the criterion of civic identity formation. These changes are most clearly reflected in the views and assessments of S. Dembitsky, Deputy Director of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, regarding the formation of civic identity in the sense of respondents' choice of the identity «citizen of Ukraine» as the most important marker of social unity. He identifies 7 stages that Ukraine has passed on this path:

- post-Soviet adaptation (1992-2004);
- the first civil mobilization (2004-2006);
- political polarization (2006-2013);
- the second civil mobilization (2013-2015);
- national and civic crystallization (2015-2021);
- national and civic consolidation (2022, February - 2022, December);
- national and civil fragmentation (2023-2024) (74).

In 2022, 84.6 percent of respondents chose the identity «citizen of Ukraine,» and in 2023 - 79.5 percent,

in 2024 - 73.8 [75]. Thus, the relative failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive in 2023, the advance of the Russian army in the east and south of the country, problems with domestic resources of various kinds, constant delays in receiving assistance from allies and partners, ambiguous US policy, etc. resulted in the terminal effect of the «long war» and several problems with civic identity, up to and including fragmentation, which the author considers a moderately destructive form of social heterogeneity as of 2023-2024. However, S. Dembitsky does not fully share the pessimistic connotations inherent in the concept of national and civic fragmentation, and in his conclusions to Chapter I of this monograph, he emphasizes that it was because of the war that Ukraine underwent dramatic changes, including the completion of the establishment of civic identity. Here we can see a logical contradiction: if civic identity has already been formed and this is a fait accompli, what is the national and civic fragmentation? In general, I do not consider the terms «fragment» and its derivative «fragmentation» to be successful in describing the social situation in 2023, because the semantics of fragmentation in Latin means the formation of fragments, pieces of something. So, does the dominant identity of Ukrainian citizens exist in contemporary Ukrainian society, or has it shattered into pieces over the past year? Furthermore, how does the difference of only 5% between the consolidation rates in 2022 and the fragmentation rates in 2023-2024 give grounds for such categorical generalizations?

S. Dembitsky's logical series continues his own statement that the national and civil fragmentation stage is characterized by the aggravation of socio-political fractures - linguistic, political, religious, migration, mobilization, etc. According to the author, these fissures, in turn, lay the potential for sustainable fragmentation of Ukrainian society and the corresponding long-term conflicts. In contrast to such threatening scenarios, the position of co-author S. Dembitsky from the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, who, in their collective monograph of 2022, more balancedly assesses the events of the ongoing war. Thus, in the introduction to the first wartime book, its editors and principal authors emphasize that war generates chaos, especially at its beginning. However, adaptive practices of individual self-defense, innovative interaction and cooperation between social institutions, population categories, and individuals form «individual enclaves of social order» [76], simultaneously asserting a new normal amid the war-induced disorder. In his later reflections, the director of the Institute of Sociology, Euvhen Holovakha, puts forward and defends several fundamental points of view on the war from the perspective of February 2024 [77]. He emphasizes that the modern world is characterized by processes of socio-political turbulence that strongly affect the situation of countries and have different manifestations, courses, and consequences. E. Holovakha believes that Ukraine has undergone «fantastic changes» during the two years of the acute phase of the Russian invasion, caused mainly by the war. In his opinion, there are three most important ones. These are, firstly, the final choice of the path of development; secondly, the erasure of regional and socio-political differences; and thirdly, the growth of institutional trust as the basis for the normal transformation of Ukrainian society, as a demonstration of its readiness for a normal democratic transition.

In his speeches and interviews in 2024, E. Golovakha introduces an evaluative comparative model based on two markers: (1) not only in sociological but also in psychological aspects and (2) on three milestones in modern Ukrainian history, or in three time dimensions: before the war, in the first year of the war, and now. In this perspective, surprisingly, a comparative analysis shows that Ukrainians feel better now than before the large-scale invasion at the end of 2021. In particular, Ukrainians' assessment of the economy started 30 years ago from an extremely low 1.5%, grew very slowly for ten years to only 3.7% in 2021, and this year,

despite the loss of territory and all the difficulties of the war, their assessment of the economy is 4.3% (in 2022 it was generally the highest - 4.7%).

The picture is similar to assessments of the government. Today, Ukrainians rate the government significantly higher than before the invasion, although somewhat more realistically than in 2022. The same trend is true for assessments of all aspects of the present. E. Holovakha called today's Ukrainian a harsh realist who soberly assesses the state of affairs.

According to E. Golovakha, the values of Ukrainians are much more stable. For Ukrainians, freedom is of significant value. Moreover, there has been a convergence of geopolitical and linguistic and cultural perceptions of residents of different regions of Ukraine - most Ukrainians see our future in the European Union and NATO, especially in 2022, when people saw what the occupiers, the carriers of the so-called «Russian world» and its social order, were like [78].

E. Holovakha continues the same methodology of comparisons in other published materials from the fall of 2024. When asked by a journalist of the Telegraph: «How do you assess the degree of consolidation of Ukrainian society now?» the head of the IS of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine replied: «Let us recall that the consolidation of Ukrainian society was a terrible problem in the first decade of independence. We had two main lines of division. Geopolitical, cultural, and linguistic perceptions in different regions were very different. So we had specific factors that prevented sustainable consolidation. Now, at the level of the majority of the population in the regions, we have overcome these differences, partly due to the war» [79].

In April 2023 (37), a well-known Ukrainian sociologist, head of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, V. Paniotto, expressed the opinion that the war in Ukraine has contributed to the emergence of a new social differentiation, which can contribute to both its significant reduction (in the sense of reducing regional and linguistic and ethnic tensions) and partial intensification, primarily due to dramatic changes in the social structure. He attributes the latter to the emergence of new categories of the population, between which new forms of supportive interaction are possible, but also towards whom certain stereotypes, prejudices, and negative feelings may arise. The title of I. Kyrychenko's interview with KIIS Director V. Paniotto - «The unity of society is growing significantly, but there are also negative trends» - reflects the balanced position of the scientist and his careful work with terminology.

There was also a question about Ukrainians' pride in their country. E. Golovakha's answer can be summarized as follows. In 2022, 80-90% of the population felt pride for their country, and about 20% felt fear and sadness. Now, three-quarters of the population still feel proud, but fear and sadness have increased by 10%. This still shows excellent potential for resilience. Pessimism and fear are not as pronounced when thinking about the future. Overall, Ukrainians are mostly optimistic about the future.

In general, the head of the Institute of Sociology, E. Holovakha, noted the following about the mood in today's Ukrainian society. According to the NASU IS monitoring, in December 2022, 69% of those were ready to endure as long as necessary until the victory was ready, and now there are 43%. There were 24% ready to endure for some time (but not for a specific period), and now there are 26%. There were 5% of those who were not ready to endure, ready to capitulate, and now there are 14%. Yes, fewer people are ready to endure, and there is no longer the enthusiasm that there was in 2022. Back then, all positive assessments were off the charts, despite all the disasters the country was experiencing. It was the result of shock. Because when a person finds himself in an extreme situation, he finds excellent resources to get out of it, and feels emotionally exhilarated. Now, people are assessing the situation quite soberly. 2024, compared to 2022, is a

emotionally exhilarated. Now, people are assessing the situation quite soberly. 2024, compared to 2022, is a year of harsh realism.

At the end of this interview about changes in public opinion during the war, E. Holovakha summarized the dynamics of changes in public opinion and moods in society, which can change from one positive event, and sociologists record this. If there are positive developments, the country's potential can increase significantly. At the moment, there are no good reasons to think of Ukraine as a split country or a country that is significantly threatened in terms of its unity.

In this interview and subsequent remarks, this well-known Ukrainian sociologist relies on the results of research conducted by the Institute he heads, often in cooperation with international scholars. The most important data for understanding the fluidity of the ongoing war situation are those of the KIIS survey dedicated to Ukraine's Independence Day and independence itself. The generalization of the data from this study revealed at least two fundamentally important positions in the context of my chosen topic.

1. The results published in 2023 remain relevant to the realities of 2024. This, in particular, also demonstrates the stability of public sentiment about Independence Day and independence itself.

2. The data obtained during the war showed an awareness of the importance and growing support for independence in forming a modern Ukrainian civil (or political) nation. Thus, discussions on specific issues and vectors of Ukraine's development were very emotional. However, Ukrainians saw Ukraine as an independent and united state [81].

Here are other results of the most recent KIIS surveys, which focus on various aspects of social change in Ukraine in the summer and fall of 2024. A separate survey conducted by KIIS in May 2024 on the issue of social unity and the factors that lead to possible disunity is of fundamental importance. Its results show that 44% of Ukrainians believe there is unity in Ukrainian society today. Three times fewer respondents (15%) believe disunity is now the case in Ukraine. At the same time, a third of Ukrainians (36%) believe that there are «elements of unity and disunity in society in equal measure». As a positive sign, it is worth emphasizing the existence of arguments to prove the causes of disunity, which were provided by 90% of respondents. Thus, the list of probable reasons for the disunity of Ukrainians as of May 2024 is as follows: cases of corruption (16%); language issue (14%); lack of competence in the government, distrust of the government's actions and official information from the government (13%); injustice, that different people feel differently about the war (11%); lack of mutual understanding and mutual assistance, «every man for himself» (9%); the presence of collaborators and those who are waiting for Russia (9%).

In his commentary on these results, KIIS representative A. Hrushetsky emphasized that «given the objective circumstances of the current situation, the assessment of social unity is fairly good for the country. Furthermore, it is better than focusing on the flow of negative information on social media. At the same time, there are disturbing trends, and the issue of strengthening Ukrainians' belief that we all remain united and stand united against the enemy is urgent. As you can see, a rather diverse set of reasons leads to critical citizens' assessments, so there is no simple «recipe for success» for strengthening unity. Furthermore, in addition to the lack of a «simple solution» this issue is not the exclusive domain of the government. The government is responsible, as are the media, civil society, and ordinary citizens. We emphasize that Ukrainians mostly expect a constructive dialogue, not an uncompromising «holy war» against the government. In addition, a review of the reasons for disunity cited by citizens creates a strong impression that many of them are united by a sharp reaction to "injustice"» [82].

A separate KIIS study in May 2024 focused on citizens' attitudes toward criticizing the government. Today, 70% of respondents believe that the government and some of its actions should be criticized. This is a dramatic change, because in 2022, the majority of respondents, on the contrary, thought that criticism should not be allowed during the war. In 2024, 63% of respondents already insisted that there should be criticism of specific actions of the authorities, but within a constructive framework to not undermine the situation in society. Furthermore, 31% of other respondents believed criticism should be harsh and uncompromising [83].

It is also worth mentioning the latest research of the Sociological Group Rating, which adds new features to the problems of national unity. One of them, titled «Promoting Unity» (June-July 2024), focuses on the problem of the liberated/de-occupied territories. They were returned to the government-controlled territories after several months of occupation by the Russian army, so many questions arose about their reintegration into Ukrainian society. Moreover, this study not only described the public opinion of the population of the de-occupied parts of Kharkiv and Kherson regions, but also contained recommendations for creating a National Reintegration Strategy [84] for the future. This was supposed to resume forming new social orders, interrupted by the war, where it had been artificially stopped.

A balanced position on the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on society, the destruction of old and the formation of new social orders in Ukraine is also taken by T. Bryk, a sociologist by profession and vocation, director of the Kyiv School of Economics. I will focus on two articles with T. Bryk's participation: for the media outlet Sensor (Nov. 21, 2023) and an interview with I. Slavinska (November 24, 2023) [85; 86]. If we summarize T. Bryk's thoughts in these speeches and interviews, we can distinguish the most important in the context of the chosen topic. First, this sociologist analyzes the achievements of Ukrainian sociology over the thirty years of its development, emphasizing the role of culture. He pays special attention to the factors of culture that have not yet been studied in Ukrainian sociology, headed by values, and creates a «value profile» of modern Ukrainians. T. Brick metaphorically compares this development to «twists and turns of fate» and emphasizes that Ukrainian society has changed dramatically and that irreversible fundamental changes have occurred in it over the 30 years of independence. Of course, not all of these twists and turns were caused by the recent Russian-Ukrainian confrontation (for example, the attitude to land privatization or religion), but many were caused by it. In particular, T. Bryk emphasizes shifts in the state of trust in political institutions, the politicization of society, the changed characteristics of civil society (which he calls new), and the development of horizontal networks. He also emphasizes the reform of decentralization and its importance in increasing trust in communities. It is also important to compare the value space of Ukrainians and Russians and identify significant differences between them, which strongly affects the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war: while the destruction of social ties characterizes Russians, Ukrainians are distinguished by the strengthening of these ties, which helps them to resist Russia's armed aggression. Thus, since 2014, Ukraine has undergone irreversible social changes and a turn of fortune: from disbelief to trust, from cynicism to support for one's neighbor, from confusion to confidence. These changes constitute the essence of the ongoing transitional period in Ukraine, with all its positive and highly ambiguous peculiarities. For example, T. Bryk believes that some of the decline recorded by sociologists in the second year of the war is real, and cites the example of migration risks, when 11 million Ukrainians were forced to change their residence. At the same time, he concludes the interview by distinguishing between risks and splits: while the former are inevitable, splits concerning modern Ukraine are an exaggeration.

Thus, the transition to a new stage of warfare, which can be cautiously called a «long lasting war,» has somewhat weakened the optimistic connotations of its assessment by ordinary Ukrainians and professional sociologists. Among the latter, the prevailing opinion is that the second year of the war has seen a slight (in quantitative terms) deterioration in the assessment of many components of the social well-being of ordinary Ukrainians, which in general does not disrupt the dominance of optimistic visions of the present, even in the face of the prospects of a «long lasting war». This attitude is characteristic of the majority, and by many indicators, the absolute majority of respondents. Moreover, this is a significant and almost unshakable optimism in challenging conditions. To summarize, we can quote E. Holovakha: "Ukrainians are tactical pessimists and strategic optimists".

Based on the above, several concluding remarks and generalizations can be made. At a very abstract level, social order can be defined as temporally fixed values that give the social world a certain degree of expectancy. Social order is procedural and therefore requires reflection not in terms of preserving its stability and permanence, but in the sense of its changeability and replacement by a new social order. Therefore, the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014-2024 can be defined as a war between the old and new social orders, as a war of values and narratives. For the residents of Ukraine, the old social order is identified with the order characteristic of Putin's imperial paradigm, and it has been realized in modern Russia[2]. This rejection of the Russian old order can be read from the public opinion of respondents of almost all reputable sociological institutions in Ukraine and from sociological analytics. A new social order is gradually being built in our country during a transitional period, but its main outlines are already known from the same public opinion. It is based on freedom, independence, inclusive democracy, and respect for human rights, regardless of nationality or religion. It is embodied in a united Ukrainian civil/political nation, a radically transformed civil society, and a reformatted social capital based on trust, solidarity, and cohesion.

Based on the above, the following definition can be made: Today's Ukraine is a grassroots horizontal network-centric society transitioning to an open-access order with irreversible threshold changes [91]. These changes and the peculiarities of the transition period can be illustrated as follows:

1) in Ukraine, it is not economic or political factors, but people's perceptions of a proper social order that play a crucial role in this transition - the perception of a country that will win and build this order of free access to the creation of various organizations and control of civil society by the grassroots over political institutions led by the state;

2) from the ideas of a proper social order, relevant organizations grow, the vast majority of which manifest bottom-up initiatives. A network-centric network of such organizations is formed with a fan of civic activities. Some of them deal with social adaptation problems, but more and more of them are innovative in their activities.

3) in Ukraine today, new social institutions are being built from organizations from the bottom up, such as the institution of local self-government or the social institution of volunteering. They possess three necessary attributes of a social institution: legality, legitimacy, and developed infrastructure. Such new social institutions are Ukraine's contribution to breaking the stereotype of outdated, untenable, and unnecessary (traditional) social institutions, which is quite common in the developed world.

2 In my opinion, the model of closed or restricted access, characteristic of old social orders and natural states in D. North's concept, correlates very well with the realities of today's Russia. However, the arguments to prove this thesis and the presentation of relevant arguments are beyond the scope of this section.

In general, the use of the model of D. North and his supporters in the analysis of the realities of modern Ukraine proves its possibility and fruitfulness, as it allows us to pay attention to the institutional factors of sociological analysis of a country at war.

However, this model also has several limitations that impede its automatic application to several post-communist countries that have chosen the path of independent democratic development, taking into account their national specifics. An example is modern Ukraine in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war, which promises to be long. Therefore, Ukrainian sociology today should pay more attention to post-nonclassical paradigms of sociological knowledge in understanding the war, which are focused mainly on the study of respondents' perceptions and aspirations, in which they initiate the construction of desired social orders and ways and mechanisms for their implementation.

In Ukraine, the North's hierarchy is changing: it is headed by perceptions, from which organizations grow, and from them, new institutions. A customized version of the social order that Ukrainians believe in and fight for is being created, based on wartime experience.

At the same time, the emergence of new social orders does not mean total optimism about them and their spread in wartime society, especially in the context of the prospects of a «long lasting war». There are many so-called «tensions» in it, from which conflicts and disorders can grow, thus deepening social differentiation. These include the creation of a new social structure under the influence of growing social mobility and mass migration (internal and external), overt and latent polarization of society, friction between representatives of new and traditional social groups, «war fatigue» and «burnout» of its participants, the return of renewed paternalism («the West will help us in everything»), a decrease in the number of external migrants willing to return to Ukraine, etc. However, there is only one unshakable postulate and the main factor of success: preserving social unity to guarantee victory in the war. This victory will mean victory over the old and the final establishment of new social orders.

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SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A RESOURCE FOR SOCIETAL RESILIENCE IN WARTIME

This chapter examines social capital as a crucial resource for societal resilience during the ongoing war in Ukraine. It defines resilience as the capacity of individuals, communities and institutions to maintain core functions, adapt to extreme shocks and recover from them, drawing on psychological and sociological approaches. The chapter reviews how social capital – trust, social networks and cooperation – strengthens resilience at individual and collective levels, and how wartime conditions reshape these ties. It highlights key trends identified in international and Ukrainian studies: growth of bonding social capital, shifts in trust dynamics and increased civic engagement against the backdrop of displacement, losses and chronic stress. Special attention is paid to the Ukrainian case, where war has simultaneously fostered national unity, enhanced trust in some institutions and stimulated self-organisation, while also producing emotional exhaustion and fluctuating institutional trust. The chapter discusses the diverging trajectories of bonding, bridging and linking social capital and the ambivalent effects of violence, which can both reinforce solidarity and deepen social divides. It also addresses methodological challenges of researching social capital in a context of displacement, mobilisation and information warfare. Finally, the authors argue that understanding these dynamics is essential for policies aimed at bolstering community adaptation, psychological resilience and post-war recovery.

Keywords: social capital, resilience, war, Ukraine, trust, civic engagement, social networks, institutional trust, community adaptation, psychological resilience

The ongoing war in Ukraine is a massive, long-lasting trauma that is transforming the lives of millions and testing both individual and collective resilience. Resilience, understood as the capacity of social actors (people, organisations, communities) to maintain key functions, withstand extreme impacts, adapt to them and return to effective functioning, has become a central concept in many disciplines over the past decade. It has moved from ecology and social geography to psychology and then to broader debates about global change and extreme conditions. Current research on resilience concentrates on three main areas: natural hazards and disasters; environmental change and resource scarcity; and political, institutional and socio-economic transformations such as migration, economic crises and urban restructuring. Among the many approaches to resilience, social capital theory highlights how dense networks, trust and cooperation enhance a community's ability to mobilise resources, support its members and adapt, making social capital a key driver of resilience in times of crisis. [25, 44]. Fukuyama emphasizes trust as a key component of social capital. He argues that trust allows people to cooperate and coordinate their actions, leading to greater resilience in facing challenges [9]. P. Norris and R. Inglehart show that communities where values such as tolerance, inclusiveness and respect for others are widespread have higher levels of social capital and, as a result, greater resilience [22]

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Although these scholars did not focus on extreme social conditions, such as war, it is natural to assume that social capital plays a key (or at least significant) role in the resilience of communities in the face of extreme challenges. Table 1 provides an overview of the relevant psychological and sociological discourse and its possible explications in studying social capital as a factor of individual and collective resilience.

Table 1: Theoretical perspectives on resilience analysis in psychology and sociology and ideas relevant to the theory of social capital

A theoretical perspective	Central ideas relevant to social capital theory
Psychoanalytic theory [12]	Through positive social connections, social capital contributes to forming early experience, development, and integration of mental components, self-identification, and the ability to control and adapt. It also has a positive impact on the psychological aspects of resilience.
Logotherapy [7]	In communities with high social capital, shared values strengthen cohesion, trust and cooperation, contributing to individual and group resilience.
Behaviourism [33]	Social capital and highly integrated social networks facilitate the acquisition of new knowledge and skills, support desirable behaviours and the acquisition of coping and adaptation mechanisms, and strengthen resilience and well-being.
Cognitive theory [29]	Social capital increases resilience through social support and a sense of belonging to a group. This, in turn, leads to cognitive restructuring, i.e. rethinking of negative traumatic experiences.
Humanistic psychology [14]	Social capital helps people to develop and self-actualize even in extreme conditions by providing resources and support and promoting a sense of belonging.
Social identity theory [28]	Social capital affects community cohesion and resilience in extreme environments: networks, trust and shared values bring people together; the absence of these factors can lead to conflict.
Structural functionalism [35]	Social capital plays a key role in building resilience by counteracting the destruction of social structures and enabling collective action in extreme conditions.
Theories of conflict [1]	Social capital plays a key role in cooperation and solidarity in effectively addressing various forms of inequality and discrimination through collective action.
Feminist theories [32]	Social capital is important in fostering collective efforts, building resilience and increasing community support to address gender inequalities effectively.
Postmodernism [20]	The diversity of perspectives shared through social connections enables resistance to dominant narratives in extreme environments. The social capital formed through these ties is important in building resilience and adaptation and stimulates collective action, including resistance and mutual aid.

From the analyzed psychological and sociological discourses, we can conclude the key role of social capital in enhancing resilience at both the individual and societal levels in the following dimensions: The social and psychological dimension: this dimension concerns the early experiences of individuals, mental development, self-identity, self-control, adaptability, constructive ideas about the meaning of life (including traumatic experiences), the ability to rethink negative experiences, motivation, self-awareness and emotional resilience. The cultural dimension: values, norms and practices that prioritize community solidarity, social cohesion, support, a sense of belonging and adaptive coping mechanisms are likely to strengthen the resilience of communities and societies in extreme environments. Cultural narratives and rituals can also play an important role in promoting healing and resilience after traumatic experiences.

The socio-political dimension: social capital influences the level of trust in institutions and governance

structures, which is crucial for effective crisis response and recovery. Societies with strong social support systems, such as local communities, NGOs, and social services, are better equipped to face the challenges of extreme conditions because social capital facilitates the exchange of information and coordination of collective efforts in response to a traumatic event. The availability of resources, institutions and social ties plays a key role in how societies collectively cope with and recover from adversity.

The issue of social capital as a resource of resilience in (post)war societies is the focus of a few publications, which sometimes contain contradictory observations and conclusions. The article by M. Bauer et al., "The Long-Term Effects of War on the Development of Egalitarian Motivation and Ingroup Bias", notes that war significantly impacts such aspects of social capital as social networks, trust, and political participation. Using the example of empirical research conducted in Syria, the authors illustrate a possible trend in the (de)formation of social capital during the war: the destruction of bridging and linking social capital and the strengthening of bonding social capital [4].

In other words, one of the mechanisms for transforming social capital in times of war is the strengthening of social networks, which are characterized by a common identity, daily experience, regular communication, small size and high density (e.g. family and close friends, religious communities, ethnic enclaves). According to the study, the most significant impact of the war on the formation of views and practices of two categories of people is 1) those who personally experience intense psychological distress and traumatic experiences related to the war and 2) those who are going through the period of youth and adulthood during the war. The study suggests that war does not significantly impact young children's social motivations, and the impact on older people is negligible [5] . Accordingly, we can assume that over the next post-war decades, people belonging to the two groups mentioned above will reproduce new patterns of social behaviour to the greatest extent, including self-organization and other aspects of social capital.

The study "Can War Foster Cooperation?" by B. Blattman et al. highlights the increased intensity of cooperation and new forms of cooperation within local communities during wartime, contributing to the resilience and recovery of social structures destroyed by war. The impact of wartime violence increases social participation and altruistic behaviour in local communities, but it can also increase prejudice. The latter can lead to social divisions, the growth and perpetuation of social distances between groups, and ultimately, the perpetuation of conflict cycles and hinder lasting peace. Violence in wartime affects people's behaviour in different ways. People who have experienced wartime violence tend to be more involved in local social and community groups and take on leadership roles [4] .

One of the most cited works in the field, the article by J. DeLuca et al. on the Ugandan military conflict outlines three possible mechanisms of social capital transformation in times of war: 1) the experience of learned distrust: in dangerous conditions, such as in war zones, people may use the rule "trust no one" to save time and avoid risks and eventually rely on this rule in unfamiliar situations or when dealing with strangers; 2) the mechanism of post-traumatic transformation: Traumatic experiences can leave lasting psychological "scars" that affect how people protect themselves and how they treat others, strengthening ingroup integration; 3) Mechanism of social isolation: war and violence, by destroying social networks through forced displacement or fuelling conflicts, reduce the frequency of interactions between people in the community, leading to a drop in trust [6].

Ukrainian researcher I. Nechytailo, in one of the few texts devoted to the social capital of Ukrainian society during the war, draws the following conclusions: the first phase of the war united society against a common enemy, but the prolonged war led to economic decline and social exhaustion, which weakened social capital. The full-scale invasion resulted in a surge of national unity, increased trust in the government compared to pre-war times, and demonstrated a strong civic identity and a value of self-determination among Ukrainians. The non-governmental sector was actively countering the invasion by developing new forms of self-organization and volunteering. The war in Ukraine has become a unique case of social capital accumulation in the face of great upheaval, which requires further research to understand the long-term impact of the war on social capital [21, 46].

Today, the sociological analysis of trends in the development of Ukrainian society during the war is complicated by several challenges and limitations. At the same time, the available empirical data allow us to record some of these trends, particularly regarding two main aspects of such an essential element of social capital: political and institutional trust.

For example, the problem of representativeness is extremely acute for Ukrainian sociology in the period after the start of the full-scale invasion. As the staff of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine note in their joint monograph: "The aggressor's seizure of territories, the migration of millions of citizens abroad, large-scale mobilisation of men and women into the armed forces, the destruction of entire industries, and mass unemployment have changed the administrative and settlement division of the country, as well as the professional, educational, and gender structures of the population. In other words, there is no reliable knowledge of the general population, which makes it impossible to construct a representative sample according to the rules that apply within the constitutionally recognised borders of the state" [38, p. 22].

Several surveys conducted by Gradus Research since the beginning of the full-scale invasion have recorded the following trends: generalized trust has increased from 45% to 63% during the period of observation; trust in the residents of their locality from 35% to 62%; trust in neighbours and acquaintances has increased to 67% and 80% respectively. During the survey, there has been an increase in the proportion of people who speak Ukrainian in everyday life (from 40% to 60%). More than 69% of respondents consciously choose Ukrainian brands. About half of the respondents noted their demand for brands regarding their position on the war and cooperation with Russia (44%). Regarding civic engagement, 64% of respondents reported regularly donating to military and humanitarian causes. Overall, the war has led to significant changes in the social capital of Ukrainian society. On the one hand, there has been an increase in trust, identity and civic engagement. On the other hand, the war has negatively affected people's emotional and economic situation [39].

The data obtained by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology shows the following trends in the dynamics of political trust:

Table 2. Dynamics of the level of trust in institutions (%) [40]:

% in the string	12.2021	12.2022	Balance sheet at the end of 2022	12.2023	Balance sheet at the end of 2023
To the Armed Forces of Ukraine	72	96	+24	96	--

To the President of Ukraine	27	84	+57	62	-22
SBU	29	63	+34	53	-10
To the National Police	30	58	+28	41	-17
To the Government of Ukraine	14	52	+38	26	-26
To the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	11	35	+24	15	-20

Source: KIIS surveys 2021, 2022, and 23.

It can be argued that the duration of the war is significant in terms of the dynamics of institutional trust, the dynamics of social capital and the resilience of society as a whole. At the initial stage of the full-scale war in Ukraine, according to A. Horbachyk, social and political trust increased under the influence of the "war" factor [41] . Despite the stress of the first months of full-scale aggression, Ukrainians have not lost faith in themselves and their country. This phenomenon is evidence of the potential for self-organization and mutual assistance at the micro level in challenging and stressful conditions [50].

Despite the undeniable positive aspects of the dynamics of interpersonal trust, likely, the duration of the war, its high intensity and the losses that inevitably accompany it have a demoralizing and disorganizing effect. In addition, there is an undulating dynamic of trust in political institutions during peacetime and wartime. In peacetime, the dynamics of trust are synchronized with the electoral cycle and socio-economic dynamics. In wartime, the conjuncture of a particular military and political situation and the subversive influence of the enemy's information and psychological operations aimed at increasing the alienation of citizens from their state and its leaders and representatives are decisive. In this way, the enemy seeks to undermine the resilience of Ukrainian society and its ability to resist.

On the other hand, the affective element of resilience is based on the sense of threat posed by enemy aggression. Nothing stimulates solidarity and horizontal collective action like a real sense of an imminent threat that must be confronted. Therefore, as paradoxical as it may sound, the weakening of the intensity of hostilities, the routinization of war and, ultimately, its termination also test the authorities and other institutions in terms of public confidence.

The challenge in terms of rooting a new type of social capital in terms of quality and capitalizing structures is that war carries the risks of significant militarisation of consciousness, formation or strengthening of intergroup resentments, growth of paternalism and entrenchment of a black-and-white picture of reality. All these trends are, on the one hand, expected and even necessary in times of war, and, on the other hand, require balancing trends that are necessary in the transition to peaceful life. In these conditions, practices related to cross-cutting social ties, adaptation practices, innovative forms of interaction and cooperation, especially those that are horizontal and transcend national boundaries, forming "enclaves" of a new social order, are important.

In this regard, examples of the creation and functioning of migrant communities abroad in the context of external aggression and a significant increase in the number of refugees among migrants are illustrative [47; 49]. Below, we will examine the peculiarities of creating Ukrainian social capital in Poland in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014. In our opinion, the formation of penetrating social ties here should be divided into two time periods. The first one includes the relatively "calm" period of international migration of Ukrainians before the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict. The second period of migration movements began with the confrontation on 24.02.2022 when the Russian Federation openly

resorted to the armed invasion of the Ukrainian state. Each of these periods has its characteristics and allowed us to identify significant factors that have influenced and will continue to influence the capitalization processes and the resilience problem.

The first period was described as a period of active labour migration. In quantitative terms, it coincided with the growth of cross-border mobility of Ukrainian citizens towards Europe (2011). In 2013, for the first time, the number of trips to Poland outnumbered those to Russia. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine, the frequency of trips by our citizens in this direction decreased significantly and amounted to 4.16 million times in 2015, while the number of trips to Poland more than doubled to 9.52 million times, accounting for about 40% of all foreign trips in 2015. In 2017, Poland was already among the leaders in the number of trips abroad made by Ukrainians (10.41 million times), leaving behind European countries such as Germany, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and others [27, pp. 165-167]. The primary purpose of Ukrainians' trips abroad to Poland as a destination country was mainly related to employment. This was facilitated, in particular, by visa-free status with several EU countries, simplified procedure for obtaining a work visa in Poland, significantly higher earnings, high demand for labour by the Polish economy, simplified procedures for obtaining work visas and other instruments of influence on migrants (the possibility of obtaining a long-term stay in the EU for themselves and their families, better healthcare system, higher level of educational services, etc.)

During this period, short-term and circular migration to Poland was dominant. According to a survey by Personnel Service, about 80% of Ukrainian migrants spend no more than six months in Poland, while less than 15% plan to stay there for more than a year. Poland attracted Ukrainians precisely because of the possibility of short-term legal employment, in which they do not need to invest their money [17, p. 46]. According to Polish experts from the Stefan Batory Foundation [13, pp. 3-8], the rapid growth of Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland (before the global coronavirus pandemic) was caused by several factors, including the war in eastern Ukraine, impoverishment of the population, and lack of security. Other factors include the low cost of travelling to the recipient country (geographical proximity), the absence of language barriers, the growth of educational migration, and the liberalization of Polish migration policy. According to the Polish labour market barometer (Barometr Polskiego Rynku Pracy, December 2021) [2], among the main reasons that Ukrainians most often cite for choosing Poland as a destination for economic immigration in 2020 and 2021, the top three reasons are geographical and cultural proximity (53.3% in 2021 vs 64.5% in 2020), lack of language barriers (46.8% in 2021 vs 52.8% in 2020) and earnings (28.3% in 2021 vs 54.5% in 2020). It should be noted that salary as an argument for coming to Poland has lost its most significant importance almost twice. The researchers state that the motives for coming to Poland differ among Ukrainians of different age groups. People over the age of 50 mention safer living conditions. Younger age groups choose Poland because they can receive higher economic rewards for their work. In this context, it is important to take into account the educational level of migrants. For people with primary and secondary education, safe and better places to live and social conditions were the most important. For those with vocational and higher education, higher earnings and a higher standard of living than in Ukraine were the most important. Experts, politicians, and employers emphasize the importance of Ukrainian migration for the Polish labour market, particularly for sectors of the economy such as construction, agriculture, and services.

Ukrainian migrants of the first period usually did not need long-term integration measures for social adaptation and were characterized by employers as good workers. Ukrainian migrant workers mostly complained about the feeling of "secondary status", which was manifested in violations of their rights by

employers, discrimination and lack of access to public services. Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland needed legal support to go through the legalization procedure, to sign an employment contract with an employer, and to obtain social insurance. Linguistic support also remained important. Such support was especially relevant for labour migrants from central and eastern Ukraine. According to the National Bank of Poland (2016), in 2014-15, out of the total number of Ukrainian labour migrants who came to Poland, 28.4% came from the eastern part of Ukraine (for comparison, the share of such migrants was usually within 6.3%) [13, p. 5]. As a result, the flow of people from the regions affected by the separatists increased to 11.7% of the total number of migrants. Demographically, migrants from eastern Ukraine differ somewhat from migrants from regions traditionally involved in migration (predominantly male, younger age), and most importantly, they have much less migration experience.

The period prior to the outbreak of the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war was also somewhat traumatic for a significant number of Ukrainian labour migrants. The global COVID-19 pandemic (which began as an epidemic in Wuhan, China, on 17 November 2019 and was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) on 11 March 2020) added to the challenges of war and concerns about the fate of their relatives in their homeland. On the one hand, this affected the partial return of Ukrainian labour migrants home. Thus, in the first months of this global crisis, up to 10% of labour migrants returned home from Poland. The pandemic has also disrupted external contacts of labour migrants through lockdowns and restrictions on direct contacts. The need to stay indoors caused mental stress for many (fear of losing their jobs and earnings due to possible departure to Ukraine or quarantine measures, loss of legal and emotional support, uncertainty about their residency status, etc.) During the pandemic, Ukrainian labour migrants suffered the most from various restrictions (42% of respondents), family separation (36%), and stress (21%) [37].

On the other hand, the conditions of the pandemic crisis have led to the active development of the global information society and the use of new media by labour migrants in interpersonal communications. The main arsenal of new media tools includes social networks (Facebook, Skype, Instagram, Twitter, Telegram, etc.), blogs and networks of mini-blogs, online media players, citizen journalism portals, Internet radio services, corporate platforms (e.g. Teams, Zoom, Webex, etc.), which have become especially popular during the coronavirus pandemic for distance learning, scientific or business conferences. The results of a study on the use of social media potential by Ukrainian labour migrants on the example of Facebook showed that women (58%) were the most active contributors to the social network, not only as authors of questions but also as respondents [42]. The online activity of Ukrainian labour migrants increased towards the end of the week. The most controversial discussions (many questions and answers) were caused by the discussion of interpretations of legal documents and regulations related to legalization, work and stay. The least controversial is the search for a place of work and residence (usually, the information here is specific, does not require discussion, and only contact is needed). Each of the topics discussed had its moderator, who made sure that the information provided was in line with the group's purpose and did not contain offensive or commercial material.

The analysis of the structural aspects of social capital (the conglomeration of social networks created by migrants in their environment) allowed A. Gurna and E. Jazwińska [10] to determine the structure of social relations of close and distant "radius of action" among Ukrainian labour migrants in Warsaw and

the agglomeration. On average, Ukrainian labour migrants had 50 contacts in social networks, including 10 people in Poland [11]. Social ties were dominated by contacts with a longer "radius of action". For men, this figure was 41 such contacts, while for women, it was 25 (as noted by the researchers since women had more migration experience at the time of the study). In both cases, the long-distance relationships were with acquaintances from Ukraine (three-quarters of respondents declared that more than half of their close acquaintances in Poland were Ukrainians). Compared to men, women were characterized by a higher percentage of close ties, which could be explained by their specific work and corresponding interest in finding Polish employers (care for home, sick, etc.). In addition, men were more open to expanding contacts, as only half of them had Ukrainians among their acquaintances in Poland. From this angle, men are less likely than women to prefer standard features in their long-distance relationships, such as age, wealth, education, and country of origin, i.e. they pay attention to what makes them different rather than similar to another person. It was found that, given their means, Ukrainian labour migrants had virtually no Polish acquaintances with a higher social or professional status. Ukrainian migrants could expect more emotional, psychological or material support from their migrant community. Each respondent pointed to at least one person they could turn to in an emergency.

According to the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), as of 1 June 2022, 6.983 million people have left Ukraine since the beginning of the war (which is the most serious refugee crisis in Europe since the end of World War II), including 3.690 million to Poland [43]. The mass migration of Ukrainians abroad under the influence of the war marked the beginning of the second period, which we have conditionally described as the period of solidarity relations, which defined new horizons for the creation and unlocking of the potential of social capital in the context of the massive influx of Ukrainian war refugees to Poland.

The subsequent institutionalization and active involvement of state institutions in assisting Ukrainian war refugees led to a specific synthesis of several factors - from individual volunteer initiatives to targeted assistance programmes - which in no way diminished the role of social capital in creating a new social order aimed at increasing resilience and reducing vulnerability to the challenges of war among citizens of both countries [43]. To a certain extent, this synthesis levelled out pre-war ethnic differences between Poland and Ukraine regarding the Volyn tragedy, the commemoration of Ukrainian cultural heritage and burials on the territory of the Polish state. On the other hand, many publications have begun to emphasize the psychotherapeutic impact of social capital in overcoming various kinds of stressful situations related to the Russian-Ukrainian war. Many studies on this topic point to a significant number of cases in which Ukrainian war refugees who have fled their country in search of refuge, and these are mostly women with children, face a high risk of developing anxiety and depressive disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and suicidal thoughts. According to the results of the international survey "Fleeing Ukraine: Displaced people's experiences in the EU" [8], which was conducted from 22 August to 29 September 2022 using open online questionnaires on a sample of 14,685 people from 10 EU countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and the Czech Republic), almost 50% of respondents admitted to feeling depressed or depressed - 42% feel this way often, and 7% always. Ukrainian refugees are also still experiencing tension and stress. 51% admit they rarely feel relaxed, and another 22% say they never feel this way. In this context, Migliorini L. et al. (2023) [19] emphasize the development of several approaches to

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Creating social capital among labour migrants in Poland in the first analyzed period is a complex and partly contradictory process with several levels of influence, which are systematically presented in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1. Factors influencing the modern reconstruction of the social capital of Ukrainian labour migrants (in the example of Poland) [23].

In authors opinion, a practical approach here is the CBPR methodology, which focuses on activating the migrant community (in this case, Ukrainian) in its cooperation with researchers, political institutions and various public actors. Community-based participatory research (CBPR) is a collaborative approach to research that involves engaging community members, researchers, and organisational representatives as equal partners to enhance understanding of a given problem, create change and ideally improve health challenges. In its practical implementation, the CBPR method involves several steps of phased implementation: 1) identification of community needs and resources (e.g., collecting comprehensive information on the current needs and resources of the community (refugees) to develop specific actions, involving experts in Ukrainian culture, engaging representatives of the migrant community as active participants in the research process); 2) joint planning and decision-making (e.g., involving all stakeholders from the migrant community to NGOs and individual researchers to jointly develop strategies and measures that meet the identified needs). Equally important here is the expanded cultural exchange between the host community and Ukrainian refugees); 4) action and evaluation (e.g., feedback on the evaluation of implemented measures based on feedback from refugees participating in interventions about their experiences and benefits). As the authors of this approach rightly point out, a resilient refugee community can increase the host country's resources. Therefore, it can be argued that the design and implementation of the above community-based interventions, focusing on community resilience, are key to protecting against the traumatic factors these people are exposed to. The multidirectional development of community social capital (instrumental and resource, emotional and supportive) can reduce the need for individual psychological interventions in the long run. Ensuring a productive community context with sufficient social capital and active diaspora involvement in the host country can function as a kind of "collective therapist" that can protect refugees from developing or exacerbating mental health problems [34; 51].

It emphasizes the need to create healthy families and, above all, community environments that allow natural human defence systems to develop and function effectively in stressful situations and to increase community resilience [31]. In addition, community resilience factors such as social support and satisfaction with assistance and support have a significant relationship with the well-being of disaster survivors. Expectations of support from the host society and some experience of living in stressful situations are important elements that shape not only individual resilience but also community and societal resilience. For example, compared to Polish society, more Ukrainian respondents demonstrated high levels of feeling unsafe (61% vs 15% in Poland) and symptoms of distress (27% vs 17%), but at the same time showed much higher levels of community (47% vs. 22%) and societal resilience (66% vs. 24%) compared to Polish respondents. The results of the above study by Kimhi S et al. (2023) showed that positive coping factors, such as hope and well-being, are better indicators of resilience than vulnerability factors in the face of severe challenges [15]. The existential threat to Ukraine's independence, they argue, can catalyze a strong sense of resilience and social cohesion despite the suffering and destruction caused by war.

The creation of new social orders in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war actualizes the possibilities of the host society, which, first of all, recognizes democratic values and considers this war as a breakdown of the fundamental principles of international law regarding the sovereignty of the Ukrainian people. The example of Poland is illustrative, as the situation of war has set in motion the social capital accumulated by the country at both the formal and informal levels. Creating a favourable atmosphere of solidarity with the Ukrainian people enabled displaced people to feel important psychological support and accelerated their adaptation to the new country. The presence of a large Ukrainian

diaspora and Ukrainians who left in search of work during the pre-war period of acute military escalation with Russia proved to be an important potential for purely Ukrainian solidarity, demonstrating the use of existing social capital resources created in Polish conditions. All of this positively impacted the resilience of the community and the host society and reduced the traumatic impact of the war on refugees. However, research shows that it will have a long-lasting impact on war refugees, who are primarily women and children and are under considerable pressure from the forced "break" of family and kinship relations. In this situation, systemic measures, involvement of specialists of various professions, relevant programmes and training are important to ensure deeper integration of displaced migrants into the host society, intensification of cultural and educational exchange, establishment of diaspora relations and informal communication. The ultimate goal of such measures is to create all the necessary conditions for strengthening social support networks, establishing cooperation and partnerships between NGOs (communities of representatives of different countries), increasing the resources of the community, not only the host community, on the way to its sustainability and building social capital.

The challenges of the Russian-Ukrainian war have led to increased research into the resilience of communities to new challenges. Below, we present a scheme in which we tried to systematize the factors that influence the formation of social capital resources in the situation of forced Ukrainian migrants who are just taking their first adaptation steps in the host country. To a large extent, we considered the Polish-Ukrainian experience of creating new community resilience.



Figure 2. The process of formation of social capital of Ukrainian migrants as a resource of resilience in the context

of forced migration as a result of war. Source. Author's own work.

Despite the significant differences in definitions, it is reasonable to agree that resilience refers to a person's ability to adaptively cope with adverse circumstances, recover and return to routine functioning as soon as possible. Let us summarise the results of this research. Ukrainian society has transformed into a powerful social organism of adaptation and resistance to Russian military aggression. The fundamentals of the life of such a society in a state of mobilization again resemble the phenomenon of the people's assembly (Maidan) with its everyday practices of self-organization, solidarity, mutual assistance, donations to the army and volunteering by non-governmental organizations and ordinary citizens and businesses" [38; 48].

The war in Ukraine has become an extreme challenge for Ukrainian society, significantly affecting its social capital. This phenomenon, which describes the connections and resources available to people through their membership in groups, plays a key role in the functioning of democracy and society's resilience. The dynamics of the war's impact on Ukraine's social capital are ambiguous. During the first stage of the full-scale invasion, we observed a surge in this capital, which was manifested in the activation of local communities: people united to defend their settlements, help the victims and ensure their livelihoods; mass volunteering: millions of Ukrainians joined volunteer initiatives to help the Armed Forces, people who lost their homes and other war-affected people; the formation of new ties and associations: the war stimulated cooperation between different segments of the population, institutions and organizations.

However, war also poses risks to social capital. Over time, due to exhaustion, economic crises, demoralization and other factors, its level may gradually decline. This can lead to increased mistrust as people may lose faith in others, the state and institutions; polarisation of society as war can divide people on political, ideological or religious grounds; and a decline in civic engagement as people may lose motivation and resources to participate in society. The long-term prospects of Ukraine's social capital depend on many factors, such as the duration of the war, the effectiveness of government policy, the level of civic engagement, and the ability of society to self-organize and help each other. The war allowed Ukraine to increase its social capital significantly despite the risks. The accumulated "capital" in the form of new connections, resources and experience can become the basis for the development of Ukrainian society in the long term.

Supporting and developing social capital increases society's resilience to future challenges. This requires joint efforts of the state, civil society, business and all population segments. War is not only destruction but also a chance for renewal. The cohesion, dedication and cooperation demonstrated by Ukrainian society during the war demonstrate its high potential. By preserving and developing its social capital, Ukraine will be able not only to defeat the enemy but also to build a better future for its citizens.

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FROM CHALLENGES TO RETURN: PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF FORCED MIGRANTS DURING RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

This chapter examines the dynamics of forced displacement during the Russian-Ukrainian war. As of today, about six million Ukrainian refugees and five million internally displaced persons remain abroad. Many sustain contact with relatives at home, and a growing number have already returned. The chapter analyses their adaptation processes, everyday challenges, and decisions to return or resettle permanently. It draws on statistical data from Ukrainian governmental bodies and analytical findings from IOM, UNHCR, Cedos, Rating, and the Razumkov Centre.

The analytical focus is placed on the distinction between stable and emergent social orders shaping migration strategies. Stable orders refer to traditional labour migration observed since independence, while emergent ones have developed under wartime conditions of forced mobility. To grasp this transformation, the chapter introduces a conceptual triad — “forced migrants,” “perceptions,” and “practices.” Adaptation and status-forming practices are central to understanding how displaced individuals reconstruct their social positions abroad and negotiate belonging amid uncertainty.

Keywords: forced migration, refugees, adaptation, return, Ukraine

The full-scale invasion brought forced changes to the lives of every Ukrainian. The war resulted in a new reality, in which millions of people in the first days decided to stay at home or go to safer regions of the country or abroad. Each month of the migration process since February 2022 has its specifics and trends, including the decision to return to their homes. Each internally displaced person or refugee has their circumstances, needs, motivations and life goals during these two years of full-scale invasion [48]. More than 6.34 million Ukrainian refugees are officially registered worldwide, of whom 5.9 million, or 93 per cent, are in Europe. The UN Refugee Agency presented these statistics on 3 January 2024 on its official website [33]. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), if the war in Ukraine continues until the end of 2024 and beyond, several million Ukrainians, especially those who have settled in the European Union, will not return home after the end of hostilities [21]. According to experts, the reluctance to return is primarily because the war will continue to destroy Ukraine’s infrastructure and economy.

Forced migration in Ukraine, unprecedented in scale, results in the loss of human capital, large-scale internal and external movements, and the redistribution of labour resources. The current migration crisis is marked by uncertainty, chaotic displacement, social vulnerability, economic instability of internally displaced persons, illegal migration to Russia, and growing external migration supported by European countries. Displaced people also face serious social and psychological adaptation challenges. Migration processes have become a key focus of global research. Russia’s war against Ukraine is not the first to produce a massive refugee flow; drawing on experiences from Bosnia, Syria, Afghanistan and other conflicts, scholars analyse the factors shaping refugees’ decisions to return or remain abroad after war. Asger S., Harold N. and Zetter R. consider

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the importance of the following factors in the return of refugees home after the end of the conflict [1]: security, availability of housing, land to return to; the possibility of earning a living; comparison of general living conditions at home and in the country of refugee stay. Researchers from the U.S. Institute of Peace emphasise that international refugee organisations have more experience in helping refugees return to rural areas and lack the expertise to properly assist refugees in returning to cities. World Bank research highlights that long-term humanitarian assistance to restore infrastructure and public services such as education and healthcare is needed to encourage refugee return effectively. Short-term support in food, medicine and clothing may not be sufficient if conditions for sustainable livelihoods are not created, which could lead to refugees returning to their countries of origin. Infrastructure investments should cover construction and future maintenance [41].

The situation with Bosnian refugees after the war in the Balkans in the 1990s is fascinating in the Ukrainian context. Unlike Afghanistan, Syria and other Asian or African countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, like Ukraine, is in Europe and shares a common border with the EU. The article summarises the experience of Bosnia and the policies of European countries in providing temporary protection, access to the labour market, development of a refugee return plan and its consequences. Researchers identify the following reasons for non-returns: security in terms of inter-ethnic tensions and misunderstandings; the unsuccessful process of returning real estate to its current owners; corruption; focus of reconstruction on housing, fewer resources for rebuilding schools, water supply systems and other infrastructure; unfavourable overall economic situation: high unemployment, low (compared to EU countries) wages, lack of social mobility, etc.

Researchers (Barry R., Liang Lee Y., and Miller P.) tested hypotheses about the assimilation of immigrants and conducted a longitudinal analysis of their professional mobility. Successful employment in highly skilled positions is possible only if the immigrants know the language and have to prove their education in the country of their current residence [2]. However, studies show that many people learn the language over time, confirm their speciality and start working in their field. However, according to Fellini I. and Guetto R., in countries with segmented labour markets, such as Italy, Spain and France, only a small number of immigrants take up highly skilled positions after adaptation [15], and the possibility of working in their speciality depends on the period of adaptation and the country of residence.

The integration of Ukrainians into European societies can positively affect the labour market and the economy as a whole, as well as negative consequences (competition with locals in the labour market, lower real wages in these sectors, and higher inflation). For example, Polish researchers note [12] that although competition in some sectors of the labour market has increased in the short term, Poland's unemployment rate is below the EU average and the labour market situation is expected to return to normal in the medium term. The long-term effect of Ukrainians' integration into the EU labour market is currently difficult to predict due to many unknown factors, such as the duration of the war, the number of Ukrainians who will remain in Europe, and which Ukrainians will stay and return. However, most of the previous studies [11; 34; 11] on the impact of immigration in general on the host country's economy and labour market show positive fiscal and economic growth effects, although there is no consensus on how immigration affects the wages of the local labour force. On the other hand, previous research shows that refugees tend to have lower labour force participation rates than other migrants, and their integration is slower [13].

As for domestic research, we believe that it is worth focusing on the results published since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, as they reflect the real situation and monitor the problems and needs of migrants affected by hostilities in terms of social protection and temporary asylum. Important thematic publications by leading experts of the Institute of Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine [20] on the scale and consequences of forced migration of the Ukrainian population as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation (E. Libanova, O. Pozniak, O. Tsymbal, etc.) [28]. Institutional problems of integration into life in new communities as a result of forced migration in the context of the war in Ukraine are considered in the works of H. Voznyak, N. Savchuk, A. Kasprzyshak [40] and other scholars of the Lviv School of Regional Studies (U. Sadova, T. Vasyltsiv, M. Bil, O. Mulska, O. Levytska, etc.), who have conducted numerous studies of migration processes, their causes and consequences of impact on spatial development, and internal displacement. It is also about analysing migration processes in the context of transformation and regulation of regional labour markets in Ukraine (I. Baranyak, M. Bachynska, O. Makhoniuk, O. Ryndzak, L. Semiv, R. Tesliuk, etc.) [24].

The phenomenon of displacement, social characteristics and practices of refugees and internally displaced persons in Ukraine are the subject of an article by Kharkiv sociologists M. Biryukova, I. Ruschenko, N. Liashenko and S. Hryhorieva [3]. T. Bondar and O. Haniukov applied a comparative approach to study the outward migration of Ukrainians before and after the full-scale aggression [5]. The comparison of the current period of martial law with the pre-war period draws on comprehensive research by the Ukrainian Institute for Social Research after Oleksandr Yaremenko [39]. This research examines migration across multiple dimensions: relocation, adaptation, and integration phases; living conditions and everyday life of migrants; employment opportunities and job search; childcare and school education; family ties and relations; and the formation of social and economic networks [45]. Y. Kalahin and O. Shanidze adopt a gender-sensitive approach to studying wartime migration, acknowledging the predominance of women with children among Ukrainian refugees [25].

A thorough analysis of the social characteristics of refugees and internally displaced persons in Ukraine as a social group that emerged as a result of a full-scale invasion by the aggressor is presented in a monographic study by a team of authors (M. Biriukova, Y. Kalahin, N. Kovalisko, D. Tereshchenko, S. Hryhorieva, and others). In particular, the study identifies the peculiarities of social practices of Ukrainians that are built when they decide to leave, motives for deterring evacuation, ways of adaptation at a new place of residence, typical problems of migrants and factors that influence their migration behaviour [26].

A comprehensive description of the three forms of data collection on the migration stories of displaced persons and four ways of presenting them in scientific publications was provided by migration researcher V. Hnatiuk, who reveals the methodological and methodological foundations for the correct study of the migration phenomenon, given the current topic of military migration in scientific publications [18].

Shevchenko argues for the relevance of studying the family dynamics of migration and emphasises the importance of studying the motivations of those who have returned after a long experience of staying in other countries and those who have changed from one host country to another. Introducing these topics into the research arsenal will expand the possibilities of sociological understanding of this phenomenon [37].

In contrast to the above sources, the current study aims to analyse the new social orders that emerged over the past two years of Ukraine's internal and external forced migration processes. In particular, it is a new social

reality for migrants who, using existing/new conditions, resources, and opportunities, overcome numerous challenges, undergo adaptation processes, and build life strategies for further staying in host communities or countries or returning home. Their perceptions and assessments of all these migration processes in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war are important for sociological analysis.

According to the Ukrainian sociologist S. Makeev, social order is generally determined primarily by a set of divisions organised both horizontally (social differentiation) and vertically (social stratification). In the historical and analytical context, there are three main types of divisions: social group divisions (classes, strata), non-hierarchical social differences, and the structure of inequalities in the distribution of wealth. Social differences and classes can coexist, but inequalities are always hierarchical, influencing people's behaviour and motivation by cultivating goals. The social order is reflected in class and socio-cultural structures, as well as inequalities in access to goods. This order initially reflects a descriptive function and is a convenient structure for scientific analysis of society [29]. Social tendencies are organised vertically as stratification orders and horizontally as differential orders. There are rules in society that define inequalities for individuals, but they can be modified. This process results from a social structure that determines the conditions for the activities of individuals and groups and is an integral part of the social order [27, p.3].

P. Blau once drew attention to the fact that newly emerging factors of forming new social orders appear unpredictably in society and, therefore, "unexpectedly" begin to act. He called his systematic ideas on this subject the theory of emergence - the sudden appearance of unusual new social conditions [4]. Emergent factors are variable external features that can influence social reality. There are stable and emergent social orders. New social practices emerge through the efforts of actors who adapt to new conditions and resources. Emergent practices include using new technologies, rational use of time, financial activities, healthy lifestyle and appearance, etc. According to E. Giddens, seeking a sense of security, "actors" rationalise their world and insist on legalising emergent practices on their individual or social recognition [16]. In our opinion, the relevant strategy for studying new social orders is their multidimensional analysis in the context of the conceptual triad of "positions (status position) - dispositions (perceptions) - practices (activities)" [27, p.31].

In the context of analysing contemporary migration processes, established orders are all migration movements that have taken place since Ukraine's independence, and emergent orders are those caused by unforeseen circumstances, such as forced migration since 2014, which continues to this day. These new social orders have emerged due to the forced migration of internally displaced persons and refugees over the past 10 years. For example, a new social practice is the increased emigration of children due to the war, when mothers try to take them abroad. As for the multidimensional analysis of forced external and internal migration as a new social order, we propose the following conceptual triad: "forced migrants" as a new social group (new social position) (social portrait; acquisition of a new refugee status , internally displaced person (IDP); their self-identification and number of distribution by regions or countries of residence) - "dispositions" (perception and assessment by forced migrants of challenges and fundamental rights in host communities and countries; expectations and perspectives, motives for returning/not returning to the homeland) - "practices" (adaptive behaviour and adjustment to new constraints; access to suddenly emerging conditions, resources and new opportunities; migrants' activities for self-sufficiency and solving problematic life situations at the new place of residence) [44].

Adaptation practices are strategies or processes to adjust to new conditions and environments. This includes changes in behaviour, life strategies, and social interactions to better adapt to new circumstances. For migrants,

this means learning a language, acquiring social skills, finding a job and community support for successful integration in host countries. Status-forming practices of migrants are a system of actions aimed at securing social status through job search, changing refugee status and improving social position. They are based on life perceptions, goals, needs and resources to achieve these goals.

In this chapter, we will highlight the components of the analysis based on the proposed conceptual triad for external migration: the social portrait of refugees, their perception and assessment of new challenges, adaptation practices, and the factors of return/non-return to their homes and their consequences for Ukrainian society as a whole.

For statistical purposes, UNHCR uses the term refugees in a generalised way, referring to all persons who have fled Ukraine because of the war. UNHCR's means of verification and level of access to refugees from Ukraine vary from country to country. While every effort has been made to verify all statistical information, the figures are approximate, and all countries cannot account for potential future movements. Triangulation of information and sources is ongoing. According to the UN, as of 14 March 2024, 6.486 million Ukrainians were registered abroad. However, this data also includes those Ukrainians who have left (or have been forcibly transferred) to Russia and Belarus. According to the UN, which considers information from official Russian sources, as of 30 June 2023, almost 1.3 million Ukrainians were in Russia. In Belarus, there were approximately 40,000 people as of the end of 2023. If we do not take into account Ukrainians who are on the territory of the aggressor countries, their number is 5.1 million [33].

The Eurostat website provides a breakdown of Ukrainian refugees by country of residence. As of the beginning of March 2024, about 4.4 million people had temporary protection status in the EU. The most significant number of refugees reside in Germany - 1.3 million, Poland - 954.8 thousand, and the Czech Republic - 373 thousand. According to Eurostat, most Ukrainians have been granted temporary protection in Germany (28.9%), Poland (22.3%), and the Czech Republic (8.6%) [14].

Outside of Europe, the largest countries in terms of the number of Ukrainians received since the beginning of the full-scale invasion are the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom: as of 28 November 2023, there are about 210.2 thousand Ukrainians in Canada (CUAET, 2024), about 280 thousand in the United States as of 21 March 2023 (NYTimes, 2023), and 253.2 thousand in the United Kingdom as of 6 February 2024 [33].

Thus, based on the registration data in the host countries, the total number of Ukrainian - military migrants who left or were taken abroad because of the full-scale invasion is 6.4 million.

According to the third wave of research by the Centre for Economic Strategies [7], most refugees are women (35-44 - 13%) and children. They accounted for 65% of all refugees abroad as of January 2024. Men make up 35% of refugees. The share of men among refugees has increased significantly since November 2022, at 17%. According to the European Statistical Office, as of January 2024, Europe's most significant Ukrainian refugees were in Germany (30%) and Poland (22%).

The percentage of surveyed Ukrainian refugees with higher or incomplete higher education in January 2024 was 70%. Among countries, this figure is highest in the United States (92%) and the United Kingdom (85%). This confirms the observations of previous waves: the share of highly educated refugees is more than twice as high as the exact domestic Ukrainian figure. As of 2022, 29% of Ukrainians over 24 had at least a bachelor's degree. In large cities in Ukraine, this figure is 44% [38]. Among refugees, 40% have never been abroad, and a quarter had experience of working or living abroad before Russia's open aggression.

A significant proportion of Ukrainian refugees lost a large part of their income after the start of the full-scale invasion. In particular, the proportion of refugees with enough money for basic and expensive items dropped from 29.9% before the war to 6% as of May 2023. However, in January 2024, the share of such refugees increased significantly to 23.4%, close to the pre-war figure of 29.9%. At the same time, the proportion of those who only had enough to buy food is still higher than in the pre-war period - 14.8% (by 5.6%), but almost half as much as in May 2023 [7].

According to an IOM study, 23 per cent of those willing to change their place of residence plan to move to other, primarily European, countries. Among IDPs who have returned home, the share of potential emigrants is even higher - 32% [22]. Thus, internally displaced persons can significantly increase the number of refugees from Ukraine to Europe.

The EU Temporary Protection System provides immediate and collective protection to refugees who, for whatever reason, cannot return to their country of origin. The purpose of such protection is to provide asylum, as well as to harmonise and unify the rights of displaced people, including the right to residence, access to the labour market and housing, medical care, social assistance, access to education for children [8]. Despite the benefits of temporary protection, which, in particular, includes assistance and quick access to the labour market, Ukrainians have to overcome numerous challenges: finding stable housing and work, access to healthcare services, overcoming language barriers, etc.

Let us analyse the results of recent studies conducted by various sociological services, which reflect, on the one hand, the perceptions and assessments of displaced people regarding protecting their rights in host societies and, on the other hand, characterising their adaptation practices.

The right to residence and housing. The main problem for Ukrainian refugees abroad was finding accommodation. In the summer of 2023, the Rating sociological group surveyed war refugees from Ukraine in 31 European countries to find out where they thought it was better: in their host country or Ukraine . According to the survey, our citizens live in Europe in quite (34%) or somewhat (51%) comfortable conditions, while only 13% have uncomfortable conditions. Comfortable conditions for 85% of refugees can be another argument for their continued stay abroad [35]. The comfort of living conditions depends on income, region and length of stay in the host country.

Access to the labour market. Several studies provide information on employment and challenges in the labour market of host countries. Refugees have become more active and are gradually integrating into foreign labour markets. Most Ukrainian citizens employed abroad reported earning more than before the full-scale invasion, almost 20% higher than in November 2022 [7; 47].

It is estimated that by the end of 2023, more than 40% of adult refugees were working in host countries. Another 8% worked remotely. It is worth noting, however, that 13% of those working abroad do not have an employment contract, and one in two are employed in less-skilled jobs than in Ukraine.

According to a survey conducted by the sociological company Factum Group in July-August 2023, 53% of adult refugees have found employment abroad: 9% work online for Ukrainian companies, and one-third work offline in the host country. At the same time, almost 80% of those employed say their work abroad is less skilled than in Ukraine [30].

According to the Rating sociological group, 49% of Ukrainian refugees in Europe are employed. Among those who arrived before the invasion, 74% are employed, 67% of employed Ukrainians in Eastern Europe and 35% in Western Europe. The lowest number of employed Ukrainians came from the South and East of

the country, as well as from Kyiv. Those who speak the local language well are the most employed. Among those employed, more than 80% have jobs in the host country, 14% - in Ukraine or several countries at once.

The employment rate among men is almost 1.5 times higher than among women. Similarly, among respondents who do not have children, employment is higher than among those who do (14% do not work due to childcare). A quarter of respondents aged 16-24 are not working due to studying. Among those unemployed, a quarter are actively looking for a job, another 39% are thinking about it, and a third are not looking for a job. Ukrainians living in Western Europe are the least concerned about job search. Women think less about job search than men, especially in middle age [35].

The most common problems for Ukrainians in Europe are the language barrier (73%), unskilled work (29%), low-paid work (19%), and non-recognition of Ukrainian education diplomas (14%). Respondents are currently actively looking for a job, and to add to this, employers are reluctant to hire Ukrainians. Respondents who continue to work in Ukraine often mention the latter factor. Also, those who work in Ukraine see unskilled work as a problem more than others, which may be why they do not want to change their Ukrainian job.

In terms of work ties to Ukraine, approximately 8% of respondents said they continue to work remotely in the same job in Ukraine that they had before the full-scale war; about 2% of respondents said they had found a new remote job in Ukraine as well [7].

While respondents in Western Europe mentioned the language barrier relatively more often, low-paying jobs and unwillingness to hire Ukrainians were mentioned more often in Eastern Europe. The fact that the job is far from home was more often mentioned by respondents in Northern Europe, and the non-recognition of Ukrainian diplomas - in Southern Europe. In the first (November 2022) and second waves (August 2023), researchers used cluster analysis to identify four groups of refugees, which gives us an aggregated structure of refugees by various indicators. The surveys were conducted by Info Sapiens in November-December 2022 and April-May 2023. The first wave of the survey was conducted in November 2022. A total of 1,003 Ukrainians who were abroad at the time (except for Russia and Belarus) were interviewed. The survey was conducted using a targeted messaging service from Kyivstar mobile operator: an SMS with a link to the questionnaire was sent.

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first wave who left their contacts were sent an invitation to take the survey again and a link to the online questionnaire.

At the same time, Ukrainians who are actively learning the local language, have rather low incomes, arrived relatively recently, and are looking for options to stay in the host country for a more extended period are looking for work. At the same time, a significant proportion of refugees who do not work cite the following principal reasons: they are unable to work due to family responsibilities (caring for young children and infirm family members), language barriers, and inability to find a job due to the non-recognition of their diploma or qualification. However, it is also worth noting that most host countries use various mechanisms to facilitate refugees' access to the labour market: language courses, counselling, job matching, training and retraining.

Access to medical services. Ukrainian refugees abroad often face the problem of access to medical services, as reported by 35 per cent of respondents (at the end of 2022, 30 per cent of respondents said this). The main obstacles include long waits, language barriers and the inability to make an appointment. At least a third of refugees have made at least one visit to Ukraine. Moreover, one in five of those who have travelled to Ukraine stated that the purpose of their visit was medical treatment (ODP, 2023). Access to healthcare services in Eastern and Northern Europe is worse than in Western and Southern Europe. So is their quality, which in Eastern Europe lags behind that of Ukraine. Older refugees rate the accessibility and quality of healthcare services in the Ukrainian system higher.

The right to social assistance. Most Ukrainians in Europe (72%) believe Ukrainian refugees receive sufficient assistance. In particular, 84% of Ukrainians in Western and Northern Europe, 65% in Eastern Europe and 47% in Southern Europe share this opinion. Most respondents (61%) believe that humanitarian aid to Ukraine is sufficient. Most respondents (52%) consider financial assistance sufficient (RATINGGROUP, 2023).

Despite the overall decrease in support, the level of assistance to refugees remains high: approximately 71 per cent of refugees receive at least some assistance. In November 2022, this figure was 92.5% (CES, 2023). Germany remains the most generous country to refugees, with almost three-quarters of Ukrainian refugees attending language courses and receiving social benefits and housing. Poland has seen the most significant decrease in assistance to refugees. In November 2022, only 9.4 per cent of Ukrainians in Poland reported receiving no assistance. In January 2024, more than half received no support from the Polish government (CES, 2024).

Thus, this situation with social payments affects the adaptive practices of refugees: learning the local language for further employment opportunities; finding a job in their speciality or accepting less skilled work; starting their own business; deciding to return to Ukraine or moving to another country with more favourable conditions for employment/residence/study, etc.

Access to education for children. Displacement and the lack of more or less permanent housing impede, for example, children's schooling. 29 per cent of refugee families with school-age children stated that at least one of their children does not attend school in the host country. Overall, it is estimated that 40-50 per cent of refugee children do not attend school abroad (ODP, 2023a). This is mainly because they prefer distance learning in Ukrainian schools (80 per cent), but also due to language barriers (10 per cent) and lack of places in local schools (7 per cent) (ODP, 2023). Young people (16-25 years old) have a somewhat better assessment of higher education in Europe because it is their priority. Perhaps they have already been exposed to it because they are studying in Europe or are considering it (RATINGGROUP, 2023). The share of respondents

who studied in Ukrainian educational institutions decreased from around 5% in November 2022 and May 2023 to 3.4% in January 2024 (CES, 2024).

Adaptation processes. The integration of Ukrainian refugees abroad is also ongoing. As for the difficulties of adaptation, Ukrainian refugees most often mention the local language (40%), financial difficulties (28%) and finding accommodation (24%). Almost two-thirds of respondents (62%) state that they were able to adapt (thoroughly or quickly) to life in the host country (GRADUS, 2023). The proportion of refugees who like it abroad better than in Ukraine has increased. Western societies have done a lot to make Ukrainians fleeing the war feel welcomed; this is manifested in institutional support and interpersonal interaction. Approximately 80% of Ukrainians surveyed positively assessed the attitude of locals towards them. Among the countries with a large number of Ukrainians, refugees in countries with a higher level of ethnic and cultural diversity, such as the UK, France and the USA, report the best attitude towards them. Another indicator of integration into a foreign society is friendly relations with locals. The share of those who have good friends among locals has increased by 8%, but almost a third of Ukrainians still do not have such personal connections (CES, 2024).

Summarising refugees' perceptions of the availability of services and the benefits of living abroad and in Ukraine, it should be noted that their prolonged stay has contributed not only to the formation of more realistic ideas about life in foreign countries but also to an inevitable reassessment of their attitude to living conditions at home. Surveys have shown that Ukrainians living in Europe believe the opportunities to succeed in Ukraine and abroad are roughly the same (RATINGGROUP, 2023). EU countries have less corruption, more income opportunities, better social protection, and better human rights guarantees. Starting a business in Ukraine is easier, and bureaucracy is higher abroad. Ukrainians rate domestic administrative and healthcare services positively and consider education better in schools and kindergartens, but higher education is slightly better abroad. Living conditions of Ukrainians in EU countries vary, depending on social benefits and support. This affects their adaptive practices and consideration of the prospects of returning to Ukraine.

Factors of return/non-return in the perceptions of forced migrants Experts of the Centre for Economic Strategies have been studying the status and attitudes of Ukrainian refugees and the impact of their non-return on the Ukrainian economy. Since then, they have conducted three waves of research on the number of Ukrainian refugees, how they live abroad, and what is needed to bring them back (CES, 2024). In the first (November 2022) and second waves (August 2023), researchers used cluster analysis to identify four groups of refugees , which give us an aggregated structure of refugees by various indicators.

The first group (25% of all refugees) are classical refugees: mostly middle-aged women with children who have travelled to Poland. They are not very adapted to life abroad, as 41% of Ukrainians in this group have never been abroad before. In addition, they mostly lived in settlements that were outside the war zone but suffered from rocket attacks (Central and Western Ukraine, as well as Odesa region). Accordingly, the main reason for going abroad was fear for their own safety.

The second group (29% of all refugees) are quasi-labour migrants who went abroad not only because of the war, but also for work. They are the most adapted to life abroad, as 25% of people in this group have already had experience of working abroad. Also, for this group, external factors - both the hostilities and the policy of the Ukrainian state - will have the least impact on their decision to return to Ukraine.

The third group (29 per cent of all refugees) are professionals, people who mostly work in their speciality and are less willing to work outside of it. They also often had their own business before the war. This group is more loyal to Ukraine and more often than others plans to return to Ukraine.

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The third group (29 per cent of all refugees) are professionals, people who mostly work in their speciality and are less willing to work outside of it. They also often had their own business before the war. This group is more loyal to Ukraine and more often than others plans to return to Ukraine [43].

The fourth group (16% of all refugees) is made up of people from the war zone, Ukrainians who suffered the most from the war. People from this segment are the most ready to take steps to adapt abroad. At the same time, they also express the greatest readiness to return to another region of Ukraine if it is not possible to return to their home region. Their decision to return will depend on the conditions created for this.

The third wave was conducted in December 2023 - January 2024, and the data from the previous waves were used to compare the results . Since the survey was not a panel survey (new respondents were randomly selected for the new wave of the survey, rather than interviewing people from the previous wave), the researchers could not track how the plans and characteristics of refugees in previous groups had changed. Therefore, in the third wave, a new cluster analysis was conducted and other groups were identified. The cluster analysis also identified four groups of refugees, each with different intentions to return home:

The first group (15 per cent of all refugees) is "people from the war zone": Ukrainians who were forced to leave their homes due to active hostilities or the occupation of their regions. All respondents from this group have experienced negative consequences due to the war. Compared to other groups, people in this group are more likely to be women aged 25-49, to have travelled abroad with children, and to reside in Poland. They are also more likely to be employed full or part-time or looking for work than other groups. Representatives of this group are less likely to be confident about returning to Ukraine: only 13.8% plan to return to Ukraine, compared to 26.2% of all refugees. Their decision to return to Ukraine will depend on the conditions created for this.

The second group (30% of all refugees) are “self-sufficient”: they are the least likely to receive assistance from the host country and are more likely to pay their rent. Representatives of this group are most likely to work remotely for a Ukrainian company (16.6% of this group compared to 10% of all refugees) and full-time in a host country (30% compared to 24.1% of all refugees). In addition, people in this group had relatively higher income levels before the full-scale invasion: 45.7 per cent of people could buy anything at any time or had enough for everything except buying a car or apartment, compared to 37.7 per cent of all respondents. Now, 34.6% of people in this group are in this income category, compared to 30% of all respondents. They are also more likely to return to Ukraine: 45.1% plan to return (compared to 26.2% of all refugees). Considering both those who plan and those who instead plan, the number of such people in this group is 64.3% (compared to 52.4% among all refugees). Representatives of this group are also the most ready to return to Ukraine even before the end of the war - 54.2% compared to 38.7% of all refugees.

The third group (28 per cent of all refugees) is “older people”. These are mostly older people (50+ years old), most of whom do not have higher education. Compared to other groups, they are less likely to receive social benefits. Furthermore, those who receive them do not have enough to cover their basic needs. They are also more connected to Ukraine than representatives of other groups: 62.8 per cent of them returned to Ukraine after leaving abroad, compared to 46.4 per cent of all refugees.

The fourth group (27 per cent of all refugees) is people “in the process of integration”. These Ukrainians are in the process of active integration into the host country. They are, for example, more likely than other groups to attend language or other short-term courses and are not yet employed. Generous social benefits allow people in this group to concentrate on their studies: the majority (67.3%) of them are provided with housing by the state (compared to 37.8% of all refugees), 82.8% receive social benefits (compared to 39.5% of all refugees), and 85.2% attend language courses (compared to 35.9% of all refugees). Many in this group (40%) live in Germany (compared to 17.7% of all refugees), which is known for its generous benefits. Ukrainians in this group are less connected to their homeland: only 35.9% of them visited Ukraine during their stay (compared to 46.4% of all refugees). They are, therefore, less likely to return: only 16.5% of them plan to return (compared to 26.2% of all refugees), and 20.8% instead plan to return (compared to 26.3% of all refugees) [7].

In the third wave of surveys, Ukrainian refugees were asked about their intentions to return: most Ukrainians still plan to return to Ukraine (26% definitely and 26% probably). However, the number of The reasons for non-return, according to migrants, are: deterioration of the economic and security situation and a high level of uncertainty in Ukraine; destroyed/damaged housing; better economic conditions abroad; assimilation in the host country (availability of work, language learning, advanced training, etc.); the desire to live abroad; and prospects for reunification with relatives abroad.

Ukraine and partner countries should work closely together to find approaches that consider the interests of Ukraine, host countries and migrants themselves. This could be achieved if the integration of Ukrainian refugees in host countries is carried out in a way that improves their situation in the host country and provides more favourable conditions for reintegration if they decide to return to Ukraine. This involves training and retraining, primarily in the specialities needed for Ukraine’s post-war recovery, which are also in demand in the labour market of the host countries, active language learning, i.e. the accumulation of refugees’ human capital, which will contribute to their life success regardless of their place of further residence [42].

At the same time, mutual recognition of knowledge and qualifications, both obtained in Ukraine and acquired during their stay in foreign countries, is extremely important for both integration abroad and eventual return. To ensure that pupils and students can continue their studies without hindrance, regardless of their place of residence, it is necessary to simplify the procedure for bilateral recognition of acquired knowledge.

Maintaining ties with Ukraine, organising Ukrainian education in host countries, especially learning the Ukrainian language, and promoting remote work for Ukrainian companies and studying in Ukrainian educational institutions are extremely important.

Host countries and Ukraine should cooperate in preserving and strengthening financial ties between refugees and Ukraine, help reduce the cost of remittances, and prevent double taxation.

Finally, further cooperation between stakeholders is needed to create a legal framework for cross-border mobility of Ukrainians in Europe after the war. Ukrainian war refugees will be more likely to return home if confident they can migrate again if necessary. Successful reintegration requires secure legal status, productive investment opportunities, and institutional support to prevent households from falling back into poverty [46].

For successful and mutually beneficial cooperation between Ukraine and host countries and to resolve the future fate of migrants, it is essential to create conditions for their integration and the possibility of returning to help Ukraine in its post-war recovery.

Forced internal and external migration processes raise the issue of the state's institutional capacity to solve problems in this area, which should be addressed with a comprehensive approach. Today, Ukraine needs to review the compliance of the declared migration policy with the real state of affairs - the ability of the authorities to adequately respond to migration challenges and address several problematic life situations of displaced persons: information and communication, housing, employment, medical, psychological, social, economic, political, integration and adaptation, etc.

Since the phenomenon of Ukrainian forced migration is new and not yet sufficiently studied, it is important to continue to apply a more sensitive sociological methodology to study adaptation practices, perceptions and motives for return/non-return. This is especially important given that emergent factors are constantly changing, and it is too early to talk about stabilising the situation. In particular, it is proposed that both positive and negative motivations be considered by comparing living conditions in Ukraine and the host country. Analysing the ratio of such motivations concerning different aspects of life in both countries will allow us to understand return intentions more accurately, as well as how different life situations of migrants are affected by decisions that are delayed or dependent on unpredictable/random events.

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OLD AND NEW SOCIAL ORDERS IN MENTALITY AND STEREOTYPES OF UKRAINIANS DURING RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR

The study of Ukrainian mentality and stereotypes is vital for both theoretical and practical understanding of national identity. These concepts help explain how Ukrainians perceive themselves and others, especially within the European cultural and political context. Stereotypes, as a major component of mentality, reflect continuity or transformation under the impact of war. The state's role is to maintain order and promote new social values that foster unity. However, when mental change lags behind social and political challenges, leaders and activists must propose models of renewed interaction and cohesion. Ukraine now faces the crucial question of what can unite its diverse society and overcome outdated stereotypes. After February 2022, unity against external threat was replaced by fatigue and fragmentation. Our goal is to explore which mental patterns persist, which evolve, and how they shape collective resilience and value change in wartime Ukraine.

Keywords: war, Ukraine, mentality, stereotypes

The current Russian-Ukrainian war has raised the issue of studying changes in mentality/mentality in the scientific discourse, which includes archetypes, stereotypes, and values historically and socio-culturally shaped by Ukrainian society. Many features of the mentality and stereotypes of Ukrainians, which are important for understanding modern Ukrainian society, have not been studied sufficiently. This leads to an arbitrary, often unreasonable use of this concept. Explaining the reasons for the behaviour of individuals and social groups by mentality or mentality has become a widespread phenomenon in recent years. "Mentality" and "mentality" are used as concepts with a vague meaning, although they focus on some personal and group behaviour features. A driver parked his car in a pedestrian zone - "this is our mentality"; a government official stole money from the public budget - again, "mentality"; someone smokes at a bus stop near passers-by, does not clean up after themselves, gives bribes and has a habit of only discussing problems and not acting on them - and here again, "our mentality". On the one hand, the concept of "mentality" has become widely used by the public. People often talk about the mentality of a nation, a class, a social stratum, a criminal community, or the mentality of women or youth.

On the other hand, such an overly broad application of this concept leads to stereotyping. That is, the very notion of mentality/mentality becomes a stereotype that is often manipulated, simplified, or used to condemn or justify certain social phenomena or actions of people. In this context, mentality acts as a "magic key" or "magic wand" to explain the individual or group behaviour of Ukrainians. The general panorama of features of the Ukrainian mentality is so variegated and poorly understood that it is probably not worth attributing to it traffic violations, theft from the budget, smoking in public places, corruption or untidiness.

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Ukrainian Society: Creation of New Social Orders

Contemporary philosopher A. Baumeister believes that Ukrainian society should transition to complex rather than simple thinking. The world is becoming more complex, and ideas about certain phenomena will become more complex. Consequently, thinking must become more complex. Ukraine is fighting for the right to build an open European society. On the other hand, Ukraine is fighting for survival, for the right to exist as a state, nation and society (i.e., to affirm the positive characteristics of the Ukrainian mentality), and we have not yet won. In this case, complex thinking manifests in the fact that both strategies are pursued simultaneously. One strategy is to survive and win the Russian-Ukrainian war by changing our mental structure/mental traits.

War as an extreme condition of change provides an opportunity to change those traits that pull Ukrainians into the past rather than the Future. Second, to recover, to take a worthy place in the world, showing their best/positive characteristics of mentality, those positive "castellations"/stable/unmovable value systems/unchangeable traits in the mentality of Ukrainians that are characteristic of Ukrainian society only. Thus, we are talking about old and new orders that shape the overall mentality of Ukrainians.

Mentality applies to any community of people that has a perception of itself as a community. This community is not necessarily a distinct historical collective. This community is not a political or historical nation. This community is not necessarily cultural. Two prerequisites are necessary for the emergence of a mentality. First, a sense of a certain "we" - a community, that is, a certain solidarity of a social group. Secondly, this "we" community has existed in history for a specific period. Mentality can be viewed as a product of specific recurring historical structures that have established certain experiences that shape our actions. These actions can be conscious or unconscious. The modes of action/strategies of action are repeated and, therefore, recognisable over time. This is the first sign of mentality. However, there is another way to look at mentality. The second feature of mentality can be seen through the prism of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has a concept of the social unconscious. The mentality is configured in such a way that we as a community construct specific knowledge about ourselves and what we would like not to know about ourselves; what we want to talk about ourselves as a community and what we would like to keep silent; what we prefer to remember, what we prefer to forget and never remember; what is permissible for us and what is not permissible, etc.

Mentality changes more slowly than the material and social world, so it can both accelerate and slow down social development. It follows that studying the peculiarities of collective consciousness and people's perception of the processes is necessary. Mental structures are formed over many generations. That is why the transformation of value attitudes and stereotypes as one of the components of the mentality is relatively slow. Ignoring the mental structures/traits formed in society or destroying them is a serious threat to modernisation, progress, democracy, unity, and national security. Mentality is formed, functions and changes much more slowly and without the awareness of those who are its bearers. On the one hand, it is the property not only of the leading strata of society at a particular stage of its existence but of the whole society as a fundamental layer of mass and individual consciousness of society. At the same time, it is a complex mental toolkit peculiar to a particular era and community, which individuals master and use in an unconscious, instinctive form, creating a special general image of the world.

That is why the issue of studying the mentality of Ukrainians is significant for theoretical and practical reasons. Today, there is a growing interest in the values, archetypes, and stereotypes in the patterns of action of Ukrainians [32]. Therefore, contemporary researchers focus on various aspects of analysing the concepts

of mentality, stereotypes denoting the national character's deep structures, fundamental characteristics of the national spirit, and archetypal manifestations of mass consciousness. Some scholars neglect the differences in the definitions of these terms and do not distinguish between mentality and mentality. The concept of "mentality" allows for considering rationalised systems of thought and consciousness and irrational ones, which are expressed in ideas, values, and attitudes.

Recent research shows how wartime conditions reshape value orientations and motivational structures within the national mentality [31, 34]. Thus, the scientific problem of the article is the discrepancy between the existing theoretical and methodological developments on the mentality of Ukrainians, on the one hand, and the growing importance of socio-cultural and historical changes in Ukrainian society related to the war, on the other. The purpose of the paper is to conceptualise the old and new orders as socio-cultural phenomena of mentality and to reveal the peculiarities of their change as a result of the extreme events of the war.

The concept of "mentality" was developed in Anglo-Saxon and French discourses, within which the search for socio-psychological characteristics of representatives of different ethnic groups and behavioural characteristics took place. The English tradition traces the term "mentality" back to the Latin "mentalis" (mind, thinking, way of thinking, mental disposition), defining a general spiritual attitude towards a holistic picture of the world. In the French tradition, the term "mentalité" was used to describe everyday situations, thanks to Voltaire. In everyday understanding, this term did not explain social groups or individuals' social and psychological characteristics.

Current encyclopaedic definitions explain mentality as the perception and interpretation of the world, widespread in a particular community and expressed in established patterns, stencils, complexes of thought - archetypes and stereotypes. It can be argued that mentality is a way of seeing the world, or "optics", through which a particular community (group of people, nation) looks at the world, perceives it and other communities, and comprehends itself. It is a particular construction or "architecture" of thinking that is shaped, built, influenced or pressured by labels, stereotypes, archetypes, or even prototypes of thought and language, as well as by the values that guide society and influence its way of life. However, it can also be said that the mentality gives rise to all these stereotypes and mits, so there is a two-way relationship (see Figure 1).



Figure 1. The relationship between mentality and stereotype. Source: Created by the authors

Schematically summarising previous studies, we can display the following components that form the framework of mentality, which most researchers agree with.

The notion of mentality is a concept studied in philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, history, and other humanities and social sciences, and each has its specific interpretation. The diversity of approaches

to defining the essence and forms of mentality by representatives of different scientific fields and schools leads to methodological difficulties and the inability to compare the results of different studies. In modern research, the category of mentality is understood mainly through the restoration of traditional categories such as "national character", "social spirit", "collective unconscious", "soul of the people", "social psyche", etc. The relevance of the topic of mentality research also lies in the fact that without a certain theoretical, conceptual coherence of the issue, a particular common "theoretical framework", researchers pay little attention to the changes that have already taken place in the mentality of Ukrainians during the military operations in Ukraine.



Figure 2. Mentality structure. Source: Created by the authors

Simultaneously with ethnologists (anthropologists), the concept of mentality was introduced into scientific use by sociologists, primarily by E. Durkheim in the section "Group Mentality" in the section "Group Mentality" in "The concept of mentality as a sphere of "collective representations" and their influence on social life was reinterpreted in the works of E. Durkheim. Considering the nature of the emergence of ideas in society, the researcher points to their objective nature, independent of the personal nature of a particular individual, since they exist outside the individual consciousness. "The basis of our judgements is the appropriate number of concepts that guide our conscious life. If categories are collective representations, they reflect different states of the collective" [8, p. 213]. Each influences social life with feelings and worldview, accumulating its development. However, this process becomes possible only due to mutual influence and interdependent actions, leading to overcoming the boundaries of individual consciousness. "A chemical synthesis takes place, which concentrates and unites the synthesised elements and thus transforms them. Since this synthesis is the creation of a whole, the whole itself is the stage on which its actions unfold. Therefore, the equal force emanating from it goes beyond the boundaries of a particular individual consciousness, just as the whole goes beyond the boundaries of the part" [9, p. 234]. Individuals find themselves in an already formed social reality from birth, so they are forced to master it in socialisation. A person acquires the initial schemes of life, behaviour, and orientation in the world through language and speech acquisition. It is then that the deep foundations of human experience are formed, which are formed and stored in linguistic structures. Changes in language habits lead to a transformation of mental attitudes. An individual tries to adapt his or her ways of thinking and acting to the existing ones, as he or she risks facing prejudice from society. Deprived of the individual nature of a particular person, collective ideas develop and change [9, p. 240]. Objectively presenting social reality and its ideals, collective ideas are not free from the world of subjectivity and its influence.

The next stage in the study of the problems of mentality is the publications of J. Lefebvre in the 1930s, in which the concepts of collective and individual mentality are distinguished and applied as specific, primarily biologically determined constants of human thinking. This problem is widely covered in the theoretical heritage of the Annales school. This trend in historical thought, or the "new historical school", dates back to the works of French historians Marc Bloch and Lucien Fevre.

The content and interpretation of the concept in sociological discourse are still debatable. In sociology, the term mentality is often used to refer to the shared beliefs, attitudes and values of a particular group or society. It encompasses a collective mindset or worldview that shapes how individuals in a given social group perceive the world, interpret experiences, and make sense of their reality.

Even though the term mentality/mentality is used in sociological discourse, it is important to note that it does not have a single, generally accepted definition. Sociologists often rely on different theoretical approaches to analyse mentality in specific social, cultural and historical contexts. Thus, it is worth paying attention to Pierre Bourdieu's work "The Social Structures of the Economy". The author explored the concept of habitus, which includes mental structures and dispositions that shape the perceptions and practices of individuals (Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education (pp. 241-258). Greenwood Press.) In The Sociological Imagination, Charles Wright Mills discusses the importance of understanding the intersection of personal problems and social issues, emphasising the role of the social mentality in shaping individual experience (Mills, C. W. (1959). The Sociological Imagination. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Irving Goffman explores how people manage their self-presentation in social interactions, analysing the importance of mentality in shaping behaviour (Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Doubleday.) These sources give an idea of the sociological understanding of mentality. However, they are insufficient to obtain a deeper essential characteristic of the concept of mentality. That is why theoretical reflection on the components of mentality and empirical sociological testing of the introduced hypotheses is a promising area of work. Summarising the experience of researchers, we can name several sociological categories, which, if considered in conjunction, would reveal the specificity of mental structures/traits. First of all, these are value orientations and related social attitudes. Secondly, the sociological study of mentality is based on a profound acquaintance with social stereotypes as a typified perception of the world around us, which is maximally adapted to human activity. Thirdly, the sociologist's analysis of the cultural environment as an intrinsic factor influencing the value orientation system is critical. Thus, the concept of mentality, according to sociological authors, reflects the historically and socio-culturally determined way of thinking of a community, the level of collective consciousness (cognitive element), which includes the unconscious (attitudes), value orientations, stereotypes (evaluative element) and behavioural strategies of a particular social group or society as a whole (behavioural element).

In our author's opinion, the structure of the mentality as a multifaceted socio-cultural phenomenon can be presented in the following way: the "archetypal" component of the mentality - a system of archetypes; the cognitive component - the image of the world and ways of thinking of a collective subject; value-sense component - a system of values, value orientations, ideals, meanings, norms; emotional component - assessments, moods, emotions, feelings; behavioural component - motives and stereotypes of behaviour. It should be noted that each of these components has unconscious and conscious levels, and the phenomenon of national mentality has stable and unstable structural states.

To a certain extent, stereotyping contributes to forming a mentality that separates it from others, particularly through the so-called autostereotypes - the perceptions of representatives of a nation about themselves, and heterostereotypes - perceptions of representatives of other ethno-national communities. We propose visually representing the mentality's components based on the analysed material.

Ukrainian scholars from the diaspora have contributed to studying the mentality of Ukrainians. First of all, these are F. Vovk's Studies on Ukrainian Mentality and Anthropology, Y. Yarema's Ukrainian Spirituality in its Cultural and Historical Manifestations, D. Chyzhevsky's Main Features of the Ukrainian Worldview in Ukrainian Culture, I. Mirchuk's Worldview of the Ukrainian People, and Y. Lypa's The Destiny of Ukraine, in which the authors explain the essence of the Ukrainian mentality and the place of the Ukrainian ethnic group in world development. Interesting approaches to solving the problem are reflected in the works of V. Shcherbakovsky's "Formation of the Ukrainian Nation" and V. Petrov's "Origin of the Ukrainian People". D. Dontsov's monograph "The Spirit of Our Antiquity" is notable for its patriotic orientation. A significant contribution was made by O. Kulchytskyi, B. Tsymbalistyi, E. Yunatskyi, M. Shlemkevych, and V. Yaniv, whose works were published in the postwar years in the USA, France, and Germany. These researchers consider the mentality problem in terms of nationally determined psychophysical properties.



Figure 3. Mentality structure. Source: Created by the authors

Today, one can find a wide range of scholarly literature on the Ukrainian mentality and its main features. However, the history of its formation and even the current state of mental changes require additional research.

In the following section, we will focus on two types of mentality, namely national and political mentality, and try to analyse what changes have taken place in the mental structure of Ukrainians. Liseenko suggests

that the essence of national mentality should be considered a set of cognitive, archetypal, value-semantic, emotional, and behavioural components that develop and form in a particular cultural space.



Figure 4. Types of mentality. Source: Created by the authors

In the most general terms, the author proposes to consider the national mentality as a set of historically formed attitudes and character traits of the people, values, stereotypes and archetypes with specific behavioural manifestations. The author notes that national mentality is an integrally syncretic formation in which a people's life meanings (values) constitute the dominant modelling of its worldview, world perception, and world understanding. The mechanism of functioning of the national mentality can be based on three main functional attitudes: perception (which is a cognitive element), evaluation (affect) and behaviour (an action component), which represent a kind of deep psychic "vertical" and socio-cultural orientations. The richest phenomenology of the manifestation of national mentality reveals its complex cognitive, value, emotional and behavioural structure. The dominant qualitative core of the national mentality is the system of values. Therefore, the national mentality can be defined as a special, extremely stable way of organising and structuring the system of fundamental values, for example, the system of moral ideals, i.e. the system of stable, established mass spiritual structures that prevail in a society at a given time. Studying stereotypes of the national and political mentality is an important key to revealing its specificity.

Numerous researchers almost unanimously cite several basic interrelated features of the traditional political mentality of Ukrainians, including:

- existential individualism,
- egocentrism,
- introversion,
- escapism,
- conservatism,
- cardiocentricity,
- social egalitarianism,
- community centricity,
- provincialism,
- general apolitical attitude,

- anarchy, etc. [12, 94].

In the course of research, Ukrainian scientists summarised and identified four systemic features of the mentality of the Ukrainian people:

1. Introversion of higher mental functions in the perception of reality manifests in the person's focus on the facts and problems of the inner, personal and individual world.

2. Cardiocentricity, which is manifested in sentimentalism, sensitivity, and love for Nature is reflected Nature is vividly reflected in song folklore.

3. Anarchic individualism, a particularistic desire for personal freedom without a proper desire for statehood, with a lack of clear goals, discipline

And organisation.

4. The predominance of the emotional and sensual over the will and intellect [13, 7]. These are the assessments and conclusions regarding the features of the Ukrainian mentality in terms of the basis of the "competitiveness" of Ukrainians in a challenging, pragmatic and rational world. Another feature that can be pointed out is marginality (from the Latin margo - edge, boundary, border). The marginal, borderline frontier character of the Ukrainian mentality is determined by a conditional intercivilisational rift, a border that runs through Ukraine, dividing it and separating European (Western) and Eurasian civilisations [14,9]. Ukraine has remained a border/frontier, an arena of confrontation between the East and the West for centuries. Traditionally, marginality is associated with a set of rather unattractive characteristics: vulnerability, aggressiveness, doubts about personal value, fear of having to make decisions, unscrupulousness, and unpredictable behaviour [16, 211]. At the same time, marginalised people can be characterised by search, dynamism, the ability to mobilise their adaptive potentials, and socially effective behaviour.

Such a split, inconsistency, and combination of different components in one society significantly complicates the predictability of social processes in Ukraine and the possibility of effective influence on public consciousness. However, this only underlines the importance of researching and understanding the mental foundations of Ukrainian society, especially in times of war.

A stereotype is a part or building block of the mentality, along with labels, archetypes and values. In our opinion, stereotypes are the inhibiting phenomenon that does not contribute to changing mental traits. Stereotypes, as specifically established formulas, shapes, stencils, thought patterns, and pre-formed assessments of events, actions, individuals, and communities, simplify our thinking. New challenges/orders that emerge in society can lead to abandoning old stereotypes, adaptation to new realities, and convergence/divergence of stereotypes. Therefore, the war as a deep collective stress and the European integration perspective as a "light of hope" for modern Ukrainians may well become impulses for change or, on the contrary, the establishment/castration/stability of stereotypes as part of the mentality [33]. One of the key tasks is to find out how Ukrainians have changed, how their stereotypes have changed, and how their mentality has changed since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war.

The interest in stereotypes as one of the ways of perceiving social reality was formed in the 1920s under the influence of W. Lippman's work "Public Opinion". A significant contribution to the development of the problem was made by T. Adorno, R. Binkley, K. Braly, M. Horkheimer, J. Dollard, D. Katz, O. Klenberg, W. Albig, G. Allport and others. In Ukrainian sociology, stereotypes are studied by V. Arbenina, V. Krasnykh, A. Ruchka, V. Sereda, Y. Soroka, and others.

It is worth noting that today, "stereotype" is one of the most widely used terms in foreign and Ukrainian socio-humanitarian research. Different philosophical, psychological, and sociological theories have developed different approaches to considering and explaining the place of stereotypes and ways of studying them. In particular, philosophy divides the world of the individual into conscious and unconscious levels or rational and irrational levels, while stereotypes are attributed to the conscious level in the overall structure of identity, which in turn functions in a certain socio-cultural environment. From the point of view of psychological and sociological sciences, mentality consists of cognitive, emotional and conative components that are part of the conscious or rational level. However, it is worth noting that stereotypes can often function on the unconscious or irrational level as well. It is the inclusion or exclusion of the irrational component from the research focus that distinguishes sociological and psychological approaches to the study of stereotypes.

In his classic works on the study of stereotypes, U. Lippmann defines the concept as "a pattern of perception, filtering, and interpretation of information accepted in a historical community, which manifests itself in the process of recognising and knowing the world around us and is based on the individual's previous social experience" [61]. Prior to the publication of U. Lippmann's work, which directly uses the term stereotype, we should mention the works of G. Tard, who does not use this concept, but considers and distinguishes the process of imitation, in particular its functions and features [136].

Today, stereotypes are viewed from several angles, but all definitions include such a feature of stereotypes as "persistence". The first group of authors [Encyclopedia of Sociology, Oxford Advanced Dictionary of Current English] includes those who define the term "stereotype" as a "frozen" image or idea of a social object held by different social actors, which expresses the habitual way of perceiving and acting towards a particular object. A stereotype is actively shared by members of society, is historically and systematically formed and consolidated in socio-cultural experience, and is characterised by uniformity. Accordingly, the stereotype implies avoiding the situation of choice and recognising each new situation as traditional and non-problematic. The second group of researchers focuses on such an element of the stereotype as an attitude proposed by psychologists, particularly social psychologists. It is worth noting that, in their opinion, the peculiarity of stereotypes as attitudes is the orientation towards the Other because if we understand the mechanism of attitudes, it becomes easier to understand the principle of the so-called dominant. The third group of researchers focuses on the form of information processing.

In contrast to attitudes, which are the subject of study for psychologists, in this case, the main emphasis is on knowledge that leads to an appropriate attitude towards a particular group. The stability of stereotypes is also emphasised because, unlike the previous categories, this group is based on action and evaluation. The fourth group of definitions is based on beliefs. According to this group of definitions, we find "beliefs", which, like in the third and first groups, are based on the stability of the phenomenon because it is beliefs that pre-programme and generalise our knowledge, which is not supported, unlike reliable knowledge, and often, like the third category, is based on an "erroneous cognitive formula". The fifth group of researchers defines a stereotype as a judgement emphasising the emotional and evaluative component, which was not present in the previous groups of definitions. This group of definitions is more similar to the first and third groups of definitions but is supplemented by emotional and evaluative tints, as well as expectations regarding the behaviour of a particular group.



Figure 5. The structure of the stereotype. Source: Created by the authors

Thus, a stereotype can be viewed as a concept based on information internalised by the individual, which is shared and maintained at the cognitive, evaluative and behavioural levels. This information can be different: true or false, reliable or unreliable, and it is this information that underlies the construction and fitting into our everyday reality. This approach allows us to consider the concept of stereotype in its social, cultural and activity aspects to emphasise its socio-historical and cultural conditionality.

The concept of "stereotype" can be schematically defined as follows.



Figure 6. The structure of the stereotype In this publication, we pay special attention to national and political stereotypes. After a brief analysis of Ukrainian social media, we can say that Ukrainian society is overloaded with stereotyped images. Source: Created by the authors



Figure 7. Types of stereotypes. Source: Created by the authors

The mentality of Ukrainians is very heterogeneous and differentiated. However, certain mental traits are believed to be common to the whole society. Mental unification, albeit to varying degrees, is facilitated by common historical challenges such as war, revolutions, other social upheavals, financial and economic crises, difficult living conditions, and even physical challenges such as the COVID-19 epidemic. Globalisation, the spread of the Internet, and modern mass culture (local and global) also affect the mentality, uniting it in different directions (positive and negative). However, there are also local, geographical, and ethnographic types of Ukrainian mentality. It is worth noting that the authors are interested in a study that deals with the transformations of political and national stereotypes and the mentality of Ukrainians during the war.

The respondents' views of themselves and the world around them are full of contradictory beliefs, serious dissonances in their perception, and exogenous to themselves. Ukrainians give themselves exceptional characteristics, sometimes even like fairy-tale characters. This ultimately indicates the still immature nature of citizens and society, the deep roots of paternalism, and the desire to divide the world into black and white, i.e. they continue to live by stereotypes. There is also a situation where the population believes that Ukrainian society is "good" and politicians are "bad" because they cannot agree. The extremes in thinking characterise Ukrainians as an "adolescent nation" - an immature society with a largely simplistic, stereotypical mindset.

The war led to the following changes in the Ukrainian mentality. Nowadays, a common feature of the Ukrainian mentality is self-identification as a separate national community and the desire (wish/aspiration) for unconditional national freedom. Freedom can be limited, and the enemy can encroach on it. In the course of historical development, at various times, freedom has been taken away from Ukrainians, or attempts have been made to take it away. Freedom has had to be defended, or for some time, it has had to be more or less obediently accepted and live in unfreedom. Nevertheless, freedom and dignity were, are and remain the most significant values for Ukrainians. On this basis, a sense was formed that Ukrainians are free people who have clear goals for building relationships with each other in communities and societies based on common mental characteristics.

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The following key points of changes in the stereotypical perceptions of Ukrainians can be identified based on empirical sociological research conducted in Ukraine during the war:

Tabe1 1. National and Political Stereotypes of Ukrainians

Negative	Positive
Ukrainians do not trust the state because of the stateless historical period.	Ukrainians have learnt to value the state by giving it a credit of trust.
Ukraine is a failed state.	A high level of patriotism. Ukraine is above all.
Russia has miscalculated that Ukrainians are Little Russians	Ukrainians' ultimate need is freedom and dignity
«Who cares?»	Forming your national identity
Common historical narratives	Ukraine is not Russia, and every country has its history.
Ukrainians are a nation of workers.	Ukrainians defend their country and Europe.
Common cultural traditions	The process of decolonisation of culture and education
Pacifist ideas of «bloodless statehood»	Ukrainians are a peace-loving nation capable of fighting if necessary
Where there are two Ukrainians, there are three Hetmans	Ukrainians are a nation of successful people
Ukrainians do not accept or trust any government	Strengthening local communities and the decentralisation process
Ukrainians are pretty traditional and conservative.	Ukraine adapts quickly to overcome difficulties.
Ukrainians use nepotism rather than laws.	Ukrainians defend democratic values in war.
Ukrainians are a nation of buckwheat growers and farmers	Ukrainians supply most of the world with their agricultural products
Ukrainians have an inferiority complex.	Ukrainians are getting rid of the colonisation discourse.
My house is on the edge.	This is my land, and I am defending it.

Source: Created by the authors

New Image Marketing Group's research highlighted the main features of Ukrainians:

- freedom-loving;
- hospitable;
- are very hostile;
- are cunning in life's matters;
- patriotic;
- hardworking;
- are unable to unite for long.

Ukrainians described themselves through the prism of auto-stereotypes, i.e. they want to see themselves in a positive light (freedom-loving, hospitable, economic, etc.). However, these traits have both positive and negative aspects. For example, the freedom-loving nature of Ukrainians does not allow us to unite around one idea and become united for a long time. However, according to the respondents, cunning in everyday life allows us to find non-standard solutions to problematic situations. In addition, perhaps the only negative trait that Ukrainians mentioned was the inability to unite for a long time. This feature can be explained by the lack of a national statehood idea that would unite all citizens in different regions of Ukraine. Anarchic individualism, a particularistic desire for personal freedom without a proper desire for statehood, is also an obstacle when there is a lack of clear goals, discipline and organisation in achieving a common goal - the formation of state interests. In this phase of the war, feeling the existential danger again as of 24 February 2022, Ukrainians must again unite under common slogans. Otherwise, they may lose the war.

According to the research "Who are we? A Portrait of Ukrainians through the Eyes of Ukrainians", before Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the situation in the country could be defined as the end of the era of the idea of statehood as an obviousness, of statehood that we received peacefully, as a gift and not won in a struggle. Although Ukrainians' romanticism about Ukrainian statehood still exists, this concept itself is beginning to outlive its usefulness because love for the state that is not backed by pride in its achievements, developed economy, etc., is no longer what most of society would like to see. Therefore, sociological data show that the country is currently experiencing a crisis in state-building ideology. Ukrainians do not perceive our state as a failure, which shows they are optimistic, even in a challenging economic and political situation. However, this is not the only positive feature, as citizens are convinced that their values, including patriotism and belief in a bright future, can overcome all adversity. Such beliefs indicate a certain mythicism and unrealistic views of citizens. The self-confidence in their abilities and the primitive formula "good always triumphs over evil" prevents Ukrainians from understanding that optimistic attitudes are not enough to overcome external threats such as Putin or internal challenges such as corruption or poverty.

We want to draw attention to a study conducted by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future in cooperation with the sociological company New Image Marketing Group from 10 to 15 June 2021 based on a focus group study (FGD) [25]. The study found that the main differences between Ukrainians and Russians are:

- decentralisation of power in all its manifestations,
- freedom of speech,
- the ability to disagree with the authorities,
- openness and sincerity,
- less aggression and ill-mannered-ness,
- hard work.

All these characteristics of Ukrainians empirically confirm the researchers' previous findings. There has been a change in how Ukrainians view themselves as a community that builds the boundaries of its identity. This is also the basis for the perception of who Ukrainians are not. Furthermore, this is also important because we mentally belong to the Ukrainian community or community as our own. Furthermore, Ukrainians form their communities, which differ from our closest territorial neighbours.

In summary, Ukrainians show a high self-awareness and awareness of their national community, which is determined by external factors and internal societal changes. The results of sociological research indicate positive and negative changes in interpersonal relations under the influence of the war. Unity, mutual assistance, and cooperation in neighbourly relations have increased, contributing to the forming of new communities and an understanding of belonging to Ukrainian society. However, differences can become more acute, especially concerning economic status, political views, language and ethical values, and moral foundations. Identifying trends in how unity and active civic participation will continue after the war ends will be important.

The respondents acknowledged that Ukrainians have a somewhat unhealthy sense of self-importance, which is why the saying, "Where there are two Ukrainians, there are three hetmans". This once again confirms the inherent laziness of Ukrainians and their desire to shift their responsibility to others. Ukrainians also admit that they tend to bend the law and disregard the rules if there is an opportunity to "negotiate" or resolve issues with the help of relatives or friends. Unfortunately, recognising this shortcoming does not lead to Ukrainians understanding the reasons for this phenomenon and their desire to fight it. None of the respondents mentioned the need to overcome nepotism and stop circumventing the law. In particular, this can be explained by the fact that the state itself does not fight these phenomena or create conditions for citizens to comply with the law, and politicians demonstrate by their example that personal connections solve everything.

In addition, Ukrainians do not trust the state and politicians. Thus, it is evident that Ukrainians have a sense of fear and pathological distrust as a result of the collective historical trauma they have experienced. This can be explained by the experience of "failed" presidents and by the fact that there are currently no authoritative politicians, public figures, or opinion leaders who would unite the country. When a society changes its value imperatives very slowly, politicians or conventional "moral authorities" should offer more effective models of social interaction. Unfortunately, this is not happening.

Ukrainians have long demonstrated their peacefulness. However, the stereotypical and highly simplified image of the buckwheat farmer alienated the image of the Ukrainian Cossack warrior. The first and second images of Ukrainians still require further analysis. The war made adjustments to the readiness of Ukrainians to defend their homeland. Thus, in 2011, the share of those in Ukraine who gave an affirmative answer about their readiness to defend the country was 40%. In 2020, it increased to 57%; in May 2023, it increased to 67%. This is according to a survey conducted by the Razumkov Centre's sociological service from 23 to 31 May 2023 as part of the MATRA Programme project funded by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Ukraine [26]. "The majority of residents of all regions express their readiness to defend the country: 61% in the East, 67% in the Central region, 68% in the West, and 71% in the South, 74% among men and 60.5% among women, 68% to 75% in the age groups of 18 to 59 years, and 51% among those aged 60 and older," the Razumkov Centre said in a press release. Thus, the study showed changes in the minds of citizens that may be related to the events associated with a large-scale war. The majority of the population expresses a united readiness to defend the country in all regions and different social groups, which indicates national unity in the face of potential threats. The mobilisation of human resources could become a unifying factor for society if conducted professionally and reasonably in the state. War is, first and foremost, the mobilisation of social, economic, and other resources. The mobilisation of human resources should have been built not for a short period but for an extended period. As of the end of 2023 - beginning of 2024, when it was necessary to confirm one's stated desire by practice, i.e. to mobilise to defend the

homeland, the population of Ukraine had many reasons and explanations for unwillingness and evasion of military service, primarily among men.

Furthermore, public opinion has changed in explaining the reluctance to fight: from "the state did not teach me military affairs" to the search for justice in mobilisation, i.e. the search for the state security forces that should have ensured this mobilisation in the first place. "Who are the children of politicians and officials at the front today? What is the Verkhovna Rada doing during the war? What does the government decide? And who is Yermak, whom we did not elect?"... These are the opinions that dominate social media today.

As for the inferiority complex, this trait is inherent in residents of the whole country. Only respondents from the western regions did not support this thesis to a certain extent, demonstrating some difference between the self-identification of representatives of different country regions [27].

Ukrainians were attributed with hetero stereotypes, the stereotype that "my house is on the edge". However, during the war, Ukrainians demonstrated that they were autochthonous on their land, where they have lived for centuries. Ukrainians did not seize or occupy other people's territories. They have lived on their land for centuries and have nowhere to go. That is why our home is not so far away. Our home is here. The war has given Ukrainians a sense (cognitive, value, emotional, behavioural) that Ukraine is their land and their home . The issue of attitude to the land, to "one's own land" is very similar to the Germans, as described by F. Tönnis in Community and Society.

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Ukrainians were attributed with hetero stereotypes, the stereotype that "my house is on the edge". However, during the war, Ukrainians demonstrated that they were autochthonous on their land, where they have lived for centuries. Ukrainians did not seize or occupy other people's territories. They have lived on their land for centuries and have nowhere to go. That is why our home is not so far away. Our home is here. The war has given Ukrainians a sense (cognitive, value, emotional, behavioural) that Ukraine is their land and their home . The issue of attitude to the land, to "one's own land" is very similar to the Germans, as described by F. Tönnis in Community and Society.

The attitude of Ukrainians towards international alliances can be diverse and depends on many factors, such as the political situation, foreign policy priorities, security threats, and others. Ukraine is generally interested in cooperating with various international organisations and unions. For example, Ukraine started forming an association with the European Union, which led to the conclusion of the Association Agreement. This strategic partnership aims to improve political, economic and social ties between Ukraine and the EU. Subsequently, in 2021, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union. Ukraine also actively participates in other international organisations, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, etc. Participation in these organisations contributes to cooperation with other countries, solving global problems and strengthening the international community. President Leonid Kuchma first announced Ukraine's desire to join NATO in 2002. At the same time, the National Security and Defence Council adopted a strategy that outlined the ultimate goal of Ukraine's European integration policy: to join the Alliance.

In 2002, Ukrainians were divided on whether to join NATO: 32% were in favour, 32.2% were against. Over the next few years, support for NATO membership among Ukrainians declined. For example, in 2006, 15.4 per cent of respondents were in favour, while 63.9 per cent were against. In 2013, 18% of respondents were in favour of NATO, while 67% were against.

After the start of Russia's aggression in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea, support for NATO membership among the population increased. According to the survey, in 2014, 47.8% of Ukrainians favoured joining the Alliance and 32.4% were against. 2015-2016, about 43% of citizens supported NATO membership, and in 2017-2018, about 41% [28]. Therefore, the results of the twenty-fifth wave of the nationwide survey conducted by the Sociological Group Rating, which studied the dynamics of the attitude of the Ukrainian population towards international unions, are of interest [29]. Thus, the main results of the survey showed that as of the end of November 2023, 78% of respondents would vote for Ukraine's accession to the European Union in the event of such a referendum, which is slightly less than in July this year (85%). The main method used was CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing), which was conducted among the population of Ukraine aged 18 and older in all regions, except for the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas, as well as areas where there was no Ukrainian mobile coverage at the time of the survey. The results are weighted using the latest data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. The sample is representative in terms of age, gender and settlement type. Sample population: 1000 respondents. The error of representativeness of the survey with a confidence level of 0.95: no more than 3.1%. Dates of the survey: 22-23 November 2023. Only 5% of respondents are against joining the EU. Instead, the share of those who have not decided or would not like to vote is increasing: 3% and 14%, respectively. Support for Ukraine's accession to NATO is also declining, at 77% (83% in July). The support rate for NATO membership is at the same level as at the beginning of the invasion in March 2022. However, only 5% of respondents would not like to see Ukraine in the North Atlantic Alliance, 15% would not vote, and 3% are undecided. There are no age differences in support for European integration. Women are more likely than men to demonstrate uncertainty (not going to vote or hesitate to answer) regarding EU and NATO membership. Respondents with the lowest incomes show the least support for the unions. In general, in each region, the majority supports joining both unions, but the highest number of those willing to see Ukraine join the EU and NATO is among residents of the capital and the West. The idea of Ukraine joining NATO only within the territories controlled by the state is unacceptable to more than half of the respondents (53%). At the same time, 40% of respondents fully or instead support this idea: residents of the western regions and the capital are relatively more likely to take such a step, as are middle-aged people. Instead, residents of the East, Centre, and South, as well as the oldest people, support this idea the least. Even among supporters of Ukraine's accession to NATO, only 44% support this idea, while 51% are against it.

The conclusions made by the New Image Company in the study "Who are we? Portrait of Ukrainians through the Eyes of Ukrainians", the findings point to certain contradictions in the perceptions of Ukrainians that may affect the socio-political dynamics in the country:

- Optimism and mythicism in views: Ukrainians are optimistic and believe in a bright future, but these beliefs can be mythical and unrealistic. Belief in oneself and one's strengths may prevent one from understanding the need for systemic change based on difficult decisions.

- Unhealthy sense of self-importance and laziness: Pride in one's identity is accompanied by an unhealthy sense of self-importance and laziness, which can contribute to passivity and abdication of responsibility.

- Distrust of the authorities and fear: A deep distrust and a sense of fear are characteristic of Ukrainians. This may result from historical and contemporary events that generate scepticism about the activities of political leaders.

- Nepotism and disregard for the law: The acknowledgement of the tendency of Ukrainians to circumvent the law and use their connections highlights the problem of lack of accountability and the need to address the system of nepotism.

- Inferiority complex: An inferiority complex in society can affect individual and collective attitudes, especially concerning geographical differences and regional characteristics.

All of these aspects are important to consider to understand the socio-cultural context in Ukraine and improve the mechanisms of social interaction and governance in the country. On the one hand, it can be argued that war changes many things. However, there are many constants in mentality. The phenomenon of war intertwines change and permanence, constancy and difference. So, the following remain unchanged in the Ukrainian mentality:

Heart-centredness manifests in sentimentalism, sensitivity, and love of nature and animals. The main symbols are the flag, anthem, coat of arms, language, Ukrainian songs and Ukrainian music, national cuisine and national clothes - embroidery, nature (Carpathians, fields), prominent figures (T. Shevchenko, A. Shevchenko, L. Ukrainka). It is worth noting that Ukrainians are characterised by self-identification by individual external features - embroidery, borshch, dumplings, palyanytsia, pysanka, etc. Politicians are well aware of the lack of clear priorities for Ukrainians, and in turn do not propose any fundamental changes to the country's development strategy. A significant part of the population of our country is mentally much closer to Europe than to Asia. Their mentality can be called Eastern European, with all the specifics of this mentality. For example, several Ukrainian diaspora and emigration researchers, including V. Yaniv, have called this psychological "Occidentalism", the pro-Westernity of Ukrainian mentality and culture. In particular, it is characterised not only by the opposition between Europe and Asia. Contrasting the Christian East and West, the civilisation of Orthodoxy and Catholicism (and Protestantism) is also important. It is often said that, in this sense, our mentality is Eastern. However, we can also add that it is Eastern, with a noticeable degree of Westernity, even if it is sometimes hidden [30].

The war has become a catalyst for positive changes in the Ukrainian mentality, but in turn, it has also become an external factor that leads to the persistence/castration/inviolability of certain negative stereotypes. Analysing the changes in the Ukrainian mentality, particularly through the prism of stereotypes, provides valuable insights into the evolution of the socio-political landscape since the outbreak of hostilities. By focusing on two different components of mentality - national and political - we delve into the transformations observed in national and political stereotypes. The national mentality of Ukrainians has undergone dynamic changes under the influence of historical events and the current geopolitical context. Stereotypes associated with Ukrainian national identity have been reassessed and adapted, particularly in the context of war. Strong stereotypes of a strong work ethic, cultural richness and resilience have persisted, but they have evolved in the face of contemporary challenges. The response of the Ukrainian people to adversity has contributed to changing stereotypes, emphasising traits such as unity, patriotism and commitment to democratic values.

The political mentality of Ukrainians, inextricably linked to the geopolitical landscape, has undergone significant changes. Political stereotypes, once shaped by external perceptions, have evolved as Ukrainians have actively participated in shaping their political narrative. The struggle for sovereignty and democratic ideals has slowly contributed to a more nuanced understanding of political identity. Stereotypes associated with political activism, civic responsibility and the desire for democratic governance have gained more weight, reflecting the aspirations of a society beginning to navigate complex geopolitical realities.

The analysis highlights the dynamic nature of stereotypes in the Ukrainian mentality. The war has led to a reassessment of national and political stereotypes, strengthening, on the one hand, their adaptability and resilience. The war also highlighted the role of public narratives in shaping a collective identity beyond traditional stereotypes. The emergence of new narratives based on the desire for democratic values and national unity is evidence of transformational processes in Ukrainian society.

Thus, the study of mentality, primarily through the prism of stereotypes, shows a society in constant dynamics of change. The subtle interplay between national and political stereotypes reflects the multifaceted nature of the Ukrainian mentality. As the country grapples with geopolitical challenges, these shifting mentalities contribute to a narrative of a resilient nation that is constantly shaping its destiny in the face of change.

The Ukrainian mentality is differentiated and heterogeneous, but common historical challenges, such as war, revolutions and other social upheavals, have contributed to a certain degree of mental unification. Globalisation and the development of the Internet are also affecting the mentality of Ukrainians, uniting it in different ways. Despite this, there are local, geographical and ethnographic types of Ukrainian mentality. During the war, we can also observe a change or, on the contrary, convergence/divergence of stereotypes of Ukrainians. For example, Ukrainians value their freedom more and defend their country and Europe. In general, the Ukrainian mentality is characterised by a desire for unconditional national freedom and is beginning to move towards the formation and self-definition of itself as a separate national community. Freedom is the most outstanding value for Ukrainians, which is reflected in their attitude to modern challenges.

However, there is also another tendency towards simplistic stereotypical thinking, which indicates the immaturity of society and the deep roots of paternalism. Current research shows that Ukrainians describe themselves as freedom-loving, hospitable, patriotic and hardworking. However, they also acknowledge negative traits such as the inability to unite for the long term and the use of cunning in life situations. Ukrainians want to see themselves in a positive light but also recognise their negative characteristics.

Research also shows that during the war in Ukraine, the end of the era of the idea of statehood as a given became tangible. Ukrainians are still romanticising Ukrainian statehood but are beginning to realise that this concept is beginning to outlive its usefulness due to the lack of real achievements supporting this feeling. Research results show that there is a crisis of state-building ideology in Ukraine.

At the same time, overcoming the outlined contradictions in national self-identification and everyday practices requires not only institutional reforms but also the development of a more reflexive and sensitive attitude towards the Other in everyday and political interactions. In this regard, research in intercultural management and negotiation demonstrates that cultural sensitivity is a crucial precondition for confidence in communication and the ability to reach mutually acceptable decisions in complex environments [36]. Transferring this logic to the Ukrainian context, one can argue that strengthening sensitivity to diversity and

difference – both within Ukrainian society and in its external relations – may become an important resource for transforming entrenched stereotypes and supporting the further evolution of the Ukrainian mentality towards greater openness, responsibility and democratic commitment.

According to another study, Ukrainians show a high self-awareness and awareness of their national community. Unity, mutual assistance, and cooperation have increased due to the war, contributing to forming new communities and understanding their belonging to Ukrainian society. They understand the importance of community and active civic participation for the country's further development. Research shows that Ukrainians have several characteristics and contradictions in their self-identification. While they feel freedom-loving, hospitable, economical and patriotic, they also acknowledge a tendency to bend the law and not follow the rules, solving issues with the help of relatives or friends. This indicates a contradiction between self-determination and actual practice. Distrust of the authorities stems from the experience of "failed" presidents and the lack of authoritative leaders. Ukrainians demonstrated a high level of readiness to defend the country at the initial stage of a large-scale war, which helped to build unity in the face of the threat. However, over time, the situation with mobilisation changed.

There are also problems such as laziness, lack of awareness of the need to fight corruption and the need to comply with the law. National identity is changing under war and social change, but some contradictions and shortcomings must be addressed and resolved. Ukrainians acknowledge the tendency to circumvent laws and disregard rules for "agreement" or resolving issues through relatives or friends. This indicates a lack of understanding of the reasons for this phenomenon and a desire to fight it.

The war in Ukraine has affected national identity, changing how Ukrainians perceive themselves and their country, but some contradictions and shortcomings require further analysis and attention.

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INSTITUTIONAL REPERTOIRES OF UKRAINIAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN (PRE)WAR PERIOD

This chapter outlines the institutional and functional evolution of Ukrainian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) during pre-war and wartime periods. It positions civil society organizations (CSOs) within the broader context of democratic development, emphasizing their essential role in social transformation, human rights protection, and public service delivery. The Russian-Ukrainian war has strengthened their importance, making NGOs pivotal actors in military support, assistance to displaced persons, and reform implementation amid socio-economic challenges. The chapter examines persistent issues in NGO-state relations, particularly the weakness of sustainable cooperation, which often pushes NGOs to act independently of governmental institutions. Drawing on comparative analysis with Western democracies, it presents the classical three-sector model—public, economic, and social—and situates NGOs as central to the "third sector." It further underlines their functions in advocacy, education, social oversight, and civic engagement, defining them as "cells" of civil society that sustain democratic resilience in times of crisis. It concludes by addressing their institutionalization and future collaboration with the state.

Keywords: Ukrainian NGOs, civil society organizations, institutional evolution, wartime civil society, NGO-state relations, social services, human rights advocacy, social resilience.

Civil society organisations (CSOs) play an important role in the development of democratic societies by protecting human rights, providing social services and promoting social change. In Ukraine, where civil society is undergoing a complex transformation, the role of CSOs is particularly relevant. Since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, these organisations have become critical in supporting the army, helping internally displaced persons and implementing reforms. At the same time, the Russian invasion of 2022 has also stimulated broader forms of civic and economic mobilisation, including changes in patriotic entrepreneurship in Ukraine and neighbouring countries, as shown by comparative research on Ukraine and Poland [23]. The main problem with the functioning of CSOs in Ukraine is the lack of a sustainable partnership between the public sector and the state [20]. CSOs are often forced to act autonomously, sometimes even in confrontation with state institutions. This creates challenges for effective cross-sectoral cooperation, which is critical for building a democratic society. The relevance of studying the role of CSOs in Ukraine is due to their growing importance in the context of war and socio-economic challenges. In conditions when state institutions do not always cope with crisis situations, CSOs demonstrate high efficiency in mobilising resources and providing assistance to the population. This underscores the need for a deeper understanding of their institutional and functional role.

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The purpose of this study is to examine the formation and transformation of the institutional and functional role of Ukrainian CSOs, in particular, the general features of their institutional and social ordering in the context of the pre-war and war periods in Ukraine, as well as in comparison with Western democratic societies. This study aims to identify key trends and challenges faced by CSOs, as well as to analyse their contribution to the development of Ukrainian society. Thus, this article aims not only to describe the current state of civil society organisations in Ukraine, but also to suggest ways to improve their interaction with state institutions and increase their effectiveness in addressing social problems.

Ukraine's path to democracy is through the formation of a multifaceted system of social institutions, among which civil society organisations play a key role. These associations, based on common interests and values, operate outside the formal structure of state bodies. Their activities are based on the personal initiative and free will of their members and are aimed at implementing socially useful projects without seeking profit. The influence of CSOs is felt in almost all areas of life. They are active in the humanitarian, informative, environmental, security and other areas of public and state life in Ukraine. Thus, CSOs can be seen as "cells" of the organic system of civil society. Their activities are based on a free choice of directions and types of activities, which makes them a driving force for democratic transformation in Ukraine [15]. They also outline important framework conditions for the civic engagement of the country's population in the face of an existential threat. In particular, the Russian-Ukrainian war has not only significantly united Ukrainian society, but also led to civic and patriotic consolidation.

The achievement of a victorious peace depends not only on the heroic actions of the army, but also on the self-organisation of society as a whole, the unification of both individual efforts and the synergy of the collective action of many citizens. Aware of this, civil society institutions such as CSOs are stepping up their activities to effectively respond to the challenges that Ukraine is facing in today's realities. By contributing to the resistance to the aggressor, civil society organisations, to a certain extent, adjust the hierarchy of the institutional structure of society [5; 21].

The issues of functioning of civil society in general and civic organisations in particular are reflected in the works of both foreign and domestic scholars. The theoretical and methodological aspects of studying civic organisations are covered in the works of such foreign authors as P. Willetts, D. Potter (non-governmental organisations and their main characteristics), R. Putnam (peculiarities of formation of civic organisations), D. Lewis (management of non-governmental organisations), W. Powell (sociological features of activity of non-governmental organisations), J. Fisher (non-governmental organisations and political development of the Third World), etc.

Many publications that, to one degree or another, relate to the issues we are studying, are presented in the national scientific discourse. It is worth mentioning the scientific work of a number of Ukrainian scholars who have studied civic organisations from different research perspectives, in particular V. Bekh, H. Nesterenko (civic organisations as a factor of democratisation of society), V. Kovalenko, A. Yuldashev (formation and functioning of civic organisations, internal organisational structure), O. Ben, V. Holovenko, K. Petrenko (institutionalisation of civic associations and their interaction with the state authorities), P. Dihtiar, V. Stepanenko (institutionalisation of civic associations and their interaction with the state authorities). V. Stepanenko (CSOs as structural components of civil society, their functional significance), I. Yevdokimova, I. Vitkovska (trends in the development of CSOs), N. Konon (peculiarities of functioning of non-governmental organisations), A. Halay, V. Kovalchuk, V. Kravchuk, S. Ponomariov (legal aspects of relations between NGOs and the state); U. Volynets, V. Dementov, I. Stronianska, I. Tkachuk (social responsibility of NGOs), etc.

Each of these scholars has his or her own research vector in studying both civil society in general and civil society organisations in particular. We would like to focus our research on the transformation of the institutional and functional role of CSOs specifically, the general features of their institutional and social ordering in the context of the pre-war and war periods in Ukraine.

It is worth noting that the formation of civic organisations dates back to the late eighteenth - mid-nineteenth centuries and is associated with the formation of the first associations, trade unions, societies, etc. in most developed countries. Over time, CSOs evolve from isolated formations into "structured organisations that have clear goals and objectives, their own 'niche' in the system of interaction with the state through the protection of certain interests, and reach the national level, creating their own vertical" [2; 19]. In other words, the historically formed "amorphous mass" of civil society organisations, interacting with public authorities, forms the system of public administration.

Initially, the general institutional role of civil society organisations is determined by the classical three-sector institutional ordering of Western societies (Figure 1). In this scheme, the concept of sector is actually an analytical construct between the organisational and societal levels. Sectors are usually represented in the form of a Venn diagram depicting the intersections of: 1) the public sector, which is associated with the state, government and other organisations associated with government institutions at all levels; 2) the economic sector, which is mainly represented by market institutions, organisations, enterprises and business structures operating in existing markets; 3) the social ("third") sector, which is associated with civil society institutions and includes CSOs and other voluntary associations of citizens.



Figure 1. Three-sectoral institutional orderliness of society. Source: Created by the authors.

While the first sector is considered to be the state and related institutions (authorities, management, etc.), the second is formed by commercial institutions that provide for profit, the third sector consists of institutions and organisations engaged in various activities and are neither part of the system of state bodies nor of the system of profit-making structures. It is worth noting here that the "third sector" is "not a simple

set of public organisations and political parties, but a certain system of stable principles, traditions and legal norms of self-organisation of people to regulate social relations in accordance with their interests. The peculiarity of this system is that it reveals the way of creation and functioning of associations of citizens independent of state and commercial structures, capable of defending their interests both before each other and before the state and business itself" [12].

Regarding the interpretation of civic organisations, it is worth noting that they are often characterised as third sector structures, the main features of which are non-governmental and non-profit-making. The notion of "civic organisations", as a number of scholars (I. Vitkovska, N. Konon) rightly point out, has a rather wide synonymous range. We are talking about such concepts as "non-governmental organisation", "nonprofit (non-commercial) organisation", "third sector organisation" In particular, the term "public organisations", which is quite familiar to the national scientific discourse, is practically absent or sometimes used in foreign scientific literature. In English-language scientific publications, the most commonly used category is "non-governmental organisation" (NGO). This aspect emphasises an organisation created and managed by citizens without any formal state intervention. Non-governmental organisations are a variety of institutions that are fully or largely independent of governments and are characterised primarily by humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial goals [13]. The term "non-governmental organisation" was first used in the UN Charter in 1945, and later it was enshrined in international documents and regulations of many countries [4, p. 37].

There are a number of markers (Salamon and Anheier, 1996) that distinguish NGOs from other organisational structures, including:

- official status (officially registered as legal entities; operate in accordance with applicable law and under the supervision of state regulatory authorities);
- private/non-governmental nature (independent from state bodies with private ownership and organisational structure);
- nonprofit orientation (unlike business organisations, they do not aim to make a profit, but instead pursue social, cultural, charitable or other socially significant goals);
- self-government (self-governance, autonomy, and independence from external interference);
- voluntary (activities are based on the principle of voluntary participation, which implies the absence of coercion or external pressure);
- non-religious nature (they are not tools for promoting or preaching religious dogmas or beliefs);
- apolitical (does not involve participation in electoral processes or promotion of individual political candidates).

Thus, the main characteristics of non-governmental organisations are their non-governmental nature, independence, non-profitability, autonomy, and focus on meeting public needs.

P. Willets divides NGOs into two broad functional and institutional categories: operational and social enterprise-oriented [18]. The former are more focused on helping specific audiences (in particular, their main mission is to implement direct assistance projects for the poor, the elderly, children, etc.) The latter focus on implementing more systemic social changes related to influencing the authorities and public opinion; promoting stronger social relations and inter-networking that can serve as a basis for collective action and expanding various forms of public participation.

The use of another synonymous term, "civil society organisations", emphasises that it does not refer to state organisations or institutions. "Civil society organisations" are self-governing associations of people who seek to achieve a common goal through joint actions; they are based on a voluntary basis; they ensure the integration of individuals into society, promote unity and cohesion of society [11, p. 90].

Another, quite common term is "volunteer organisations" - organisations that function on the basis of voluntary initiative.

For Ukrainian society, the term "public organisation" is the most traditional. According to the current legislation, a civil society organisations is one of the types of associations of citizens. It is a voluntary association of individuals and/or legal entities of private law for the purpose of exercising and protecting rights and freedoms, satisfying public, in particular economic, social, cultural, environmental, and other interests, whose founders and members (participants) are individuals [3].

K. Petrenko, analysing P. Willetts' views on the essence of public organisations, notes that there is no generally accepted definition of public associations, but there are a number of defining characteristics that should be taken into account. In particular, it is said that public associations should not be directly related to any governmental institutions; should not seek to achieve political power within the framework of their activities; should not generate profit, since an important essential characteristic of this type of organisations is the socially useful purpose of their creation and functioning [8].

According to the existing scientific and applied discourse, the institutional repertoire of modern CSOs in the context of Western democratic societies will include a number of functions, especially:

Public control and monitoring function

In the government-business-third sector triangle, CSOs often function as watchdogs, ensuring accountability and transparency of public authorities, governments and private enterprises, including in the context of compliance with laws and public ethical norms.

The function of providing social services

This function is regulated as an area of partnership between civil society organisations and the state, when the state transfers the function to CSOs and finances the provision of services to certain groups of society (mainly minorities), as in these situations the model of service delivery at the level of CSOs is more efficient and cost-effective compared to the deployment of state institutions. In situations of large-scale social challenges, such as overcoming poverty, food and environmental crises, limited access to education, working with vulnerable or marginalised groups, etc., CSOs often function as a partner that complements and strengthens the state.

The function of protecting rights and advocating for necessary changes

CSOs play an important role in the protection of human rights, particularly in the context of ensuring respect for the rights and freedoms of individuals and groups. They monitor and report on human rights violations, provide support to victims and engage in strategic litigation to ensure that the rights of vulnerable groups are respected. They are key players in advocating for social, political and legal changes that are consistent with human rights principles and the public interest.

Education and information function

This function encompasses several key roles of CSOs in raising awareness, educating and disseminating information among stakeholders, including the general public, decision makers and specific target groups.

This function also supports other CSO functions, such as advocacy, capacity building and public engagement, etc.

The function of facilitating public participation

CSOs often serve as a platform that allows citizens to communicate their problems and needs, defend their rights, and proactively contribute to the development of their communities [22]. CSOs are not only a tool for bringing together people who share similar values and interests, but also often focus on community development and engaging different groups of society in civic participation. CSOs serve as a bridge in the interaction between citizens and the state, and promote understanding and cooperation between different stakeholders. In many Western countries, civic engagement is an integral element of a person's reputation and social capital.

The function of mobilising people and resources [14].

CSOs are active actors in society that engage people or create opportunities for their active participation in order to achieve their goals, as well as attract the necessary material and non-material resources. The most common forms of human capital mobilisation are volunteering and direct participation in the work of CSOs. It should be noted that in recent decades, the culture of donations and various crowdsourcing tools have been actively developing, which expand the possibilities of CSOs in mobilising resources, in addition to the "traditional" ones related to membership fees, charity, funding from governments or specialised funds.

The function of implementing social change and innovation.

The results of CSOs' activities are often concrete social changes and the spread of social innovations. CSOs act as think tanks that develop projects of necessary changes and innovations, test relevant solutions, work on education and broad social support for their further implementation, etc.

M. Tokar [Tokar, 2019] characterises the development of CSOs in Ukraine by identifying five main stages:

1. Spontaneous and organisational stage (1987-1990) - this period is characterised by the spontaneous creation of civil society organisations in the context of political changes during Perestroika period in the USSR. The lack of legal regulation and opposition to state structures were the main features of this time.

2. Basic and normative stage (1990-1998) - at this stage, the legal basis for the activities of civic organisations is laid. The first laws regulating their work appear, which facilitates their further institutional development.

3. Mass mobilisation stage (1999-2005) - during this period, the number of civic organisations increased and they became more active in solving social problems. CSOs become important actors in political processes, especially during the Orange Revolution.

4. Integration-institutional stage (2006-2012) - at this stage, CSOs begin to more actively influence the state in the formation of policies and legislation. Their overall institutional strengthening and professionalisation takes place.

5. Activist-volunteer stage (2013-present) - This stage began with the Revolution of Dignity and is characterised by a high level of volunteer activity and self-organisation of citizens. Civil society organisations play a key role in protecting human rights, supporting the army and internally displaced persons, and implementing reforms.

According to the official data of the Unified State Register of Enterprises and Organisations of Ukraine, published by the State Statistics Service, there has been a fairly intensive development of CSOs. In particular, in 2023, there were already about 100,000 of them. Their activities cover almost all areas of public life in

Ukraine. They mostly deal with the problems of children and youth, civic education, human rights, social and other issues.



Figure 2. The dynamics of formation of civil society organisations in the period from 1997 to 2013 [7]

The positive dynamics of growth in the number of civil society organisations can be traced to the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia. War serves as a kind of test for the capacity of state institutions. In an extreme situation caused by war, the institutional structure of society changes somewhat. In the hierarchy of social significance, NGOs occupy a significant place, given their contribution to resistance to the aggressor. This situation of exclusivity demonstrates that state institutions are not coping well with the chaos caused by the war, and the public sector is a significant complement to their activities.



Figure 3. Dynamics of formation of civil society organisations in the period from 2014 to 2023 (excluding the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol) [7]

The positive dynamics of growth in the number of civil society organisations can be traced to the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Russia. War serves as a kind of test for the capacity of state institutions. In an extreme situation caused by war, the institutional structure of society somehow changes. In the hierarchy of social significance, CSOs occupy a significant place, given their contribution to resistance to the aggressor. This situation of exclusivity demonstrates that state institutions are not coping well with the chaos caused by the war, and the public sector is a significant complement to their activities. Since the outbreak of full-scale war, civil society organisations have focused on meeting the basic needs of their target audience. In particular, the activities of many organisations and civic initiatives were aimed at providing internally

displaced persons (IDPs) with housing and food, evacuating residents from the occupied and frontline areas, and providing them with psychological support. Other services included training, employment assistance and support for IDPs to integrate into their new communities. By responding quickly to the urgent needs arising from the war, CSOs helped to meet the material and other needs of the population and even the military, including providing equipment and supplies to the Defence Forces, etc.

Volunteer activity has also significantly intensified since the beginning of the full-scale war with Russia. "As part of a large-scale initiative, volunteers of the Ukrainian Volunteer Service together with specialists from SoftServe have developed the Palianytsia.info platform. Users of the platform can quickly search among more than 800 organisations in all regions of Ukraine to find CSOs that provide assistance to IDPs, the elderly, children and other vulnerable groups with housing, food, medical care and evacuation. The Yurydychna Sotnia CSOs provided free legal aid to war participants, veterans and their families on issues of military service and social security. The Association of Women Lawyers of Ukraine "YurFem" provided support to victims of gender discrimination and sexual violence, which has become more frequent in the territories occupied by Russian troops" [1].

As of December 2022, the majority of the population of the government-controlled territories (61%) was involved in some type of volunteer assistance to the defence forces or IDPs [10, p. 5]. It is worth noting that the full-scale war not only mobilised people, but also created new challenges for the volunteer sector. Individual volunteer practices and unofficially registered volunteer organisations have become widespread. A large number of Ukrainians who had no previous volunteering experience joined volunteering and thus gained it through learning from their personal mistakes. The conditions in which volunteer activities were carried out have changed (it became more dangerous to provide volunteer assistance); volunteering became more time-consuming and replaced official employment for many volunteers.

According to the results of the survey of CSOs [16; 24], the latter indicate that they have regular contacts with the state authorities, and in most cases both parties are interested in such cooperation. More than half of the surveyed CSOs believe that they and the state authorities have the same goals, but different ways of achieving them (complementing them); almost every fourth respondent believes that CSOs and the state authorities are in conflict or confrontation. Only 13% of CSOs believe that CSOs and state authorities have the same goals and the same ways to achieve them (coordination), and 60% of respondents believe that CSOs and state authorities have the same ways to achieve their goals, but the goals are different (co-optation). In 2014, the number of organisations that chose the option of "complementarity" increased significantly and the number of respondents that chose the option of "cooperation" decreased.



Figure 4. Nature of Cooperation of CSOs and Public Authorities (N=563) [16].

Thus, the state and dynamics of the institutional and functional dimension of CSOs in the pre-war and war periods have both their own peculiarities and similarities. Initially, after Ukraine regained its independence in 1991, CSOs became an important actor in the development of civil society, promotion of democratic values and support for civic participation. The institutional and functional spectrum of CSOs included a wide range of focuses, including: human rights protection, support for democratic initiatives, development of freedom of speech and press, promotion of education reforms, improvement of the quality of education, access to education, support for healthcare reforms, prevention of various diseases, environmental protection, promotion of renewable energy sources, fight against pollution, provision of services to vulnerable groups of society, etc.

After the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014, CSOs received an impetus in the development of social capital in the form of volunteering and increased trust in civil society actors, and significantly increased their level of influence. The occupation of part of Ukraine by Russia also led to a restructuring of the focus of CSOs' activities. In particular, the civil society sector has become actively involved in military and humanitarian issues, including support for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, assistance to war veterans, rehabilitation of the wounded, and comprehensive assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other categories affected by the war. At the same time, they continue to work on the protection of human rights, in particular in the context of Russia's occupation of the territories in eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, international activities to ensure support for Ukraine, advocacy of Ukraine's interests in the international arena, etc. In the context of the public demand for European integration, intensification of work on supporting and advocating for the implementation of reforms in such areas as anti-corruption, decentralisation, community development, judicial reform, etc.

In our opinion, the following general specifics of the institutional arrangement of CSOs in Ukraine can be identified in comparison with Western democratic societies.

The institutional and functional repertoire of Ukrainian CSOs generally reproduces the structure inherent in Western CSOs.

The priorities and thematic focuses of CSOs in Ukraine have a slightly different structure, which is determined by the development of the civil society sector, the dynamics of transformation of society itself and the historical challenges of Ukraine.

The key difference is that in Western democratic societies, intersectoral interaction and its functional and institutional ordering are based on the principles of complementarity and partnership between the public, economic and third sectors. In the context of Ukrainian society, the public sector and civil society organisations, having contacts with the state, do not build a sustainable partnership, but rather act autonomously, CSOs often "replace" the institutional roles of the state, and in some cases are in confrontation.

The institutional development and functional focus of CSOs in the pre-war and war periods are characterised by the following trends:

There has been a general increase in the number and gradual professionalisation of CSOs, with both dynamics intensifying after 2014. At the same time, direct participation in CSOs has been and remains low, but during the war period, involvement in the form of volunteering and charitable contributions (donations) has significantly increased.

The thematic focus of CSOs' activities is not constant and changes according to the state and challenges of the society. However, at the level of institutional influence, the activities of CSOs can be reduced to two main vectors: promoting the transformation of society and the state in the context of building democracy and the principles of sustainable development; providing social services to vulnerable, affected groups of society.

In the face of the challenges of war, CSOs relying on civil society and volunteer activity have demonstrated greater effectiveness in performing the crisis response function than state institutions. The issue of developing intersectoral cooperation in a partnership format remains open, as state institutions and CSOs in some aspects rather "duplicate" functions than build systemic interaction.

In conclusion it is important to mention that civil society organisations play a critical role in protecting human rights, providing social services and promoting social change in Ukraine. CSOs have been key in supporting the army, helping internally displaced persons, and implementing reforms since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war. At the same time, the absence of a sustainable partnership between the public sector and the state in Ukraine forces CSOs to often act autonomously, sometimes even in confrontation with state institutions. This creates problems for effective cross-sectoral cooperation, which is critical for building a democratic society. The institutional and functional repertoire of Ukrainian CSOs includes the functions of public control, provision of social services, protection of rights, education, facilitation of participation, resource mobilisation and implementation of changes. These functions are generally consistent with the role of CSOs in Western democratic societies, but have certain specifics that are determined by the development of the public sector in Ukraine.

At the current stage, there is an increased in the number and professionalisation of CSOs, especially after 2014, while maintaining low direct citizen participation. The thematic priorities of CSOs change according to the challenges of society, focusing on democratic transformations and assistance. During the war, CSOs have demonstrated greater efficiency in crisis response than state institutions. At the same time, the issue of developing partnerships between CSOs and the state remains open. In general, CSOs are an important actor in the development of democracy and civil society in Ukraine, especially in times of crisis. Further development of CSOs requires strengthening partnership with the state and increasing the level of public participation.

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LEGAL REGIME OF MARTIAL LAW IN THE MIRROR OF LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY

In the context of a long-lasting war, its consequences extend beyond the military sphere, affecting nearly all aspects of public life, including law. Martial law exemplifies this through "temporary, threat-driven restrictions on constitutional rights and freedoms." Such practice is common worldwide. During war, legitimising the existing social order becomes a key means of countering destructive changes in mass consciousness. This involves public acceptance of martial law restrictions and support for state actions during conflict.

In November–January 2023, an online pilot survey (N=1116) assessed Ukrainians' legal awareness and attitudes toward illegal practices under martial law. The study revealed paradoxes in legal consciousness: people downplay institutionalised civic participation (free media, elections, protests) yet prioritise autonomy, privacy, and freedom of speech. Another deformation lies in lenient assessment of individual offences compared to stricter judgement of official misconduct or misuse of humanitarian aid. Overall, Ukrainians' legal consciousness remains dual—shaped by post-totalitarian legacies and intensified by wartime threats and uncertainty.

Keywords: martial law, legal consciousness, mass consciousness, non-legal practices.

The war has put the Ukrainian state and society in extreme conditions, i.e., "such circumstances of life that are prolonged and significantly exceed the norms... significantly deviate from their usual, everyday indicators, negatively affect the life of individuals, groups and communities, and are associated with threats to human health and life" [26, p. 46]. In sociology, extreme conditions have mostly been studied in socioeconomic crises, epidemics, internal (mostly inter-ethnic) conflicts, artificial and natural disasters, etc., but rarely in war against an external aggressor.

The war against Ukraine has signs of total war, i.e., one that involves unlimited resources (human, technical, financial) and has no restrictions in terms of weapons used, territory, or combatants involved. The term "total war" was coined in the 1930s by the German military officer Eric Ludendorff. His understanding also included the idea that total war is a war between societies as a whole, not just armies. At this time,

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governments became increasingly active and interventionist, passing laws that were unacceptable in peacetime [15; pp. 276-278].

Martial law was introduced in Ukraine by Presidential Decree No. 64/2022 of 24 February 2022 and extended for further terms by the Parliament. In addition to narrow military consequences, a protracted war impacts all spheres of public life, as illustrated, in particular, by the legal regime of martial law , which defines the rules of social order in these conditions. The Law of Ukraine, "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law", does not set any time limits for its introduction and, accordingly, martial law may last as long as there is a threat to national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article 1 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Legal Regime of Martial Law" provides "temporary restriction of constitutional rights and freedoms of a person and a citizen due to a threat" [13].

S. Makeev, analysing the work of J. Agamben's "The State of Exceptionality" ("Stato di eccezione"), notes that social order, solidarity and security are (should be) protected by law from moral and political inflation and the risks of disintegration with particular severity. However, such a protectorate of laws is not all-encompassing, and there inevitably come times when their effectiveness is wholly lost, times of anomie (absence of norms) - times of a state of exception [17].

These are the conditions of war, but it is worth noting that despite its extremity, if it lasts for a long time, it gradually acquires the character of a "new normal" - it becomes a familiar, everyday circumstance and is routinised. From a shocking and abnormal event, war in the minds and practices of the population turns into another circumstance of daily existence that requires typified, repetitive actions and cognitive and emotional reactions to restrictions, threats, violence, suffering, destruction and death to new social, economic and legal circumstances. In other words, we are dealing with violating the usual social order, modifying or creating a new one.

According to the famous saying of Marcus Tullius Cicero: "In time of war, the laws are silent" (Latin: Silent enim leges inter arma). At the same time, as the analysis of modern legislation of countries worldwide shows, an almost universal principle is the recognition of the inviolability of several rights and freedoms that must be guaranteed by the state, even during the martial law regime. These include the right to life and bodily integrity, a fair trial, the principle of presumption of innocence, equality of citizens before the law, and the right not to be discriminated against. Restrictions of other rights and freedoms in one form or another are allowed by the laws of foreign countries [27]. In this area, Ukrainian legislation is in line with international practice.

In the new conditions, the weight of the power component in the institutional system of the state increases, and state coercion is implemented more massively and actively than outside the special period, causing a significant public outcry. As a result, the eternal dilemmas of the social contract are intensifying: on the one hand, the state, represented by its power apparatus, pursues the most important goal in a particular historical situation in the interests of society and its components, and on the other hand, it does so imperatively [34].

As S. Makeev notes: "[in war]... even the illusion of the autonomy of institutions is cancelled, and the institution of the president and the army are fused, becoming the centre of making the most important military and political decisions. This is where the available resources are concentrated and distributed, where the chances to work, fight, help, live and die are managed. The president and the army fully represent

the state with its unlimited right to mobilise everything and everyone in the context of total war, justifying their actions by reference to the highest interests of the nation... The decree on the introduction of martial law, which restricts rights and freedoms, is now a new social contract between the government and citizens." [16, pp. 37-38].

In the context of war (taking into account new social norms, restrictions, real and potential threats), the level of social and psychological tension increases significantly, especially when citizens begin to understand that it is not expected to end soon, restrictions are not temporary, and the authorities may use measures that would be unacceptable in other circumstances. The powerful influence of disruptive technologies complicates the situation [36].

Information and psychological operations (PSYOP) are a type of information operations that involve the use of a complex set of coordinated, coordinated and interrelated forms, methods and techniques of psychological influence. They consist of political, military, economic, diplomatic and information-psychological measures aimed at a specific person or group of people in order to introduce alien ideological and social attitudes into their environment, form false stereotypes of behaviour, and transform their moods, feelings and will in the desired direction [37]. The term was introduced into scientific circulation by the British historian J. Fuller, who noted: "the so-called traditional means of warfare can be replaced by psychological warfare, which does not use weapons on battlefields... but rather the eclipse of human intelligence, the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation under the influence of the will of another" [6, p. 320].

Thus, under the influence of objective contradictions, on the one hand, and as a result of targeted information and psychological operations of the enemy, negative stereotyping of state authorities, discrediting of the mobilisation campaign, spreading destructive messages about corruption and inefficiency of the military and political leadership of the state, low level of training and provision of military personnel, indifference of the authorities to the fate of prisoners of war, etc.

In the above context, the issues related to the sociological study of individual and mass consciousness, which can undergo significant multi-vector changes and even deformation, are becoming more relevant. On the one hand, there is a militarisation and radicalisation of consciousness, increased paternalistic expectations, and, on the other hand, the self-organisation of citizens to resist the aggressor and provide mutual assistance. The new wartime circumstances and corresponding restrictions are significant in legal awareness. One of the social challenges for the legal consciousness of citizens may be situations that create the need to choose priorities (between the possibility of acting following the law or bypassing it, between private and national security, duty and personal gain, material or spiritual values).

According to psychologists, military actions, such as an extreme emergency, significantly change the consciousness of the person experiencing such events. All structures of self-consciousness are affected, and behavioural patterns emerge that distort and limit its social and civic effectiveness [5, p. 21]. Given the above, monitoring the public's perception of the norms, restrictions, and measures envisaged by martial law is relevant and constitutes a "new normal" for the foreseeable future. The article aims to study the areas of development of legal awareness of the population of Ukraine under martial law to identify those phenomena which impact the formation of (un)legal practices and their possible social consequences. Such knowledge is

of particular interest since it makes it possible to develop a strategy for reducing the crime rate in the state, overcoming legal nihilism and cynicism in the extreme conditions of total war.

From the perspective of sociology, legal consciousness is a special form of reflection of legal reality, which is a component of social, group (including collective), and individual consciousness, constituting a system of interrelated elements that express knowledge, assessment, views and perceptions of subjects about the existing and desired law, and is the driving force behind actions in the legal field through the formation of motives and behavioural attitudes. Legal consciousness is conditioned by macro- and meso-factors (socio-cultural, historical, political, economic) and the micro-environment. The latter is formed in legal socialisation, which lays the foundations for legal understanding and law enforcement, attitudes to offences and motivation to comply with legal norms. Individuals and groups evaluate the legal system, themselves and others through the prism of the categories of legal and illegal, fair and unfair, moral and immoral, permissible and unacceptable, effective or ineffective, and choose their behavioural models.

In this context, we can talk about legal or non-legal social practices rooted in individuals' everyday behaviour. Non-legal social practices are behaviours that contradict the laws established by the state. These practices can arise as a result of several factors, including objective factors (such as the low efficiency of the legal system, its excessive repressiveness, social inequality, corruption, and political instability) and subjective factors (deformations of legal consciousness that may manifest themselves in disagreement with the need to comply with laws, deliberate violation of laws, distrust of the legal system, abuse of law, etc.) and form the basis for changing or preserving social orders.

In contrast to the normative, legalistic view, the sociological perspective is that law, as an element of social order, is a system of social norms, the content of which may differ from the models enshrined in formal law. In the literature, the concepts of "infra law", "living law", "informal law", "intuitive law", "free law", "moral law", etc., are used to describe the parallel existence of different (sometimes directly opposite in content) legal systems. These concepts describe the situation of two "realities": the normative one, where legal norms are formally defined, universal and unchangeable, and the subjective, flexible one, where appropriate actions are determined by a specific life situation and its participants. The correlation of these "realities" interests the sociologist, as it creates a favourable environment for modifications of mass consciousness and behaviour.

From this perspective, the concept of mass consciousness (in the Durkheimian sense) needs to be clarified since the level of normative integration of modern societies does not allow us to speak of a single collective (legal) consciousness that has a subjective impact on an individual and is manifested in his or her actions and views. The traditional list of categories that differentiate individual experience, attitudes and behaviour in the legal sphere in wartime is supplemented by several new ones. Golovakha and colleagues note that "war introduces distinctions that segment the population in a new way, significantly reducing the importance of traditional features that differentiate and stratify citizens. The life and everyday situations of those who remained in the occupied territories (a); are in the war zone (b); live in the territories that are almost unaffected by the war (c); became refugees within Ukraine (d); and left for abroad (e) are obviously different, almost incomparable. It is difficult to imagine even the possibility of constructing a sample in which such a division would be the first step in selecting respondents" [7, p. 22].

In addition to the fact that each consciousness is an active "co-creator" of legal reality, there are normative regimes established by certain institutions, organisations and social groups. An illustration of

such pluralism is the coexistence of different legal regimes in the Middle Ages when the axis of division was the person's class (separate laws for peasants, townspeople and knights/nobles) and the institution that established the legal order (whether it was the ruler, church or city authorities). In such a situation of legal pluralism, state law loses its monopoly on universal force, and other institutions and sets of norms begin to fulfil the role attributed to it by traditional legal theory.

Studying the phenomenon of normative pluralism in modern Ukrainian society, I. Ruschenko analyses situations where specific practices are officially prohibited and criminalised but are not condemned by the population [25, p. 143-144]. Another Ukrainian researcher, A. Bova, analyses the term "infra-law", a system of unofficially enshrined normative guidelines (norms, attitudes, values, behavioural patterns) that compete in their strength with legal provisions. He also proposes to supplement the structure of legal consciousness with a new element - infralegal consciousness, which reflects informal conventions in society [1].

The category of legal efficiency is inextricably linked to legal awareness. However, the problem is determining the criteria or external indicators of this effectiveness and how to achieve it. In the sociological understanding of law, effectiveness is determined by the degree to which the state-recommended model of behaviour complies with social expectations and stereotypes of behaviour regarded by society as legitimate. It is worth noting that citizens' assessment of laws (in our case, martial law) as ineffective can have negative social consequences. After all, the aggravation of the security situation, sudden and forced radical changes in the lives of millions of people, fear of war-related threats, on the one hand, and protective measures established by wartime norms, on the other hand, give rise to the need to choose one's model of behaviour in the context of the "security - freedom" dilemma. Ukraine is a state governed by the rule of law, which means that the rule of law is respected, and the rights, freedoms, and legitimate interests of human beings and citizens are ensured. At the same time, as the American researcher R. Jackson notes: "Freedom is achieved only by a complex but fair structure of legal norms that are impersonally and dispassionately applied to both the rules and the governed. Because Freedom cannot exist apart from the impartial rule of law, it is vulnerable to the stresses of wartime, when the rule of law breaks down" [11, p. 104]. Under martial law, state interference with the individual's autonomy creates the need to balance the principles/values of protecting one's rights (to liberty and life) with national security. The martial law norms, which are regarded as significantly restricting rights, may become one of the reasons for the deformation of legal consciousness and lead to the spread and entrenchment of non-legal social practices.

A considerable body of academic literature (mainly of a socio-philosophical and legal nature) on the security-human rights dilemma. This discourse, without exaggeration, can be called one of the most extensive since the Enlightenment and the classics of liberal democracy. War as a context for unfolding this dilemma is analysed much less. Among the current studies are, in particular, publications that point to human rights violations related to the war on terrorism after the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States [2], as well as studies of human rights issues in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict [3]. Several victimisation studies also show that armed conflict increases the likelihood of human rights violations [14].

There are few scientific studies of wartime social order. This lack of attention is probably explained by the established perception of war as chaotic, destructive, and anarchic, i.e., making any form of social order impossible [12]. Along with the undeniable relevance of the study of the above-mentioned issues, there is virtually no scientific literature directly focused on the legal aspects of creating new social orders in times

of war. At the same time, martial law in Ukraine is mentioned in about 3,000 publications recorded in the Google Scholar database. An analysis of the keywords in these publications shows that researchers primarily focus on the following topics: general theoretical and legal content and application of the Law "On Martial Law" [22], peculiarities of distance education under martial law [32], protection of national security under martial law [26] and its impact on economic activity [21]. Despite a significant number of such texts, we do not find among them works performed from a sociological perspective based on empirical data with a description and analysis of the socio-psychological preconditions, features and consequences of the (de) formation of the legal culture of the population in wartime.

The empirical study of the perception of martial law norms was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, a group of experts consisting of scientists, educators, managers, social service workers and NGOs outlined the following attributes of the state of legal awareness of the population under martial law: a list of restrictions provided for by the legal regime of martial law; illegal practices that emerged or spread with the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine. Regarding the norms envisaged by martial law, experts identified the following forms of public attitudes: assessment of the degree of effectiveness of these norms and public perception of the degree to which these norms restrict rights. Concerning illegal practices widespread during martial law, the experts identified the following forms of public attitudes: perceptions of the degree of public danger of these practices and the necessary degree of punishment for violators.

In the second stage, an online survey on the topic: "(Un)legal, social practices in modern Ukrainian society under martial law" (N=1116) was conducted in November-December 2023 using a questionnaire designed based on expert interviews. Since the online survey method makes it challenging to achieve representativeness, the sample was weighted by key socio-demographic indicators after the field stage was completed.

Table 1. Distribution of answers to the question about the effectiveness of martial law

Measures and restrictions under martial law	Have a negative / rather a negative effect	Have a positive / rather a positive effect	Average score	The balance of positive and negative assessment
Blocking of the aggressor country's Internet resources	17,5 %	77,9 %	4,15	+60,4
Curfew	23,1 %	68,8 %	3,72	+45,7
The absence of elections	27,7 %	55,2 %	3,41	+27,5
Prohibition of strikes	41,4 %	48,4 %	3,05	+7
Censorship in the media	41,6 %	43,6 %	2,95	+2
General mobilisation	41,1 %	38,2 %	2,94	-2,9
Restrictions on travelling abroad	44,1 %	39,3 %	2,9	-4,8
Restricting the secrecy of correspondence	43,8 %	34,7 %	2,79	-9,1

Prohibition of mass gatherings, rallies, marches	51,9 %	37,4 %	2,74	-14,5
Restrictions on Freedom of thought and speech	72,6 %	15 %	1,98	-57,6

Source: Created by the authors

In particular, the survey asked the following question: "Under martial law, several restrictions and measures are in place in our country to improve defence capabilities and counteract the destabilisation of society. In your opinion, what effect do these measures have?". Table 1 shows the results. The most effective martial law provisions are blocking Internet resources, the aggressor country (77.9%), curfew (68.8%), and legal provision that elections are not possible during martial law (55.2%). Instead, respondents consider the following to be the least effective: restrictions on the right to Freedom of thought, speech, and expression (15%); prohibition of peaceful gatherings, rallies, marches, demonstrations, etc. (37.4%); restrictions on the right to secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, and other correspondence (34.7%). It should be noted that respondents were almost unanimous in their negative attitude to restrictions on the right to Freedom of thought, speech, and expression and most polarised in their attitudes to media censorship, as evidenced by the standard deviation. The most effective martial law provisions are blocking Internet resources, the aggressor country (77.9%), curfew (68.8%), and legal provision that elections are not possible during martial law (55.2%). Instead, respondents consider the following to be the least effective: restrictions on the right to Freedom of thought, speech, and expression (15%); prohibition of peaceful gatherings, rallies, marches, demonstrations, etc. (37.4%); restrictions on the right to secrecy of correspondence, telephone conversations, and other correspondence (34.7%). It should be noted that respondents were almost unanimous in their negative attitude to restrictions on the right to Freedom of thought, speech, and expression and most polarised in their attitudes to media censorship, as evidenced by the standard deviation.

As we noted earlier, the effectiveness of legal provisions may be related to the respondents' opinions on whether such provisions protect or violate human rights. In our study, we found out how respondents in this context assess the restrictions imposed by the martial law regime (Table 2).

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question about the degree of restriction of rights by martial law

Measures and	Seriously / rather	Not at all /	Average score on	The balance
Curfew	17,2 %	74,2 %	2,46	+57
Blocking the	17,2%	74,0%	1,96	+56,8
The absence of	28,2 %	60,7 %	2,6	+32,5
Prohibition of	47,3 %	55,7 %	3,11	+8,4
General	38,9 %	42,8 %	3,07	+3,9
Restrictions on	43.9 %	38,7 %	3,26	-5,2
Censorship	47 %	37,9 %	2,96	-9,1

Restricting the secrecy	52,7%	36 %	3,38	-16,7
Restrictions on	56,7%	35 %	3,8	-21,7
Prohibition of mass	53,5 %	30,4 %	3,29	-23,1

Source: Created by the authors

The norms that, in the perception of the respondents, significantly restrict their rights were restrictions on the right to Freedom of thought and speech (56.7%), prohibition of mass gatherings, rallies, and marches (53.5%); restrictions on the right to secrecy of correspondence (52.7%), censorship in the media (47%), and prohibition of strikes (47.3%). In general, these norms relate to the opportunities provided by democracy and civil society to prevent abuse of power, ensure equal access to various sources of information and protect their interests. Such restrictions can lead to increased social tension and distrust of the authorities.

According to an all-Ukrainian survey conducted by KIIS in February 2024, 49% of respondents perceive the state's attempts to more actively control information in online sources (news sites, social media, telegram channels) as a restriction of rights and freedoms (in July 2022, the share was 30%) [33].

In the two-dimensional coordinate system formed by the horizontal axis of "Effectiveness" and the vertical axis of "Impact on the observance of rights", the measures and restrictions provided for by martial law are arranged as follows:

1. Restriction of the right to Freedom of thought and speech...; 2. Prohibition of peaceful gatherings, rallies, marches, demonstrations, etc.; 3. Restriction of the right to secrecy of correspondence; 4. Restriction of the right to Freedom of thought and speech...; 2. Prohibition of peaceful gatherings, rallies, marches, demonstrations, etc.; 3. Restriction of the right to secrecy of correspondence; 4. Restrictions on travelling abroad for men liable for military service; 5. Compulsory mobilisation; 6. Censorship in the media; 7. Prohibition of strikes; 8. Impossibility of holding elections; 9. Curfew; 10. Blocking of the aggressor country's Internet resources on travelling abroad for men liable for military service; 5. Compulsory mobilisation; 6. Censorship in the media; 7. Prohibition of strikes; 8. Impossibility of holding elections; 9. Curfew; 10. Blocking of the aggressor country's Internet resources.

According to the respondents, the least adequate and most restrictive martial law provision is the restriction of Freedom of thought and speech. Most of the martial law measures and norms are assessed by respondents as balanced in terms of effectiveness and the degree of restriction of rights. Such norms of martial law, such as curfews and blocking of the aggressor country's Internet resources, are assessed by respondents as effective and do not restrict the rights of citizens.

Placing the martial law norms in the two-dimensional space of mass perceptions "Effectiveness - Impact on the observance of rights", we can distinguish the following groups:

1) Effective and not significantly restricting rights (blocking of the aggressor country's Internet resources, curfews, legal provision that elections cannot be held during martial law);

2) Those that are perceived as balanced in the dimension "Effectiveness - Impact on the observance of rights" (prohibition of peaceful assemblies, rallies, marches, demonstrations, etc.; restriction of the right to secrecy of correspondence; restriction of travel abroad for men liable for military service; compulsory mobilisation; censorship of the media; prohibition of strikes);

4) Ineffective and significantly restrictive of rights (restriction of the right to Freedom of thought, speech, and expression of views and beliefs).

From the perspective of infra-legal reality, legal norms (especially restrictions) that are perceived as ineffective and violating human rights will be questioned, and individuals will seek ways to avoid their implementation, producing new models of what they consider to be "normal" (non-legal) social practices.

The second pair of analysed attributes of legal consciousness concerning martial law norms is the idea of the degree of public danger of certain types of offences and the idea of appropriate punishment for offenders. The study aimed to identify the respondents' perceptions and evaluative judgements of offences that began to spread under martial law, namely the degree of public danger of actions and the need for a certain degree of punishment. The mass legal consciousness, through such perceptions, gives specific actions (practices) the characteristics of criminals or justifies them, which does not always coincide with the formal definition in the legislation.



Figure 1. Assessment of martial law measures and restrictions in the two-dimensional space of perceptions of their effectiveness and impact on human rights . Source: Created by the authors.

Of all the unlawful practices assessed by respondents, the least socially dangerous, in their opinion, are evasion of mobilisation; violation of curfews; illegal travel of persons liable for military service abroad; failure to comply with security requirements and restrictions (curfews, improper arrangement of shelters, etc.). Illegal travel abroad by persons liable for military service does not pose a public danger, according to 10% of respondents. As for mobilisation evasion, this percentage is even higher (17%). This topic is not well-researched today, but some surveys show relevant and even more disturbing results. For example, a survey conducted by Info Sapiens in March 2024 found that 30% of respondents believe that society supports those who seek to avoid military service [19]. It should be noted here that the topic's sensitivity, acute nature, political dimension and instrumentalisation in hostile IPSOs are complemented by methodological

The distribution of answers to the question about the degree of public danger of the most typical wartime offences is as follows (Table 3):

Table 3. Distribution of answers to the question about the degree of public danger of certain types of offences during martial law

Certain types of offences during martial law	Degree of public danger				Average
	None	Minor	Significant	High	
Dissemination of information on the composition, movement, and	2,5%	4,4%	6,6%	86,5%	3,77
Abuses in state defence procurement	3,1%	3,1%	13,8%	80,1%	3,7
Dissemination of information about the places of «arrivals»...	2,9%	5,4%	12,6%	79,1	3,68
Abuses in the import and distribution of humanitarian aid	2,8%	3,9%	17,4%	76%	3,52
Failure to comply with security requirements and restrictions	4,9%	10,6%	28,2%	56,3%	3,5
Illegal travel of persons liable for military service abroad	10,1%	14,4%	34,3%	41,3%	3,06
Violation of the curfew	7,8%	21,0%	29,7%	41,4%	3,04
Evasion of mobilisation	17%	23,3%	37,4%	22,3%	2,64

Source: Created by the authors.

From a theoretical point of view, the rule of law is based on a unity of perceptions of the effectiveness of legal norms, their fairness and the corresponding beliefs about the appropriate punishment of violators. In practice, however, individual and mass consciousness may be internally contradictory, the legal sphere may be reflected to different degrees, and assessments and actions may be determined situationally and specifically (for example, depending on whether they concern a person or his or her family). All such inconsistencies lead to the prevalence of infra-legal reality over the letter and spirit of the law. The perception of a particular restriction or prohibition in the mass consciousness is evidenced by the attitude of citizens to the penalties to be applied in case of violation of the law (the trinity "Norm - Violation - Punishment" is an integral feature of the legal regulation mechanism). The survey revealed that citizens' attitudes toward violations of "Martial law" and the corresponding punishments differ.

According to the respondents, the most severe punishment should be imposed for abuses in the field of state defence procurement, as well as for offences related to the dissemination of information that favours the enemy and harms society and the armed forces. Instead, the least severe punishment should be imposed

on violators of curfew restrictions. Notably, the average rate of appropriate punishment for mobilisation evaders (between fines or community service and short prison sentences) indicates a relatively low public disapproval of this practice (Table 4).

Table 4. Distribution of answers to the question about punishment for offences during martial law

Forms of offences and corresponding penalties	Do not punish	A fine or community service	Short sentences of imprisonment	Long sentences of imprisonment	Life	Average score
Abuses in state defence procurement	1,1%	5,9%	14,1%	40,3%	38,6%	4,09
Dissemination of information on the composition, movement, and location of the Armed Forces of Ukraine	1,4%	8,3%	12,7%	38,4%	39,2%	4,05
Dissemination of information about the locations and damage caused by hostile shelling	3,3%	12,9%	23,3%	35,4%	22,9%	3,62
Abuses in the import and distribution of humanitarian aid	0,5%	11,5%	31,2%	39,2%	17,5%	3,61
Failure to comply with security requirements and restrictions	6,5%	42,2%	21,5%	21,5%	8,2%	2,82
Illegal travel of persons liable for military service abroad	11,4%	39,6%	30,5%	15,2%	3,2%	2,59
Evasion of mobilisation	19,9%	54,3%	16,3%	8,6%	0,9%	2,16
Violation of curfew (operation of establishments, sale of alcohol)	25,2%	59,6%	8,9%	3,9%	2,5%	1,98

Source: Created by the authors

From the perspective of infralegal reality, which can undermine existing legal norms, the biggest challenge is the population's attitude to such practices as illegal travel of persons liable for military service abroad and evasion of mobilisation. These norms relate to implementing civic duty and prioritising national security over private interests but are associated with significant changes in human life, challenges, and risks to life and health.

1) evasion of mobilisation; 2) violation of curfews; 3) illegal travel of persons liable for military service abroad; 4) failure to comply with security requirements and restrictions; 5) dissemination of information about the places of "arrivals", damage caused by enemy shelling; 6) abuse of the import and distribution of humanitarian aid; 7) dissemination of information about the composition, movement, location of the Armed Forces of Ukraine; 8) abuse of public defence procurement.



Figure 2. Assessment of offences during Martial Law

in the two-dimensional space of ideas about appropriate punishment

and the degree of public danger Source: Created by the authors.

The factor analysis revealed a three-factor model that explains 70.3% of the variance, i.e., sufficiently reliable (principal components method, Varimax rotation, 5 iterations, KMO - 0.806, Barletta - 0.000).

The identified latent structure of the variables divides martial law offences into three groups: 1) Offences perceived as the most serious and requiring severe punishment. These offences are related to disseminating information in favour of the aggressor's abuse of State and charitable resources. 2) The second group of offences comprises those related to general mobilisation and evasion of its mandatory nature. In the respondents' opinion, this group of offences deserves less severe punishment than the first. 3) Offences assessed as the least serious are violations of curfews and failure to comply with security requirements and restrictions.

War often weakens and sometimes destroys state institutions and agencies. Numerous studies have shown that in the absence of effective formal institutions, new ones are likely to emerge - informal ones, according to me. Ruschenko, social order can be analytically presented in the form of several interrelated

elements: “structure”, “relations”, “institutions”, “values and norms”, “roles”, and “actions”. Thus, crimes can be seen as structural defects when an actor’s actions do not reproduce the objective structure in society at the time of the action, i.e., they are not guided by “social rules”. We assume that a crime somehow destroys or calls into question this chain, its internal harmony. The offender brings an imbalance to the social order by neglecting or redefining relationships, institutions, values, norms, and roles [24].

Table 5. Matrix of factor loadings of variables describing respondents’ attitudes towards punishment of offences during martial law

In your opinion, what kind of punishment do the following offences deserve	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Dissemination of information on the composition, movement, and location of the Armed Forces of Ukraine	,817	,200	,085
Abuses in the distribution of humanitarian aid	,813	,092	,113
Abuses in state defence procurement	,810	,022	,069
Illegal import of goods across the border under the guise of humanitarian aid	,768	,111	,238
Dissemination of information about the places of «arrivals» and damage caused by hostile shelling	,742	,174	,178
Evasion of mobilisation (ignoring calls, fictitious marriage, etc.)	,090	,860	,170
Illegal travel of persons liable for military service abroad	,204	,840	,110
Violation of curfew (operation of entertainment venues, sale of alcohol)	,042	,236	,842
Failure to comply with security requirements and restrictions	,350	,057	,758

Source: Created by the authors .

Institutions are a set of rules of the game (formal and informal) accepted in a society that regulates behaviour and correlates it with dominant values. Douglas North considers institutions as the “rules of the game” in society or human-made constraints that organise relationships between people and influence the functioning of social systems. In his work Violence and Social Order, he states: “Institutions are the rules of the game, the patterns of interaction that govern and constrain the relationships between individuals. Institutions include formal rules, written laws, formal social traditions, informal norms of behaviour and shared beliefs about the world, and the means of enforcing them all [20; 35].

Suppose we are talking about the institution of martial law aimed at preserving national security and protecting citizens. In that case, its maintenance and reproduction are possible only through the performance of social actions by citizens ready to take responsibility and assume the required duties. Under other conditions, the existing social order is destroyed. The consequences in this case may include conflicts at the group or institutional level, increased social tension, crisis, and anomie.

Social upheavals associated with a change in the value and normative system are described in sociology using the concept of anomie. Modern scholars, rethinking the ideas of E. Durkheim, R.Merton and other classics of sociology, analyse anomie in the context of a society going through a five-phase process, namely, from the phase of a “stable society” to the phase of dispersion of practices to the phase of the constellation of new norms to the phase of irradiation (acute anomie) and, finally, to the phase of authentication of society (rooting and establishment of a new order of sociality) [4]. The reaction to anomie can be seen as a particular

socio-psychological state of mass consciousness that can be manifested in indifference and indiscriminate means of achieving goals, in a significant distrust of social norms and other people in general, and, as a result, social cynicism, legal nihilism (as a deformation of legal consciousness) and anomalous demoralisation.

The monitoring toolkit of the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine contains a scale of anomalous demoralisation (the judgements offered to the respondents state different feelings and awareness of the disorder of the public and, as a result, personal life). In 2021, this index was 12.6. A score of 9 to 12 points on the Abnormal Demoralisation Index indicates an elevated level of demoralisation. A value above 12 points is high [29, pp. 45-86].

In November 2022, after the full-scale Russian invasion, there was the most significant synchronous decrease in anomalous demoralisation. That is, the legitimacy of the social order has increased almost equally for residents of all regions [29]. The social cynicism scale is another scale that interprets mass sentiment as a response to anomie. According to the authors, the high prevalence of cynicism in society reflects the prevalence of a dismissive attitude towards generally accepted values, the state and the nation, and thus, indirectly, the degree of illegitimacy of the social order. In 2022, the Cynicism Index recorded the most significant value decline over monitoring observations. However, for a year in a row, as intense hostilities have continued unabated, there has been an inevitable reverse increase in the level of cynicism in the masses [29, p. 65]. Thus, there is a connection between these two scales, which is explained by the fact that abnormal demoralisation contributes to the emergence of cynicism in extreme conditions.

Along with socio-legal cynicism, one of the most widespread and dangerous manifestations of the deformation of mass legal consciousness is legal nihilism. It can become the basis for offences, manifesting in the subject’s active rejection of official legal norms and disbelief in their potential to solve social problems. Like other forms of deformation, legal nihilism can manifest itself at both the personal and institutional levels. The reasons for this may include shortcomings in legislation, the substitution of legality by political and ideological expediency, the desire of officials and bodies to realise their interests outside the formal norms, shortcomings in the work of judicial and law enforcement agencies and a high degree of distrust in them; media coverage of crimes committed by politicians, representatives of the TCC, officials and their impunity (including corruption related to compulsory mobilisation, defence procurement, and distribution of humanitarian aid, which are the most negatively assessed by the public, as shown by our survey); martial law norms, which are assessed as a restriction of rights, especially the right to life, liberty, security, privacy, housing (which is relevant in the context of total war in the country, as discussed above).

Within the structure of legal nihilism, there are two extreme forms: legal indifference (lack of interest in legal phenomena, unwillingness to use and exercise the rights granted by law, refusal to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in the fight against crime) and legal negativism (the belief that the requirements and prohibitions of law are only formal, and one should be guided only by one’s desires and interests. The law is compared to an obstacle that can be circumvented or overcome). The most negative is social nihilism, i.e., the nihilism inherent in the majority of society and is the basis of public opinion in legal relations. The way to overcome these destructive phenomena in the mass consciousness is to legitimise the existing social order (particularly the norms of martial law). In the mass consciousness, this will mean the recognition or acceptance by society, the public, and social groups of the legitimacy and necessity of martial law restrictions, recognition of the legitimacy, and support for the authorities’ actions in the context of a military conflict [38].

The empirical study of the peculiarities of legal consciousness of Ukrainian society in a state of war faces several methodological challenges, including the sensitivity of the topic and, therefore, the difficulty of empirically recording the relevant attitudes, experiences and assessments of citizens; difficulties associated with the irrelevance and even the impossibility of constructing a correct representative sample in the new socio-demographic and settlement-territorial conditions. Understanding the vulnerability and limitations of the data obtained with such a convention, we will outline specific trends and patterns of the formation of new social orders in the legal consciousness of the population, which should be studied in depth in the future. The empirical data obtained indicate that both dimensions of human and civil Freedom - its positive and negative modalities ("freedom for" and "freedom from") - are of significant importance for Ukrainians, which positively characterises the legal consciousness of society. At the same time, several paradoxes of legal consciousness and its deformation can be traced. For example, the population's relative indifference to institutionalised forms of political participation (elections of deputies of various levels and the president) and public control (attitudes towards media censorship and blocking of information resources) was recorded. At the same time, respondents have a negative attitude towards restrictions on Freedom of speech, which is paradoxically not linked to media freedom in the public perception.

A threatening phenomenon in the legal consciousness of the population is the paternalistic shifting of responsibility from ordinary citizens and their practices to the institution of the state and its representatives, which corresponds to the well-known pattern of infra-legal consciousness - relaxed requirements for the behaviour of an ordinary citizen, which can be situational and flexible, and increased requirements for the state and its representatives.

The assessment by a significant part of the population of offences critical to the effectiveness of national resistance (evasion of mobilisation, illegal departure of persons liable for military service abroad) as not socially dangerous or having a low level of social danger creates preconditions for the constitution of an infra-legal reality that will only stimulate such offences.

It can be concluded that the respondents support some restrictions on rights under martial law, but there were also those whose perception of the individual and mass consciousness is less optimistic. The latter can become a favourable basis for manifestations of deformation of legal consciousness, an increase in the level of anomalous demoralisation, social cynicism and, as a result, the spread of illegal social practices.

These deformations indicate the "pain points" of society that can be used and are already being used by the enemy in its information and psychological operations to destabilise society, stimulate alienation of citizens from government institutions and, ultimately, weaken national resistance. In order to avoid the vulnerability of the social order, particularly its components such as the norms of the martial law regime, it is advisable to establish clear and universal rules that regulate general mobilisation and travel of persons liable for military service abroad transparently and understandably for the society. It is equally important to guarantee forms of expression in the public sphere that do not threaten national security, to develop electronic forms of voter and government feedback, and to protect the autonomy and privacy of citizens.

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HABITUALIZATION OF NEW EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES IN CONDITIONS OF WAR

This chapter explores the social transformations in Ukrainian higher education amid the ongoing war, focusing on the legitimation and capitalisation of new educational practices. The full-scale Russian invasion has catalysed the rejection of old social orders and the rapid adoption of new ones. Ukrainian society has been compelled to legitimise and normalise previously unimaginable educational forms. The chapter analyses the dual transformation of order, where new practices may replace or coexist with the old, highlighting tensions of radical change, ambivalence, and conflict.

A literature review synthesises empirical studies and analytical reports on higher education since February 2022, addressing institutional destruction and relocation, shifts to distance and hybrid learning, psychological wellbeing, and the adaptability of educational processes under martial law. Despite immense challenges, the sector demonstrates resilience through digitalisation, international cooperation, and emerging educational trajectories.

Grounded in Berger and Luckmann's theory of social reality construction, the chapter introduces legitimation (social acceptance of new orders) and capitalisation (routinisation of new practices). Codification is proposed as the bridge linking these processes between the social and individual levels. This framework supports analysis of how war-induced changes become institutionalised within Ukrainian higher education.

Overall, the study offers insight into how the system balances the preservation of core functions with adaptation and innovation, contributing to the discourse on resilience, transformation, and the creation of new social orders under extreme conditions.

Keywords: higher education, Ukraine, war, social transformation, legitimation, capitalisation, codification, educational practices, institutional change, adaptation, resilience.

Social transformations, both global and local, are driven by the rejection of old orders and the establishment of new ones that shape the functioning of communities and societies. Old and new orders can either replace one another or coexist, each scenario bringing its challenges: complete replacement implies rapid, often radical change, while coexistence creates ambiguity and tension. The disappearance of old orders and the rise of new ones is a natural but variable process across societies, becoming especially intense under extraordinary circumstances. In Ukraine, Russia's full-scale war has acted as such a catalyst, forcing society since 24 February 2022 to legitimise a new social order and adopt unprecedented practices. During wartime, every sphere undergoes transformation. Depending on context, these take the form of replacement or hybridisation of orders. Higher education plays a crucial role here, preparing the younger generation to sustain and rebuild society amid and after war.

On the one hand, Ukraine's official policy should be aimed at synchronising new educational practices with the priority areas of European education development (in particular, ensuring the quality of higher

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education, developing individual educational trajectories, developing academic mobility, equal access to education, ensuring lifelong learning, etc. On the other hand, in times of war, several objective and subjective conditions and contexts can either facilitate or hinder the emergence, development and implementation of new educational practices [20]. Any innovations, including those in education, go through the processes of legitimation, i.e. social acceptance of existing orders, and capitalisation, i.e. getting used to specific social practices. Legitimation is more related to accepting orders at the theoretical level, while capitalisation is more about the routinisation of specific facts and processes in the practical dimension. The processes of legitimation and capitalisation complement each other and synergistically give rise to the formation of new social orders at the level of people's perceptions. Higher education, namely the peculiarities of capitalisation of new practices, is the object of interest of this study.

A general understanding of the objective indicators of the state of higher education in Ukraine after the full-scale invasion can be found in the educational and analytical collection "Education under Martial Law: challenges, development, post-war prospects", which was published by the Institute of Educational Analytics, which is subordinated to the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine in 2023. At the beginning of 2023, there were 332 higher education institutions (HEIs) in Ukraine, with a total student population of 1,113 thousand. However, the war affected the infrastructure and location of higher education institutions. As of 1 July 2023, 4 higher education institutions were destroyed due to hostilities, and 29 higher education institutions and 64 separate structural units of higher education institutions were relocated (starting from the first wave of 2014). The hostilities also affected the format of education within which higher education institutions operate. As of 1 July 2023, 53% of higher education institutions operated remotely, 35% - in a mixed format, 10% of higher education institutions switched to full-time education, and 1% did not resume their activities [1].

A large-scale sociological study of higher education was conducted as part of the project "Universities under Siege: Challenges for the Ukrainian Higher Education System after Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine", implemented by the School of Political Analysis of the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in partnership with the National Agency for Higher Education Quality Assurance and with the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. Since the study was conducted from June to March 2022, it gives us a particular vision of how higher education in Ukraine functioned immediately after the full-scale invasion. The main findings of the comprehensive sociological study include the following.

- The percentage of students (48%) who believed that the quality of education had deteriorated somehow was equal to that of respondents who did not see any changes in the quality of education (47%). At the same time, 46 per cent of the students surveyed acknowledged difficulties with their ability to study as well as before the war.
- There was a certain flexibility in the organisation of the learning process on the part of teachers, as only 30 per cent of students said that teachers had not changed the teaching format after the war outbreak. At the same time, a third of the students surveyed said that teachers had changed the assessment criteria and become less demanding after the outbreak of war.
- Almost half of the students (47%) said they lacked communication with their classmates and other students.

Despite the significant changes in the conditions in which higher education institutions operated after the outbreak of war, their administration was not confused and clearly understood the need to continue educational activities [2].

Another area in which higher education studies were conducted immediately after the full-scale invasion was to identify trends in the organisation of distance learning in higher education institutions. Between 6 and 13 May 2022, the State Education Quality Service of Ukraine conducted an anonymous online survey of students and academic staff of higher education institutions of all types and forms of ownership (sample of 27,000 respondents). In particular, it is noted that the practical experience of using the distance format by higher education institutions during quarantine has undoubtedly become crucial for rapid adaptation under martial law and has also had a positive impact on ensuring the quality of educational services at all levels and preventing significant losses in the sector [3; 16].

Several scholars have analysed the psychological consequences of the war for Ukrainian students, faculty and staff of higher education institutions who remained in Ukraine [4; 17]. The study was conducted through an online survey in May 2022 (a sample of 589 respondents from 4 Ukrainian universities in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Rivne). According to the study, 98% of respondents reported a deterioration in their psycho-emotional state with complaints of depression (84%), exhaustion (87%), loneliness (52%), nervousness (84%) and anger (77%). Students were more likely than staff to report exhaustion, loneliness, nervousness, and anger in the survey, and women were more likely than men to report depression, exhaustion, loneliness, and nervousness [4].

The topic of educational practices in higher education was considered in various research and analytical reports based on desk research of open data. In particular, the research and analytical report "Higher Education of Ukraine in the Context of Martial Law and Post-War Reconstruction: Challenges and Responses" analyses the main problems of higher education (threat to the life and health of higher education students and staff; large-scale destruction and damage to infrastructure; forced relocation of institutions; the impact of the war on the contingent of higher education students and the composition of research and teaching staff; exacerbation of the problem of ensuring equal access to quality higher education; difficulties in conducting research and innovation activities) [5; 18]. In 2023, the report "Higher Education in Ukraine: Changes Due to War" was published by the analytical centre "OsvitaAnalytics" of Borys Grinchenko Kyiv University with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Based on open sources of information, the authors of the report analyse the problems and challenges faced by the higher education system in Ukraine during the war, public policy in higher education after 24 February 2022, and the directions of transformation and restoration of the higher education system. In particular, the author points to the new procedure for admission to higher education institutions, significant economic human losses and psychological problems of students and teachers, support for Ukrainian students and researchers under various grant programmes, forced relocation of universities, etc. It is worth noting that despite several challenges for the modern higher education system that have arisen as a result of Russian aggression against Ukraine, it still has some development opportunities. Among them are opportunities for international academic mobility, international cooperation of higher education institutions, the introduction of information technologies in the educational process and professional development of teachers, and the application of flexible and distance learning technologies (which facilitates the ability of students to study and work simultaneously, and for teachers to work in education and other fields) [7; 19].

It is worth noting that most empirical sociological studies of education carried out after the full-scale invasion were not about higher education but the school sector. In particular, the "Study of the quality of the organisation of the educational process in the academic year 2022/2023" was conducted by the State Quality of Education Service of Ukraine in December 2022 - January 2023 (questionnaire method) and concerned school models, educational losses, compensatory measures, etc. Another all-Ukrainian survey of the school sector, "Between Quality and Security: School Education and Enrolment in Time of War," found that most guardians (63%) whose children or grandchildren are enrolled in schools do not support distance learning during the war. Compared to a survey conducted in 2021, when distance learning was introduced in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, attitudes towards online learning have not changed [9]. The study of school education in the context of war is also presented in "War and Education. 2 years of full-scale invasion" . The study shows that students and their parents consider full-time education (or a format where most classes are held in person) to be more effective (62% of students and 79% of parents), while all groups of respondents consider air raids to be the main barrier to learning (47% of students and 51% of parents, 75% of teachers and 87% of administration representatives). Among students, 53% want to stay in Ukraine after school, a quarter (26%) want to move abroad, and the remaining 20% are undecided [10].

The literature review allowed us to identify the main topics that have been addressed in studies of higher education in the context of a full-scale invasion, namely: quality of education, educational losses (material, psychological, human, etc.), difficulties in organising education, new ways of adaptation (in particular, distance/mixed format of education), new opportunities, etc. Given this, it becomes clear that the war affects the formation of new educational orders, which participants in the educational process can view as temporary or become habituated and legitimised practices, thus contributing to the latest trends in the institutionalisation of education.

The new arrangements in the organisation of an educational institution should be seen in the broader context of their formation, which is influenced by both the Russian-Ukrainian war and the economic and socio-cultural changes that have occurred in society in recent years. Certain new educational practices are initiated by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (e.g., increasing the number of disciplines students can choose independently). In contrast, other educational practices are legitimised and habituated from the bottom up, from students, teachers and university administrators (e.g., the spread of non-formal education). In addition, old educational practices that were widespread in the pre-war period continue to function in Ukrainian society, thus creating complex combinations within the functioning of the educational institution.

This study's theoretical and methodological basis combines several positions of the theory of social reality construction by P. Berger and T. Luckmann (Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T., 1991). Based on the important provisions of these authors, we have constructed schematic connections between such key categories as "legitimation" and "capitalisation", which, as we assume, will also be inherent in the educational sphere (see Figure 1).

The author's research logic is that the formation of new social orders can be explained through two key processes: legitimation and capitalisation. Legitimation, as a process of social recognition, involves the construction of specific ideas at the theoretical level, and capitalisation, as a process of personal habituation, is associated with specific social practices. Another important social process interconnects these two



Figure 1. Relationships between legitimation and capitalisation (constructed for higher education study). Source: Created by the authors.

categories - codification. According to the proposed research logic, codification takes place in two directions and, accordingly, has two directions.

1) Codification (A) is transforming theoretical ideas into specific practices, which involves first legitimation at the level of ideas and then capitalisation within practices. This suggests that codification "moves" from the social to the individual and can thus be called "individual-oriented/directed".

2) Codification (B) is a process that begins in habituated individual practices and is then transformed into representations at the level of social legitimation. We call this codification "socially oriented/directed".

Thus, the codification is formed in theoretical ideas and embodied in habituated practices, then returns to the ideas at a higher level of legitimation, thus forming new social orders. The above scheme will be tested on the example of theoretical ideas about higher education in the conditions of modern Ukrainian society and habituated practices related to these ideas, and together, new orders will be constructed in the educational environment.

Based on the proposed scheme, the results of the author's empirical research will be analysed following several indicators of legitimation and capitalisation of new educational concepts and practices in the higher education system in two directions:

- individual orientation of higher education (among the fundamental indicators will be individual educational trajectories within higher education institutions, which are implemented through disciplines of free choice of the student, the ratio of highly specialised and worldview disciplines, academic mobility, etc.)
- social orientation of higher education (combination of formal education with other educational and career activities such as work, non-formal education, social activities, sports, volunteering, etc.)

The author's empirical research is focused on higher education because, on the one hand, this area is relatively less studied than, for example, secondary education, and on the other hand, students, as young but almost formed individuals, are good experts in modern educational concepts and practices. The study was conducted in the city of Lviv, which gives grounds to exclude completely extreme conditions in the educational sphere in other regions of Ukraine and allows us to assess educational innovations from the perspective of introducing new educational practices not only during the war but also after its end, which is of particular importance for Ukrainian higher education itself.

The field stage of the author's research, "New Educational Practices in Ukraine", was conducted in February-March 2024 utilising an online survey. The target audience was students studying at higher education institutions in Lviv. The total sample of the empirical study, constructed using the primary array method, was 470 people, of whom 60% were women and 40% were men. The distribution of students by year of study is as follows: 28% - 1st year, 24% - 2nd year, 21% - 3rd year, 19% - 4th year, 8% - masters.

Since 2020, the coronavirus pandemic has gripped the global world, and the remote format of social organisation has gained significant momentum and subsequently become one of the normative components of modern society [21]. In some cases, given the prevalence of remote lifestyles in various social spheres, both globally and locally, we can even talk about forming a social institution such as remoteness [13]. In the context of Ukraine, remoteness was actualised by the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, which forced many spheres into a remote format. One of these areas is education, notably higher education, which, due to security requirements, has faced the challenges of new social orders. As of the beginning of 2024, the remote lifestyle, in general, is habituated mainly at the personal level and legitimised at the social level. Our study aims to determine how legitimised and habituated the distance format is in higher education, particularly in Lviv students' perceptions. From our point of view, distance is one of the characteristics of new social orders, so that special attention will be paid to this aspect.

According to the study results, modern students in Lviv prefer the mixed form of education among the three proposed forms of education - full-time, distance and blended - which was chosen as a priority by 44% of respondents. The second place in the priorities was taken by full-time education (36%), and the third and last position in terms of priority, from the point of view of students, went to distance education (20%).

The results of the $\chi 2$ independence test suggest that the preference for a particular form of education significantly depends on the course of study (the calculated $\chi 2$ (40.572) is higher than $\chi 2^*$ (16.81). The p-value (3.516e-07) is significantly lower than α=0.01), i.e. the course of study is an active factor for such an indicator as the priority of a particular form of education by modern students of the rear of Lviv at the level of statistical significance of 0.01. While in the first two years of study, students prefer face-to-face learning (54% in the first and 43% in the second year) compared to other learning formats, in the third and fourth years of study, students consider the mixed learning format to be optimal (52% in the third and 57% in the fourth year). We can observe a clear tendency to change students' perceptions of the optimal form of learning depending on the course (see Table 1):

Table 1: Priority hierarchy among the three formats of higher education

Course	**Full-time training**	**Blended learning**	**Distance learning**
Hierarchy of priorities among the three learning formats in higher education («I place - the most desirable learning format», «III place - the least desirable learning format»)			
1st year	I	II	III
2nd year	I	II	III
3rd year	II	I	III
4th year	III	I	II

Source: Created by the authors

Thus, the first and second years of study are characterised by a similar situation, with the most preference given to the full-time study format. In the third year of study, the first place in the hierarchy of preferences is occupied by the blended learning mode, with the full-time mode coming in second. In the fourth year, the mixed form of study remains in the first position, but the second place is taken by distance learning. For 4th year students, full-time study is last in the hierarchy of their preferences. As for students of the second master's level of higher education, their position is closest to bachelor's graduates and 4th-year students - similarly, the most preferred form of education is blended learning, distance learning is second, and the least preferred is full-time education.

Unlike the course, the preference for a particular form of education does not depend on students' gender. Since the calculated $\chi 2$ (1.3628) is less than $\chi 2^*$ (5.99) and the p-value (0.5059) is greater than α=0.05, we have reason to believe that there is no dependence between the gender of modern students in rear Lviv and their preference for a particular form of education.

Also, according to the results of the $\chi 2$ independence test, we can record the dependence between the actual learning format and the way students would like to learn since the calculated $\chi 2$ (59.043) is higher than $\chi 2^*$ (59.043). The p-value (4.609e-12) is significantly less than α=0.01. We have reason to believe that the current education format is an active factor for such an indicator as the preference for a particular form of education by modern students of rear-guard Lviv at the level of statistical significance of 0.01. We can assume that students are more likely to be satisfied with the form of education they use. The highest percentage of satisfaction is among those students who study in a mixed form of education (67%). Among those who study in full-time and distance learning formats, the percentage of students who are satisfied with these formats is less than 50% (45% and 48%, respectively), but these are the forms of education that students use, and they still give the most excellent preference.

Thus, we can say that in the conditions of "rear" Lviv, blended learning, which can be considered a form of combining old and new educational practices, is generally the most favoured by modern students. As a traditional educational practice, full-time education remains important for junior students. As a new educational practice, distance learning is generally the least popular among students but is more preferred than full-time education for senior students. It is worth noting that the relationship between the actual and desired learning format demonstrates a particular combination of processes of capitalisation (at the personal level) and legitimation (at the level of theoretical ideas) of various educational practices that function in modern Ukrainian higher education. In addition, the combination of traditional and modern educational practices, as well as the clear priority given to the blended learning format, give rise to the conclusion that the persistent preservation of old practices characterises the new social order in the educational sphere, the cautious introduction of new ones, and the confident crystallisation of their combination, which is manifested in the blended learning format.

One of the manifestations of the new orders in the organisation of higher education in Ukraine is the growth of academic freedom and the role of student subjectivity, which are embodied in certain practices of individualising student educational trajectories within higher education institutions. The study of this particular dimension of new educational practices in higher education involved an online survey of students in Lviv as part of the study of individual-oriented codification, which is directed from theoretical ideas of people at the level of legitimation to habituated practices. The questions of this block concerned

the disciplines of students' free choice, academic mobility, the ratio of highly specialised and worldview disciplines, etc.

The practice of students' free choice of disciplines is relatively new for Ukrainian universities, as this provision was put into force only in 2014. According to Article 62 of the Law of Ukraine "On Higher Education", a person studying at a higher education institution has the right to choose academic disciplines within the limits provided by the relevant educational programme and the working curriculum, in the amount of at least 25% of the total number of ECTS credits [11].

At the level of theoretical ideas, Lviv students agree that higher education should be individually oriented. In particular, 63% of respondents believe that modern higher education should combine compulsory subjects that are predetermined and subjects chosen by students at their discretion. Only 6% of respondents believe that there should be no discretionary courses. On the other hand, 43% of respondents say that higher education should be formed mainly from disciplines chosen by students at their discretion. It should be noted that this group of students (43%) can serve as a basis for proposals from the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, which in 2023 initiated a discussion on increasing the number of free choice subjects in educational programmes.

It is worth noting that the two most important reasons for students to choose free-choice disciplines are "personal interests not related to professional education" (70%) and "professional interests" (50%). It seemed that these positions should be mutually exclusive. However, they demonstrate that the free choice of disciplines allows students to choose professionally oriented disciplines, deepening their professional skills and knowledge and developing competencies that provide general erudition, interdisciplinarity or "soft skills". In addition, this specificity of answers may be since curricula provide for the choice of disciplines from both the block of professionally oriented and the block of disciplines unrelated to the speciality of study. We can also assume that modern students associate their functioning in higher education with professional development and socialisation in a broader format (as discussed below). When choosing a HEI, students attach much less importance to factors that are not related to their conscious personal interests, namely the advice of other students (35%), the personality of the teacher (31%), and the name of the discipline (22%). It is worth noting that 1/5 of students choose "easier to pass" disciplines. Thus, their choice may demonstrate a lack of interest in gaining specific knowledge or skills but only a desire to obtain a diploma.

It is worth noting that the issue of choosing disciplines may relate to another important aspect of building individual trajectories, namely the ratio of professionally oriented disciplines and "worldview core" disciplines, which are often formed by higher education institutions and are mandatory for all students. 60% of students surveyed agree that higher education should include only those relevant to their future profession, and 42% of respondents believe that higher education should include several disciplines of broad ideological significance (history, philosophy, etc.). At the same time, a certain dissonance in students' attitudes to the ratio of professionally oriented and compulsory worldview disciplines is demonstrated by answers to the question about which disciplines should be compulsory for all higher education students (Table 2). Only 7% of the surveyed students indicated that "no compulsory disciplines are needed ". In our opinion, such contradictory answers demonstrate that students do not have a formed attitude to higher education as one that forms only professional competencies or as one that forms broad knowledge and skills.

Students' attitude towards introducing possible innovations looks very telling and may indicate that students' theoretical ideas about what higher education in Ukraine should be like are complemented by ideas close to possible practices (see Fig. 2).



Figure. 2. Students' attitude to the probable share of free choice subjects. Source: Created by the authors.

The study results indicate that students tend to shape their educational trajectory actively, and the practice of free choice of disciplines is legitimised and habituated (only 5% of students surveyed want to reduce the number of elective courses). At the same time, the data show that almost half of the respondents (51%) tend to legitimise the possible expansion of students' opportunities to choose disciplines, while another significant part (44%) leave the opportunities to choose disciplines in the same ratio. The above data demonstrate that Lviv higher education institutions fall into two categories: one-third of students are satisfied with a certain level of autonomy in choosing disciplines. In contrast, the other part would like more opportunities to choose disciplines independently and build individual educational trajectories.

At the same time, attention should be paid to the criteria that guide students when choosing free-choice courses (see Figure 3).



Figure 3. Criteria used by students when choosing free-choice subjects. Source: Created by the authors.

Table 2. Compulsory disciplines for all higher education students from the point of view of modern students

«What disciplines should be compulsory for all higher education students?»	%
English language	72%
history of Ukraine	62%
psychology	38%
basics of medicine	36%
business Ukrainian	35%
military training	30%
physical education	18%
life safety	18%
management basics	17%
political science	17%
history of Ukrainian culture	16%
sociology	15%
philosophy	15%
no compulsory subjects are required at all	7%

Source: Created by the authors

The student survey results indicate the importance of learning English, as 72% of respondents would like to see it become a compulsory subject. The high legitimisation of the importance of learning English is indicated by 89% of respondents consider English "important" or "very important" for a modern young person. In our opinion, these results can be explained by the value of English in terms of a better starting point in the labour market, enhanced international communication, and access to various English-language resources.

The importance of studying the history of Ukraine as a compulsory discipline was mentioned by 62% of respondents, which demonstrates the demand of students to deepen their knowledge of the history of their own country and its origins. It can be assumed that one of the factors behind the actualisation of the study of Ukrainian history is the full-scale war and the need to understand national identity and memory. At the same time, only 35% of the surveyed students would like to see business Ukrainian among the compulsory subjects, which may be due to students' perceptions of their proficiency in their native language. The respondents consider psychology (38%) and the basics of medicine (36%) to be relatively less important among the subjects that should be compulsory for all students, as they deepen the necessary psychological and physical health knowledge and skills.

Despite the active hostilities taking place on the territory of Ukraine, only 30% of the students surveyed consider military training a compulsory discipline. The questionnaire included a similar question to clarify the respondents' attitudes towards military training. Respondents' answers showed that this study area is irrelevant, as only 20% of respondents agreed with the thesis that modern higher education should include compulsory military training for those liable for military service. According to this study, only 4% of the students surveyed had received military training last year. In addition, only 28% of the students surveyed said that "modern higher education should have a national and patriotic orientation". In our opinion, these data are somewhat discordant with the importance of the discipline "History of Ukraine" (as indicated by students) and demonstrate the ambivalent nature of legitimating the national-patriotic orientation

of education in the perceptions of the surveyed students. It can also be suggested that there are specific differences between theoretical ideas and habitualised practices (e.g. military training).

Thus, we can conclude that the interests of modern students are constructed within 3 trends - "globalisation" (the need to learn English), "Ukrainisation" (significant attention to the disciplines "History of Ukraine" and "Business Ukrainian") and "adaptation to war conditions" (implemented within such disciplines as "Psychology", "Fundamentals of Medicine" and "Military Training"). It should be noted that the combination of these two trends - "globalisation" and "Ukrainisation" - may, on the one hand, indicate contradictions and ambivalent perceptions of modern Ukrainian students, but on the other hand, it may also be a basis for concluding that young people in Lviv are versatile, for whom globalisation and national interests are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. All other academic disciplines offered to the respondents (see Table 2) received less than 30% of the votes, which indicates a lower interest among today's students.

The students' ideas and practices regarding academic mobility, which can be seen as another opportunity to build their educational trajectory, were fascinating. It should be noted at once that this practice, according to the study's results, is completely marginal - only 7% of respondents noted the relevance (permanent and partial) of this activity for themselves. 59% of students are not interested in academic mobility. Every fifth student (20% of all respondents) declared potential intentions to realise themselves in this area. It should be noted that the survey was about academic mobility in the context of studying abroad. We can assume that, for various reasons, there is no significant interest among modern students in this way of self-realisation. Even in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, when many Ukrainians are looking for opportunities to travel abroad, Lviv students hardly use such opportunities. This is an interesting point that we think is worth paying attention to. In the course of the study, respondents, when forming a list of subjects that are not directly related to their future profession but should be included in the curriculum as compulsory (see Table 2), confidently gave the first place to English language learning (72% of respondents consider this subject necessary). It is interesting that English can be improved while studying abroad as part of academic mobility. However, for specific reasons (which require further study), the declared importance of English language skills and the opportunity to practice it within the framework of foreign academic mobility programmes do not coincide with the perceptions of modern students. Again, we can discuss specific differences in theoretical ideas and habitualised practices.

Thus, the analysis of individually oriented perceptions of higher education and related educational practices allows us to draw several conclusions:

- The student environment is heterogeneous, with some students satisfied with the level of individual trajectories provided and others expressing a desire for even greater relevance at this level;
- Modern students demonstrate ambivalent views on the content of higher education with purely professional or "worldview" disciplines;
- Among the respondents, we notice a certain dissonance between theoretical ideas about various educational aspects and their implementation within personal habituated practices.

In conclusion, it should be noted that, according to the study results, the individual-oriented component of modern higher education is significant for modern students not only at the level of theoretical concepts but also at the level of current educational practices. The special attention to individual needs in higher

education is also demonstrated by the fact that 42% of the surveyed students consider it necessary to expand the practice of individual learning in times of war.

The second part of the analysed research results concerns the extent to which students are included in the broader socialisation of society, particularly through legitimising their habitual practices. Among the basic practices relevant to students, we have identified formal education in higher education, non-formal education, extracurricular activities (science, social activities, sports, creativity, etc.), as well as work during studies, which we divided into work in the speciality and work outside the speciality that students are studying. These practices are studied in the context of socially oriented codification, which involves the capitalisation of social practices at the personal level and their further legitimisation in a broader format.

According to the study results, the most relevant of these practices is formal studying at a higher education institution. Among all the respondents, 88% indicated that they practice studying hard in higher education; 40% of students do it regularly, and slightly more (48%) study hard occasionally. The results of the $\chi 2$ independence test demonstrate the dependence between students' gender and their attitude towards formal learning. At the level of statistical significance of 0.01, we can say that girls study harder than boys. Among girls, we see 45% of those who study hard regularly, while among boys, there are fewer students who are diligent in formal education (33%). The $\chi 2$ test of independence did not show any correlation between studying hard in higher education and the course students are enrolled in, nor the format in which they study. However, it was possible to identify a relationship between the practice of studying hard and the form of study students consider a priority. With 95% confidence ($\alpha=0.05$), we can state that the highest number of students who study hard regularly is among those who prefer full-time study (46%), slightly lower (39%) - among those who prefer blended learning, and the lowest (32%) - among those who prefer distance learning. From our point of view, these results may indicate that students who want to study in a "live" format are more responsible for obtaining a quality higher education, while those who would like to study online are less responsible for obtaining their higher education in general.

The second most relevant for modern students is non-formal education, which is practised to some extent by 64% of respondents. The number of those who practice non-formal education from time to time is much higher (49%), while the number of those who engage in self-development in this way is only 15%. According to the results of the $\chi 2$ independence test, we cannot say that the practice of non-formal education is dependent on the gender of students, their age, or the form of education they consider to be a priority. However, we can state with 95% confidence ($\alpha=0.05$) that the relevance of non-formal education depends on the format of actual learning - the percentage of those who constantly receive non-formal education is significantly higher among distance learning students (35%), while among mixed learning students, it is 18%, and among full-time students - only 12%. Thus, distance learning students partially replace formal education with non-formal education for various reasons. This may indicate the construction of a modern student who combines formal and non-formal education but chooses a distance learning format in higher education for such a combination.

The third position among the practices relevant for modern students while studying in higher education is extracurricular activities (social activities, science, sports, creativity, etc.), which are practised by 58% of respondents combined with studies. It is interesting to note that the results of the $\chi 2$ independence test showed no dependence of this indicator on any of the tested factors - extracurricular activity is not affected by gender, course of study, or the format of study or priority given to one or another form of

study. We can assume that this may be due to a comprehensive understanding of extracurricular activities, which can include many activities. We want to point out that more students today should practise such a broad understanding of extracurricular activities. Looking at the data from another angle, more than 40% of today's students did not indicate that they are always or sometimes active. Given that it is student youth who should be as active as possible in various public affairs, especially in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, such a significant percentage of somewhat passive students is alarming.

The next relevant practice important for modern students' socialisation and their formation in a potential professional direction is the combination of study and work. According to the proposed division, more modern students practice (permanently and occasionally) work outside their speciality while studying at higher education institutions (42%). A job related to their future profession is managed to be obtained and combined with studies (permanently and from time to time) by 29% of the surveyed students. The greater popularity of unprofessional work among students compared to professional work is understandable, as it is easier to find such work at a young age and without a completed relevant education. However, these percentages indicate that combining higher education and work is important for today's students. According to the survey, less than a quarter of today's students are not interested in working while studying in higher education (22% are not interested in working in their field of study, and 24% are not interested in working outside their field of study). On the other hand, 35% declare a desire to work in their field of study, and 23% say they plan to get a non-field job while studying.

According to the results of the $\chi 2$ independence test, we can see the influence of the course students are studying on their practice of combining study and work. With confidence at the level of statistical significance of 0.01, we can say that the older the students are, the more they are likely to combine study and work, regardless of whether it works in their field of study. Similarly, we can observe the influence of the format of the actual study on whether students practice work-study at the level of statistical significance of 0.01. It is important to note that the highest percentages of students who practice work-study are among those who study in a mixed format (60% say they have experience working outside their speciality and 41% have experience working in their speciality). Among distance learners, 57% of respondents work outside their speciality, and 35% have a professional job. The lowest number of those who combine study and work is among full-time students - 36% of respondents have experience working outside their speciality, and 25% work in a job related to their future profession.

In summary, it should be noted that such educational practices as combining higher education and work are important for many students. Despite the differences described above in courses and formats of actual learning, the proportions of students who declare the importance of gaining work experience during their studies are pretty significant. Interestingly, 25% of students said that they had studied less in the last year because they had to work due to the difficult financial situation in their families.

We present data on modern students' full-time and distance learning assessments to reinforce the conclusion about the importance of combining study and work. According to the results of the survey, 60% of the students surveyed named the ability to combine study and work as one of the most important advantages of distance learning (and almost mirroring this, 63% of respondents consider the obstacle to combining study and work as one of the key disadvantages of full-time study).

Thus, combining study and work in the context of modern Ukrainian society is becoming an important and largely habitual practice for students. Given this, higher education institutions, in our opinion, should

take into account such realities and help students who understand the importance of their development as potential professionals not only in terms of passive knowledge acquisition but also in terms of their active application, especially when it comes to their future profession. It should be noted that in today's society and highly competitive labour market, students with work experience will be more competitive than those without. Students who have combined study and work often look more responsible and mature in the eyes of potential employers. This is primarily true for those who have found a job in their field of study, but it is also true for those with any work experience. Since combining study and work is often a significant challenge for these students, higher education institutions should organise learning for them differently. According to the categories of this study, it is about the need to legitimise what is habitualised within the contemporary student environment at the official level.

One of the options for organising education in higher education may be distance education, which could be introduced as an alternative way of obtaining higher education. Distance education could likely replace the current part-time education system, which needs to be reformed for various reasons. It is known that such initiatives are already being discussed and promoted. We believe full-fledged distance education can replace part-time education to be as equivalent to full-time education as possible. Distance education, in our opinion, should, similarly to full-time education, last for a whole semester, not with significant breaks (as in the current part-time education), should take into account the individual characteristics of each student, which is much easier to organise in a distance format than in the format of individual study schedules, which are often quite conditional. Therefore, the organisation of distance education as a full-fledged form of higher education could partially solve the current difficulties and, as a result, help those students who have important reasons to study online. Work itself, especially regarding professional development, can be an important factor for many students who want to be successful. Society and the educational community must understand that distance education is not an inferior or less prestigious form of higher education (as is often said about current distance learning) but a real alternative for some students.

Another option would be a full-fledged blended education system that combines online and offline formats. Such an education could be relevant for motivated students who can thoroughly study and carry out some other activity important for self-realisation (non-formal education, work, etc.). As of today, the blended learning format is used in some, usually senior, courses. This is often negatively perceived by younger students, who believe they could also study in a mixed mode. It is not uncommon for both students and teachers to try to organise blended learning without authorisation. In order to avoid such unfair practices, we believe blended learning can be officially introduced as a separate form of education, which will be different from traditional full-time and modern distance learning. However, it is important to understand that blended learning must be completely innovative in the Ukrainian higher education system. Blended learning would have to go beyond distance lectures and classroom practical classes. This education format should include a much larger component of independent work of students than is currently the case. This requires additional research both from the point of view of the student and teaching communities and from the point of view of educational experts.

Thus, according to the study results, we record different educational practices that are habitualised mainly among modern Ukrainian students. In Fig. 4, we can see that the percentage of students for whom these practices were "very useful" and "useful" mostly exceeds 50%, which gives grounds for considering these practices as common for modern students.



Figure. 4. Useful social practices from the point of view of modern students. Source: Created by the authors

It should be noted that these educational practices are relevant in the context of contemporary Ukrainian society primarily because of their combination. Formal education (despite numerous discussions about the crisis of higher education) continues to be an important habitualised educational practice. However, formal education in the socialisation processes of modern students is constantly combined to some extent with other practices - non-formal education, extracurricular activities and work experience - which, as the data show, have become commonplace for many students and, accordingly, require a new level of legitimation. In other words, a modern student is positioned as a versatile personality with broad socially oriented needs for whom formal education is insufficient. Forming such personalities is possible in different educational formats, among which modern students in Lviv choose a mixed format (43%). Given such demands, modern students should be able to obtain not only pure formal higher education but also other alternative opportunities that would meet the needs of a modern young person for versatile development. Such alternatives can be fully organised in both blended and distance education.

Thus, returning to the author's research idea about the links between legitimation, formed by theoretical ideas, and habitualisation, within which these ideas are put into practice, we can state that this scheme works on the example of modern higher education. The results of the study have given grounds to demonstrate the links between the theoretical ideas of modern students in Lviv about higher education and their habituated educational and related practices in two directions - individually oriented and socially oriented. In other words, the codification of new educational practices occurs through combining two discourses - the individualisation of higher education and its inclusion in the broader social context. This combination gives grounds to believe that modern higher education is important for young people today, but it requires a significant level of individual approaches and complementation with related social practices. Higher education institutions are no longer completely self-sufficient in the modern world. New social orders, including those in education, call for diversity, versatility and attention to individual needs, and distance learning has already become a recognised part of these orders. Therefore, the sooner the modern higher education system can adjust to the requirements of the new social order, the more successful and relevant it will be. The adopted law [15] provides for these transformations, but these transformations still need to be legitimised at the level of public consciousness and habituated in educational practices.

A study of the opinions of students of higher education institutions in the rear of Lviv, conducted in February-March 2024 utilising an online survey, has given grounds to identify several important educational practices that broadly indicate the spread of new social orders to the field of modern higher education in Ukraine.

First, modern students of Lviv higher education institutions confirm the relevance of the traditional full-time form of education but prefer such a new educational practice as blended learning. Another new educational practice, distance learning, has gained fewer supporters than full-time and blended learning but has gained much support. While junior students consider full-time education a priority, distance education is preferred by senior students. Blended learning has proved to be a favourite among students in general. Thus, according to students in Lviv, higher education can function in three formats - full-time, distance and blended - which allows us to conclude that modern students combine old and new educational practices in their perceptions.

Second. The results of the study characterise the student community of Lviv as a rather heterogeneous environment, characterised by contradictory, often ambivalent positions (some students need more elective courses, some consider the opportunities provided sufficient; some are guided by personal interests when choosing courses, some by professional interests, etc.) In some cases, there is a dissonance between theoretical ideas and habituated practices (military training is required, but very few people take it; English is required, but academic mobility is not interesting, etc.) Such heterogeneity and contradictions, the norm for new social orders, require new educational practices to expand the possibilities for shaping individual educational trajectories.

Third. According to the study results, modern students go beyond the higher education institution in their needs, trying to integrate into society through related practices combined with formal education practices (non-formal education, combining education and work, extracurricular activities, etc.) All these practices related to education vary depending on the gender, course or format of study, but they are generally interpreted by contemporary students of Lviv higher education institutions as an important part of their student socialisation. This gives grounds to talk about a new type of student, for whom formal higher education is an important part of their personal development but is optimally implemented in combination with other related practices.

Fourth. Thus, the study of the habitualisation of educational practices of modern students in the rear of Lviv creates the conditions for distinguishing three full-fledged formats of the educational process in the system of modern higher education in Ukraine, including one traditional full-time education and two new educational practices - distance and blended learning. The functioning of these educational formats, according to the perceptions of modern students, takes place in the context of two discourses - individual educational trajectories and attempts to integrate into the broader society by combining formal education with related educational practices. These new educational practices are habituated mainly at the level of modern students' perceptions, which necessitates their further legitimisation at various micro, meso and macro levels.

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1st Edition

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Suggested citation:

Pachkovskyy Y., Chernysh N., Kovalisko N., Demkiv O., Lapan T., Khymovych O., Kalynyak O., Kozachenko O., Marusiak T., Savchynskyi R., Kudrynska H. (2026). Ukrainian Society: Creating New Social Orders in Conditions of Wartime: monograph. Edited by Y. Pachkovskyy and O. Demkiv. Szczecin: Centre of Sociological Research. DOI: 10.14254/ 978-83-979051-3-9/2026